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The “enhancement debate,” i.e. the academic discussion of  whether 
physical or cognitive enhancement of  human beings is ethically acceptable 
or not, is often conducted with no real engagement between the protagonists 
on each side. Each side has its own set of  stock arguments, counterarguments 
and cases (often hypothetical or highly idealised), that in most cases fail to 
engage in any meaningful way with the ethical concerns that motivate the 
other side in the debate. As a reader of  the enhancement debate it is easy to 
become bored because the debate does not really seem to be moving, each 
side just reiterating its original position with ever more elaborate arguments.
This book is, however, a fine example of  how the debate can move 
forward if  the protagonists were really interested in engaging with the question 
of  whether or not a particular set of  enhancements should be promoted, 
allowed or prohibited in a particular context. The approach taken by Silvia 
Camporesi is casuistic in the sense that it takes its point of  departure not in 
some idealised philosophical question, e.g. is there a sustainable distinction 
between treatment and enhancement, but in concrete, specific cases. The 
analysis is philosophically rigorous, but each of  the cases she considers is 
considered with due attention to all its complexity and to how it is similar, but 
yet different from other enhancement cases. This is definitely not armchair 
philosophising, but applied ethics as it should be done.
Reading the book leads to the interesting realisation that a casuistic approach 
does not preclude new and generalisable conclusions. In analysing a range of  
cases in detail Dr. Camporesi shows that we can reach firm conclusions about 
many aspects of  the individual cases, although these conclusions often have 
to be more carefully caveated than is usually done in the enhancement debate. 
But we can also reach some new, interesting and quite general conclusions, 
for instance about the need to allow research into enhancement technologies, 
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even in cases where we are still unsure whether a particular type of  putative 
enhancement is ethically acceptable or not.
A further major contribution that is made in this book is to press the point 
that it is a mistake to conflate ethical and policy issues. Our ethical analysis may 
in the best of  circumstances provide us with an answer to whether a particular 
enhancement that is desired by a particular person, in a particular context is 
ethically acceptable or not, but it rarely provides an answer to the question 
of  what policy a particular society should adopt in relation to enhancements 
of  this particular type. The equality implications of  promoting, allowing or 
prohibiting a particular type of  enhancement may for instance vary immensely 
between different societies and this will have implication for what policy a 
society ought to pursue. So, as soon as we move from the level of  ethics to the 
level of  policy we need not only to engage with ethical theory but also with 
political philosophy. Camporesi expresses this much better than I can:
Moral disagreement in society will persist, no matter what philosophers may 
say. This, however, is not an indication of  the fact that all views in the field 
of  philosophical ethics are equivalent or incommensurable. Rather, it high-
lights how, in practice, we face a political problem. The pressing questions 
posed by genethics do not allow us simply to acknowledge that moral posi-
tions differ and then nonconfrontationally to concern ourselves with iron-
ing out internal inconsistencies. Instead, they demand a shift in focus from 
classical philosophical ethics to the realm of  political philosophy. (p. 130)
If  every participant in the “enhancement debate” took this to heart, and at-
tended to the messy reality of  introducing any kind of  enhancement in the 
real world to the same degree as the author of  this book, then there would 
perhaps be hope that we could move on from the current stylised, stale and 
largely hypothetical non-debate that characterises the literature.
Introduction
 
This book addresses the issue of  human enhancement technologies and their 
ethical permissibility through a contextual, bottom up approach based on case 
studies. The first chapter familiarizes the reader with the various definitions 
that have been put forward for “enhancement,” and the arguments for and 
against. I then argue in favour of  a neutral definition of  enhancement, where 
decisions regarding the ethical permissibility of  a technology are reached 
through a contextual analysis aimed at spelling out the values intrinsic in the 
particular practice under scrutiny. In this first chapter I also discuss the value 
of  distinguishing therapy versus enhancement, and distinguishing absolute 
versus positional goods. 
In the second chapter I discuss the application of  genetic technologies 
from the “bench” (of  research on molecular biology) to the “bedside” of  
clinical trials and experimentation on pharmaceuticals on human beings.
The first part of  the chapter is dedicated to the discussion of  the objections 
to genetic technologies aimed at enhancing human capacities and grounded in 
the resurgence of  “eugenics.” To answer the question of  whether the ethical 
objections against classical eugenics are still valid against contemporary practices 
of  reproductive genetic choices, I provide a comparative historical overview 
of  eugenics in the UK, the US and Scandinavia. I divide the analysis into three 
periods: (a) “classical eugenics” (1883-1945), (b) “modern eugenics,” from the 
end of  WW II to the first ‘test tube baby’ (1946-1978), and (c) “contemporary 
eugenics,” from the birth of  Louise Brown until now (1978-2014). I highlight 
similarities and differences between the three periods and address whether the 
ethical objections to classical and modern eugenics are still valid today, and 
whether the contemporary use of  genetic technologies in the reproductive 
context to choose children’s traits can still be called “eugenics.”
The second part of  the chapter is dedicated to the analysis of  how pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis and other genetic screening techniques at the 
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level of  the human embryo raise a conflict of  interest between parental re-
productive freedom and children’s right to an open future and capacity for 
self-determination. As a case study, in section 2.4 I analyse the case of  parents 
choosing to have deaf  children through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. 
The expressivist argument that deafness (or other traits traditionally considered 
disabilities) is “only a difference” is the focus of  my analysis in section 2.5. 
 Genetic technologies impact all stages of  life, and in Chapter 3 I analyse 
how genetic technologies, and in particular gene transfer, are translated direct-
ly from the molecular genetics/biology laboratory to “track & field,” where 
they are applied with the goal of  enhancing athletic performance, without 
going through the clinical research step of  experimentation of  the pharma-
ceuticals in human subjects.
In the first part of  chapter 3 I discuss gene transfer technologies applied 
to enhance athletic performance. In section 3.1 I analyse the scientific and reg-
ulatory context of  gene enhancement, and the basis on which these technolo-
gies are classified as doping. In section 3.2 I focus my analysis on a real case 
study of  a gene transfer clinical trial aimed at raising tolerance to pain, and 
discuss its ethical permissibility in therapeutic and professional sport contexts. 
In the second part of  the chapter (sections 3.3 and 3.4) I discuss the ethi-
cal and social implications of  the recent boom in direct-to-consumer genetic 
tests to scout out children’s athletic potential. In the last section of  the chapter 
I discuss performance enhancement and anti-doping governance, and analyse 
the arguments in favour of  introducing doping in sport under a controlled and 
regulated medical context.
In Chapter 4 I discuss how professional sport has always been a laboratory 
for biomedical and biotechnological innovations regarding the treatment of  
injury, recovery and training regimes aimed at maximising athletic performance. 
It is a matter of  fact that elite athletes are willing to accept high degrees of  risk 
in exchange for the expected performance enhancing benefits derived from 
the consumption of  prohibited substances, from extreme training regimes or 
diets, or the experimentation upon themselves of  innovative surgeries. In the 
first part of  the chapter (sections 4.1 and 4.2) I propose an alternative way to 
alter the practice of  high-performance athletes discounting future health for 
current performance, without engaging in doping under a medical context, 
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by shifting the burden of  proof  from the regulator to the sponsors, as well 
as providing the right incentives in the form of  penalties to the sponsors 
whose athletes test positive. In order to do so, I borrow arguments from 
similar discussions in the sustainability field, where it has long been proposed 
to shift the burden of  proof  of  damaging the environment from regulators 
to the private sector. In the second part of  the chapter (section 4.3) I tackle 
the broader question of  an ethical justification for research on enhancement, 
which has been surprisingly neglected in the bioethical debate on enhancement. 
I argue that even though particular technologies aimed at enhancing human 
capacities are not ethically permissible in a certain context, it does not follow 
that research on enhancement per se is also not ethically permissible.
Moral disagreement in society about bioethical issues will persist, no mat-
ter what philosophical arguments are put forward. The pressing questions 
posed by enhancement technologies do not allow us simply to acknowledge 
that moral positions differ and then nonconfrontationally concern ourselves 
with ironing out internal inconsistencies in the different positions. Rather, 
they demand a shift in focus from classical philosophical ethics to the realm 
of  political philosophy. This is what I try to do in the last section of  chapter 4, 
where I lay the groundwork for the discussion of  how to shift the debate on 
enhancement technology from the ethical level to a policy level, and to analyse 
the role for the philosopher in the enhancement debate.
All throughout this work I adopt a casuistic approach to ethics, meaning I 
deploy different tools from deontologist, consequentialist, principled and vir-
tue-ethics approaches, trying to bring the debate on enhancement out of  the 
stalemate caused by the polarization of  proponents and opponents. In each 
case I discuss the ethical permissibility of  a technology in a way that could be 
used to inform policymaking, and to bring forward the bioethical debate in a 
productive way. I am aware that the work contained in this book is preliminary 
and incomplete, but I hope that it will point towards interesting and original 
directions for research, for example at the intersection of  sport, medicine and 
ethics, where traditional ethical issues in clinical research are exacerbated in 
the context of  elite sports; and in the field of  reprogenetics, where the use 
of  genetic technologies to choose children’s traits traditionally considered a 
disability force us to rethink the debate surrounding enhancement and the 
resurgence of  eugenics.
Chapter One
Framing the ethical debate on enhancement 
technologies
1.1 What we talk about when we talk about “enhancement”
Because human enhancement apparently involves altering human nature, it 
is meant to be the sort of  thing that sends shivers down the spine. For ‘trans-
humanists,’ these are frissons of  excitement at the thought of  a wonderful 
new world of  genetically and pharmaceutically augmented, ultra-intelligent, 
long-lived super-persons. For conservatives such as Leon Kass, our shivers 
are the wise verdict of  an instinctive moral repugnance. (Lewens 2009, 354)
It is a matter of  fact that the mere mention of  the possibility of  “human 
enhancement” is able to spark a vehement discussion between staunch 
supporters and vocal opponents.. Lewens is quite right in putting the finger on 
the instinctive opposite reactions triggered by the newest possibilities opened 
by biomedical enhancements. But what exactly is so unique about human 
enhancement that is able to elicit such visceral reactions? It seems to be the 
perception that human enhancement technologies are tinkering with human 
nature, and that humans engaging with biomedical enhancements are playing 
at projects of  self-creation and self-evolution that are hubristic and may lead 
to dangerous slippery slopes. Before addressing the arguments on both sides, a 
disclaimer is necessary: both reactions described above are extreme examples 
triggered by misrepresentation of  the real scientifically feasible prospects 
of  biomedical enhancement. Often the scenarios portrayed by the media 
are science fictional, and as such will not be discussed in this work, where 
I am interested in an empirically grounded discussion of  existing or highly 
plausible enhancement technologies, with a focus on genetic technologies. As 
pointed out by Atry in the context of  genetic technologies aimed at athletic 
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performance (Atry 2012), I think it is the bioethicists’ responsibility to discuss 
real-world scenarios or scenarios which are at least plausible in the future, 
and that it is also the bioethicists’ responsibility to avoid creating “media-
like hype” around biomedical technologies, jeopardizing the ethical debate 
surrounding the same technologies. Borrowing a felicitous expression from 
American storyteller Raymond Carver,1 we need to understand what we talk 
about when we talk about “enhancement.” 
The term “enhancement” as we refer to it in bioethics has its origin in 
genetic technologies in the late 1980s, when it arose in opposition to the term 
‘therapy’ in the discussion of  cases that were considered legitimate for the ap-
plications of  gene transfer, in contrast to applications of  the same technolo-
gies which were considered illegitimate and ethically troublesome. The first 
“gene therapy” trials involved the treatment of  severe adenosine deaminase 
(ADA) immunodeficiency in 1990 at the US National Health Institutes. (Aiuti 
et al. 2009) Also known as “children in a bubble” disease, ADA is a devastat-
ing condition caused by a mutation in the ADA gene, which reduces or elimi-
nates completely the activity of  the corresponding enzyme, resulting in toxic 
levels of  the same that lead to the death of  lymphocytes (white blood cells). 
As a consequence, individuals affected lack virtually all immune protection 
and are prone to frequent and persistent opportunistic infections that can be 
life threatening. (“Adenosine Deaminase Deficiency” 2013) In the past thirty 
years, a series of  clinical trials, employing different (and safer) vectors have 
been conducted. In particular, three recent studies have demonstrated that 
gene therapy can successfully correct the disease at the molecular level, and 
lead children to live a healthy life “out the bubble” to which they had been 
confined in the past. (Aiuti et al. 2009; Gaspar 2012)
At the time of  the first clinical trials, the use of  gene transfer to treat this 
severe immunological disease was seen as a morally justifiable means, even 
though risks for the individuals were very high, because of  the severity of  
the disease and of  the absence of  alternative treatments. In parallel though, 
people started worrying about the prospect of  other uses of  gene transfer 
techniques, which would put subjects at a high risk without the same justifi-
cation as the treatment of  a life-threatening condition as ADA. Therefore, it 
1  Raymond Carver, What we talk about when we talk about love, 1981
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was initially thought that a terminological distinction (therapy/enhancement) 
could also serve as a moral distinction. (Elliott 2009) Things would not prove 
to be so easy, as we will see below. 
In what follows, I adopt the framework developed by Menuz and co-au-
thors who classify definitions of  enhancements into four main categories: the 
implicit approach, the therapy-enhancement distinction, the improvement of  
general human capacities and the increase of  well-being. (Menuz, Hurlimann, 
and Godard 2011)
The implicit approach
Authors who adopt an implicit approach would start discussing the ethical 
permissibility of  a biomedical technology that they refer to as “enhancement 
technology” without spelling out what they mean with the word “enhancement”. 
Some examples of  this method can be found in (Mansour and Azzazy 2009; 
McKanna and Toriello 2010; Sadler 2010), among others. For example, Sadler, 
discussing the implications of  enhancement technologies, while providing a 
critique of  different accounts of  the concepts of  “dignity” as used in the 
transhumanist debate, takes for granted that the technologies he discusses 
can be classified as enhancements. (Sadler 2010) Two obvious shortcomings 
with such an approach are the following: (1) that it does not acknowledge 
the complexity of  the “enhancement” concept, by assuming that all the 
people involved in the discussion are on the same page when referring to 
“enhancement,” which is usually not the case; (2) that it does not acknowledge 
the constant evolution of  social and political values, and therefore does not 
address the question of  if, and when we can stop considering a technology 
as an enhancement. For these reasons an explicit approach to defining 
“enhancement” should be preferred. Of  course, to be fair to Sadler and other 
authors who use an implicit approach, one cannot recapitulate the entire story 
of  humankind – so to say – every time one writes, but one could, and should, 
make clear at the beginning of  the text what definition of  enhancement one 
is endorsing. Without doing so, it becomes impossible to discuss or bring 
forward the debate, as the different participants in the debate may be talking 
about different things.
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Improvement of  some human capacities/abilities
According to this widely used approach (Bostrom, Nick and Sandberg, An-
ders 2007; Allhoff, Lin, and Steinberg 2010; Harris 2007; Chan and Harris 
2008), human enhancement is defined as the application of  a technology ‘to 
individuals so as to improve their body, mind or any ability beyond the species-
typical level or statistically-normal range of  functioning of  a human being.” 
(Menuz, Hurlimann, and Godard 2011)
For example, John Harris, one of  the most prominent representatives 
of  this approach, defines enhancement as “an improvement on what went 
before.” (Harris 2007) He also adds: “If  it wasn’t good for you, it wouldn’t be 
enhancement.” (Harris 2007) Bostrom and Sandberg (2007) define enhance-
ment as either a functional improvement over a “normal healthy state,” or 
as the addition of  a capacity that was not present in the human species at 
a former time point. This latter meaning of  the term enhancement is then 
considered by Bostrom and Sandberg as they see enhancements as a means to 
transcend humanity as we know it today, and to produce better specimens of  
‘transhumans.” Here is their definition:
We define an enhancement as an intervention that causes either an improve-
ment in the functioning of  some subsystem (e.g. long-term memory) beyond 
its normal healthy state in some individual or the addition of  a new capacity 
(e.g. magnetic sense). (Bostrom, Nick and Sandberg, Anders 2007, 3) 
Note that, according to this definition, an enhancement is not necessarily a 
good thing, in contrast to John Harris’ account (Harris considers the benefits 
of  an enhancement technology only in relation to the individual, and not to 
society). Bostrom and Sandberg’s definition is neutral in values. Improving 
on a human trait, or providing a new trait does not necessarily have positive 
effects on a person’s life, as pointed out by De Melo-Martin in the welfaristic 
approach described below. 
Increase in individual’s wellbeing 
This approach, which is adopted by a minority of  scholars in the enhance-
8 Camporesi
ment literature, defines enhancement as an increase on individual’s wellbeing, 
or welfare. One well-known proponent of  this value-laden account is Julian 
Savulescu:
The term human enhancement is itself  ambiguous. It might mean 
enhancement of  functioning as a member of  the species homo sapiens. 
This would be a functionalist definition. But when we are considering 
human enhancement, we are considering improvement of  the person’s life. 
The improvement is some change in state of  the person – biological or 
psychological – which is good. Which changes are good depends on the 
value we are seeking to promote or maximize. In the context of  human 
enhancement, the value in question is the goodness of  a person’s life, that is, 
his/her wellbeing. (Savulescu 2006, 324)
Therefore, Savulescu proposes a “welfarist” account of  human enhancement, 
where the enhanced state is defined as a “capability” and a capability is “Any 
state of  a person’s biology or psychology which increases the chance of  
leading a good life … .” (2006, 324) (Note that the opposite of  a capability is, 
in Savulescu’s account, a disability, which is seen as a condition that diminishes 
the chances of  an individual to lead a good life). While this approach has the 
advantage of  sidestepping the problem of  determining what “health” and 
“disease” are, and of  determining a species-typical level, it does not solve 
the problem but merely relocates it, since this approach is also based on 
other controversial concepts, namely: human flourishing, wellbeing, welfare, 
etc. Moreover, this approach runs the risk of  underestimating the social 
and cultural pressures that influence individual choices in life (see 2.1 for a 
discussion). It seems to me that Savulescu’s definition of  enhancement would 
more appropriately be referred to as “enhancement of  wellbeing,” which is 
a narrower class within all enhancements. Quite ironically, Saveluscu himself  
seems to recognize that the term enhancement is probably not the right one in 
his account. Writes Savulescu: “Enhancement is a misnomer. [emphasis added] 
It suggests luxury. But enhancement is no luxury. Insofar as it promotes 
wellbeing, it is the very essence of  what is necessary for a good human life.” 
(Savulescu 2009) As already noted, this absolutely positive connotation of  the 
term “enhancement” is problematic, as the various applications of  biomedical 
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technologies need to be spelled out and discussed contextually before they can 
be univocally classified as positive, starting from an accurate description of  the 
underlying science, and of  their context of  application. Not necessarily, and 
not in all contexts, enhancements will turn out to be good for the individual, 
or for society. As a matter of  fact, the welfaristic approach does not take into 
consideration the social and collective consequences of  the technology, but 
only the consequences of  the technology on the individual’s wellbeing.
The work by Inmaculada de Melo-Martin provides another example of  
a scholar who adopts a welfaristic approach to enhancement. In her work, 
de Melo-Martin objects to a “value-neutral” definition of  enhancement. Her 
critique is based on the need to discuss what counts as a risk, and what counts 
as a benefit before entering the analysis of  the risk/benefit ratio of  the tech-
nology, and therefore the analysis of  the value of  an enhancement technology. 
(de Melo-Martin 2010) De Melo-Martin discusses also the necessity to spell 
out the different values underlying the application of  a particular enhance-
ment technology. For example, de Melo-Martin writes that some enhanced 
capacities, e.g. the ability to read a book in a very short time, or enhanced nu-
merical abilities, should not necessarily be considered enhancements, as they 
are not necessarily related to a more fulfilled life, or to an enhanced wellbeing 
of  the individual. (de Melo-Martin 2010) In this sense, an improvement on the 
human capacity for reading, or on human mnemonic skills for example, would 
not necessarily constitute an enhancement, unless we had decided a priori that 
such increases in human capacities were good things per se, on the basis of  an 
intrinsic value – for example – in being able to read very fast. 
The therapy-enhancement distinction approach
Finally, in this widely used approach (Daniels 2000; Resnik 2000; Wolpe 2002; 
President’s Council on Bioethics (U.S.) 2003) human enhancement is defined 
through its goal and the condition or state (i.e., “disease” versus “health”) 
that it aims to modify. This approach suggests that the “therapy/enhance-
ment” distinction can function to draw a moral boundary between ethically 
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permissible and ethically impermissible technologies (as it was also thought 
when the term “gene therapy” was coined, as illustrated before). In order to 
be valid, such an approach needs to be based on a clear definition of  “health” 
and “disease,” both concepts which are a source of  considerable controversy. 
In addition, through such an approach interventions aimed at prevention and 
traditionally considered part of  the scope of  medicine (such as vaccination) 
should be viewed as enhancement. As I explain in the next section, I find this 
approach only of  limited usefulness, due to the inherent problematicity of  the 
therapy/enhancement distinction itself. Nevertheless this approach can still 
have a limited though useful role in the enhancement debate, as also illustrated 
below.
1.2 On the therapy versus enhancement distinction
 
As we have seen above, the term “enhancement” itself  was coined in opposi-
tion to the term “therapy” in the context of  gene transfer technologies. Con-
sequently the analysis of  this opposition is a necessary premise to understand 
the debate about enhancement technologies. The distinction was initially 
thought to possess an intrinsic moral significance, and to be able to demarcate 
ethically legitimate applications of  gene transfer technologies from other not 
so legitimate applications. But it would not prove to be so easy. In this section 
I discuss the meaning and moral significance of  the therapy/enhancement 
(T/E) distinction and the role it can play in the enhancement debate.
Norman Daniels spells out a limited defence of  the T/E distinction. A 
US-based scholar, Daniels acknowledges that often this distinction is invoked 
in his country to demarcate conditions for which an insurance reimbursement 
would be appropriate (would-be treatments) and for conditions for which it 
would not (would-be enhancements). Such an approach could be generalised 
to include countries with a public health system or a mixed public-private 
health system between medical services for which the patient has to pay (even 
if  partially), and services for which the patient does not have to pay. Writes 
Daniels:
The treatment-enhancement distinction draws a line between services or in-
terventions meant to prevent or cure (or otherwise ameliorate) conditions 
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that we view as diseases or disabilities and interventions that improve a con-
dition that we view as a normal function or feature of  members of  our spe-
cies. The line drawn here is widely appealed to in medical practice and medi-
cal insurance contexts, as well as in our everyday thinking about the medical 
services we do and should assist people in obtaining. (Daniels 2000, 309)
In this sense, the distinction is therefore closely related to the concept of  
“medical necessity” that is used in legislation in the US and Canada. (Hurley et 
al. 1997) Daniels offers the examples of  children with a short stature receiving 
or not reimbursement for growth hormone (GH) therapy on the basis of  the 
different underpinning causes of  their short statures (only those children with 
a genetically identified cause would receive growth hormone therapy). Dan-
iels raises the question whether such a differential reimbursement is justified, 
on the basis of  the T/E distinction that forces us to treat “relevantly similar 
cases” in dissimilar ways. According to Daniels, providing treatment and re-
imbursement to a child, with short stature because of  a genetic cause, and not 
providing treatment (or not reimbursing) to another child, who is short either 
because of  idiopathic conditions, or only because he “feels short” in society, 
is unfair. 
An excursion into the history of  GH can be enlightening to better under-
stand how the ethical dilemma of  the scarcity of  GH and the application of  
a scarce hormone have been justified in our recent past, in an occurrence of  
a problem that is still present today in many other instantiations. In the US 
in the 1950s, “stunted growth” was the term used to refer to “short stature,” 
while “pituitary dwarfs” was the term used to refer to individuals deficient in 
the GH, and “primordial dwarves” to individuals affected by achondroplasia. 
(Rothman and Rothman 2003) In the ‘50s the only way to obtain GH (at that 
time known as “somatotropin”) was to collect it from the pituitary glands 
of  human cadavers. To overcome this scarcity, the US National Institutes of  
Health set up the National Pituitary Agency (NPA) at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity in Baltimore to appeal for organ donation. (Rothman and Rothman 
2003) How did the discourse surrounding the T/E distinction play out to 
decide how to allocate a scarce resource? Initially, GH was allocated only to 
“pituitary dwarves,” but vocal patient advocacy requests pressed the NIH to 
allocate it also to other individuals affected by stunted growth, independently 
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of  the genetic causes of  the short stature. Note that it was never demonstrated 
that the administration of  GH in individuals who had no GH deficiency was 
successful in the long-term to obtain an increase in stature, although it was 
demonstrated that they were able to cause spurts in growth in the short term. 
(Rothman and Rothman 2003) 
In 1985, the problem of  the scarcity of  the resource was solved when the 
San Francisco Bay area biotech company Genentech started the synthetic pro-
duction of  GH (hence, the legal dispute with the University of  California, San 
Francisco (UCSF) about the primacy of  the invention, that was settled with 
$200M from Genentech to UCSF in 1999 (Barinaga 1999)). The discussion of  
the ethical use of  the hormone was quenched by its new availability, but not 
extinguished, as a lingering one remained on to what extent patients’ requests 
should be satisfied: what was, if  any, the threshold under which an individual 
was to be classified as “short”? In 1990, after many decades of  use, the NIH 
set up a clinical trial aimed at testing once and for all the efficacy of  GH 
for short, non-hormone deficient children. (Tauer 1994) The results of  the 
study, though, were not able to provide a clear-cut answer to the question be-
cause of  the way it had been designed (Rothman and Rothman 2003) and the 
trial concluded that if  a “condition” (e.g. short stature) caused “unhappiness, 
psychological pain, and social disadvantage,” then interventions to remedy it 
should be considered “cures,” irrespective of  the biological cause. (Rothman 
and Rothman 2003) 
As put by Daniels, 
It is not because there is something biologically distinctive about Johnny’s 
condition, as opposed to Billy’s, that has led us to describe Johnny as having 
a disease and Billy not. Rather, our “social construction” of  disease draws on 
a set of  values that happens to have singled out Johnny rather than Billy in 
this way. … Pointing to the line between treatment and enhancement is not, 
then, pointing to a biologically drawn line but is an indirect way of  referring 
to valuations we make. (Daniels 2000, 313) 
Finally, in July 2003, the FDA accepted the NIH recommendation and ap-
proved GH for “otherwise medically normal but unusually short” children. 
(LATimes Associated Press 2003) As pioneer US plastic surgeon Max Thorek 
  Framing the ethical debate           13
was reported saying in the 1930s, anything that could raise “the quotient of  
patient happiness” was to be considered a legitimate medical task. (Rothman 
and Rothman 2003, 143) Hence, we could say that the conclusions of  the 
NIH trial and FDA recommendation in 2003 represent an example of  how 
the NIH constructed the category of  “short stature” in order to respond to, 
and accommodate, patients’ and society’s requests.
Returning to the T/E distinction, what can we say about its significance, 
after we have argued that it is unfair to use it to demarcate “medical necessity” 
from “non-medical” necessity? 
As have seen in this section, the use of  the T/E distinction as a demarca-
tion line between what is reimbursable and what is not reimbursable is prob-
lematic both from an historical and philosophical point of  view. Daniels has 
also objected to the notion that the natural baseline of  the T/E distinction, 
according to which disease and disability are departures from species-typical 
functioning, has an ontological importance. Even though I agree with Daniels 
that the distinction does not hold an ontological value, practically it has be-
come a “focal point for convergence in our public conception of  what we owe 
each other by way of  medical assistance or healthcare protection” (Daniels 
2000, 318), at least in North America. As such, there is a “primary rationale 
for including medical services in a healthcare benefit package” (Daniels 2000, 
319) on the basis of  this distinction. We can then conclude that, from a practi-
cal point of  view, the T/E distinction can play a prima facie role in demarcating 
the scope of  medical necessity from other scopes. This prima facie role though 
needs to withhold scrutiny and may not constitute a sufficient reason to treat 
similar cases (e.g. short children) in dissimilar ways.
While the distinction traced by Daniels is an interesting one and illustrates 
one of  the concrete applications of  labelling a technology as an “enhance-
ment” or as “therapy,” it is not one of  the central concerns of  this work fo-
cused mostly on genetic technologies. A more helpful perspective for the kind 
of  contextual analysis and the choice of  technologies that I carry out in this 
work is offered by David Resnik in relation to genetic technologies (2000), to 
whom I turn to conclude this section.
Genetic interventions are of  particular interest for the scope of  this work, 
which includes analysis of  how they can be applied to enhance athletic perfor-
mance in a professional sports context (sections 3.1 and 3.2), to decide what 
14 Camporesi
kind of  children to bring into the world (sections 2.4 and 2.5) and to scout out 
children’s talents (section 3.3). Resnik (2000) argues that the T/E distinction 
does not mark a firm boundary between ethical and unethical genetic inter-
ventions, for which it was originally conceived:
Perhaps the most popular way of  thinking about the moral significance of  
the therapy-enhancement distinction is to argue that the aim of  genetic ther-
apy is to treat human diseases while the aim of  genetic enhancement is to 
perform other kinds of  interventions, such as altering or “improving” the 
human body. Since genetic therapy serves morally legitimate goals, genetic 
therapy is morally acceptable; but since genetic enhancement serves morally 
questionable or illicit goals, genetic enhancement is not morally acceptable. 
(Resnik 2000, 366)
According to Resnik, this way of  thinking of  medical genetics is flawed as it 
based on at least two questionable assumptions, namely: (a) that we have a 
clear and uncontroversial account of  health and disease (and we do not); and 
(b) that the goal of  treating diseases is morally legitimate, while other goals are 
not. I concur with Resnik’s analysis, but would also like to add that even if  we 
were able to provide uncontroversial accounts of  health and disease, it would 
not follow from this that using biomedical technologies for therapy purposes 
would be ethically justifiable, while the use of  biomedical technologies for en-
hancement purposes would not. I am sympathetic with Resnik when he writes 
that what is really ethically troubling with the use of, for example, steroids by 
athletes, is not the non-medical use of  steroid (or another pharmacological 
enhancer), but the violation of  a value intrinsic to the context of  professional 
sport. (Resnik 2000) In a paper co-authored with Mike McNamee and includ-
ed in a slightly revised version in this work in section 3.2, we reach conclusions 
regarding the ethical permissibility of  the same technology (gene transfer to 
raise the tolerance to pain) in two different contexts by spelling out the values 
intrinsic in the two contexts/practices. It is on the basis of  this discussion at 
the level of  values that we argue that the same technology could be ethically 
justified in one scenario and not in the other, not on the basis of  the fact that 
it would count as a non-medical use of  medicine.
Finally, another brief  historical excursus could be useful to debunk the 
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arguments that the use of  biomedical technologies to enhance human capac-
ities falls outside the scope of  medicine, as it is argued by some scholars. The 
US pioneer surgeon, Max Thorek, provides a case in point. Already in the 
early 1900s Thorek was performing “therapeutical gonadal implantations,” 
(i.e., testicular transplants collected mostly from apes and monkeys, but also 
from human cadavers) with the aim of  elevating the level of  male hormones 
(and supposedly, their sexual function) in the recipients, mostly older patients. 
(Rothman and Rothman 2003, 142–44) Between 1912 and 1923, Thorek per-
formed more than one hundred testicular transplants at the American hospi-
tal in Chicago. Thorek was also among the first surgeons to perform breast 
reduction and abdominal excisions (the antecedents of  contemporary plastic 
surgery practices), and in 1942 he wrote one of  the first textbooks on plastic 
surgery. As a doctor, Thorek is a particularly interesting figure as his arguments 
could be seen as anticipating some of  the arguments used today in support of  
pharmacological enhancement. Thorek was also a convinced champion of  the 
legitimacy of  enhancement within the scope of  medicine, as he was convinced 
that “raising the quotient of  patient happiness” was a legitimate medical task 
to pursue within the purview of  the doctor’s remittal. (Rothman and Rothman 
2003, 142–44) The following quote exemplifies his thinking: “If  the child can 
be given shapely ears he should have them for his own happiness; and who is 
to deny him that happiness if  he can attain it?” (Rothman and Rothman 2003, 
143), and also: “If  surgery can restore happiness and enjoyment of  life to an 
individual who has lost them, that is as strong a justification for its use as res-
toration to health.” (Rothman and Rothman 2003, 143) Therefore, as it can be 
shown from this example and many others (for a more extensive analysis see: 
Scripko 2010), the arguments that enhancement technologies do not belong to 
the proper scope of  doctor’s profession are historically inaccurate.
1.3 Absolute versus positional goods
The last feature of  the definition of  “enhancement” that remains a matter 
of  controversy and that I am going to analyse in this work hinges on the 
distinction between absolute and positional goods. Objects that everybody 
can enjoy without risking that they lose their status of  “goods” belong to 
the former category. Examples would be music and sunlight. To the latter 
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category belong goods that only some individuals can enjoy before the objects 
lose their status of  goods (e.g. height. Not everybody can be tall; there must 
be at least one short person around. Note that the definition itself  of  being 
“tall” and of  other positional goods changes over time, hence the importance 
of  the discussion of  enhancement in the context of  society where they are 
found, as the same technology may count as an enhancement in one society 
but not in another). Goods that belong to this latter category are referred to 
as “positional goods” exactly as they place the individual who enjoys them in 
a better position with respect to another person. In other words, they offer a 
competitive advantage to the individuals. 
Performance enhancing drugs in sport are one of  the classical examples 
of  instruments which provide a positional good, such as strength, endurance, 
resistance to pain, etc. Athletes seek to use performance enhancing drugs as 
they aim to obtain that competitive advantage which, even if  marginally small, 
could secure them victory in competition. As I discuss in section 3.5 and more 
at length in (Camporesi and McNamee 2014), it is highly problematic that the 
demonstration of  the performance enhancing effects of  substances included 
in the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Prohibited List is not a necessary 
criterion for inclusion in the List, but that only the potential to do so is suf-
ficient (in combinatin with one of  two criteria: potential risk to the athlete’s 
health and the violation of  the spirit of  sport) for inclusion of  a substance in 
the List. (WADA Code 2009)
John Harris views enhancements as absolute rather than positional good. 
He writes: “I defend them because they are good for people not because they 
confer advantages.” (Harris 2007, 29) And elsewhere, he writes: “It follows 
[from the fact that something is good for people] that there can be nothing 
morally wrong with human enhancement per se.” (Chan and Harris 2008) 
This view, while attractive in its simplicity, risks being too simplistic, as Harris 
neglects other important, and often fundamental factors, that underlie the rea-
sons why individuals may seek enhancements. These factors are, more often 
than not, rooted in the search for a positional advantage, in the pressure of  
peers, of  society, of  the market, or in a combination of  these factors. Note 
that these are the very same factors that result in social inequalities of  ac-
cess to enhancements. The problem of  differential access to enhancement 
technologies is one of  the most pressing ethical issues opened up by the new 
  Framing the ethical debate           17
technologies. John Harris, by stating that an enhancement is always “good for 
people” (understood as the individual), is neglecting this fundamental issue 
of  social inequalities. Indeed, not all things that on a subjective account can 
considered good for the individual are good also for society, nor are all things 
that can be considered on a subjective account “good for people” allowed in 
society (think of  gambling, or of  recreational drugs). 
There are other values to take into account when judging the permissibil-
ity of  enhancement technologies, apart from the personal freedom to pursue 
one’s goals in life, and the relations and implications of  the pursuit of  one’s 
own goals in life, including enhancements, need to be put in perspective with 
the pursuit of  others’ goals in a society, and with social values such as equality, 
and fairness.
Finally, it must also be noted that in practice it is very difficult, if  not im-
possible, for a single enhancement technology to possess only characteristics 
that would qualify it as an absolute good, or only characteristics that would 
qualify it as a positional good. As a matter of  fact, most enhancement tech-
nologies possess a combination of  the two characteristics (see also the point 
on “relative ends” in the following section). DeGrazia offers the example of  
a technology that would give a person a “sunnier disposition” (while it is not 
clear from his writing how the technology could achieve the result of  giving a 
person a sunnier disposition; probably DeGrazia has in mind Paxil, the anti-
depressant mentioned earlier in his work): 
One might think that an enhancement that gave someone a sunnier disposi-
tion, making his life more enjoyable, would provide a major intrinsic benefit 
without conferring any positional goods. One might think again. For a sun-
nier disposition offers competitive advantages to politicians, salespersons, 
real estate agents, and others whose job performance is improved by extro-
version and the expression of  optimism. (DeGrazia 2012, 129)
The absolute value of  a biomedical enhancement acquires therefore an instru-
mental, external value when put in the context of  the workplace. Plausibly, 
this would be a very common occurrence for most (if  not all) biomedical 
enhancements. In addition, DeGrazia notes how positional goods create con-
cerns about coercion, fairness (of  access to the technology), and possibly con-
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cerns about collective self-defeat: if  everybody, or at least a substantial portion 
of  the population, had access to positional enhancements, they would lose 
their character of  conferring an advantage to others. These are all issues that 
need to be taken into account when assessing the ethical permissibility of  an 
enhancement technology in a particular context, as I aim to do in the following 
chapters. Before moving on to the analysis of  the ethical and social implications 
of  particular technologies though, let us briefly review the arguments that have 
been put forward and against enhancement in the bioethical arena.
 
1.4 Arguments in favour and against enhancement
One of  the frequently raised objections to biomedical enhancements is 
that they alter human nature. This is what sends “shivers” – borrowing the 
expression from Lewens (2009), quoted at the beginning of  this chapter – 
down the spine of  some of  the most vehement opponents of  biomedical 
enhancements, including Leon Kass (Kass 2002) (former Chair of  the 
President’s Council on Bioethics under President George W. Bush), Francis 
Fukuyama (Fukuyama 2003), and Juergen Habermas (Habermas 2003). These 
authors embrace what Allen Buchanan refers to as “normative essentialism”: 
they believe it is possible to derive substantive moral rules from reflection on 
human nature. (Buchanan 2009) 
Habermas argues that interventions aimed at modifying human nature will 
affect “the necessary presupposition for being-able-to-be-oneself  and [affect] 
the fundamentally egalitarian nature of  our interpersonal relationships.” 
(Habermas 2003, 13) For Habermas, what is most unsettling in genetic 
interventions and other kinds of  biomedical interventions aimed at shaping 
oneself  or others is “the fact that the dividing line between the nature we are 
and the organic equipment we give ourselves is being blurred.” (Habermas 
2003, 22) This blurring, he continues, shifts the “line between chance and 
choice,” and by doing so “affects the self-understanding of  persons who 
act on moral grounds.” (Habermas 2003, 28) Moreover, this blurring of  
the categories of  the “nature we are” and the “organic equipment” we give 
ourselves might “change our ethical self-understanding as a species” and give 
rise to a “novel, curiously asymmetrical type of  relationship between persons.” 
(Habermas 2003, 42) The possible blurring of  the categories is especially 
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problematic for Habermas as it touches upon “a necessary condition for an 
autonomous conduct of  life and a universalistic understanding of  morality.” 
(Habermas 2003, 48) 
At the other end of  the spectrum of  the debate, we find scholars who 
are so excited about the prospect of  biomedical enhancements that they get 
“frissons” – borrowing again from Lewens (2009) – down their spines. Ex-
amples include (Bostrom, Nick and Sandberg, Anders 2007; Harris and Chan 
2008; Chan and Harris 2008; Savulescu 2009) among others. As we have seen 
above, John Harris is among the strongest proponents of  enhancements tout 
court. According to Harris, “Enhancing human capacities is taken to be a self-
evident good,” and we have a moral duty to enhance ourselves, and our chil-
dren. I have already explained why I think that such an indiscriminate positive 
connotation of  enhancement is incorrect. Here I would like to show why 
the discourse being used by Harris and other proponents of  enhancement to 
frame new technologies as the most recent instantiation of  the human pursuit 
for progress is only partially accurate.
In Harris’ view, enhancing human capacities must be seen as the pursuit 
of  a linear progress without any apparent end, along the lines of  the Olym-
pic motto of  “citius, altius, fortius” (swifter, higher, stronger). Harris dismisses 
worries about enhancement as being a function of  unnecessary anxiety, or 
of  a similarly unnecessary fear of  hubris. Together with the pursuit of  “a 
linear progress,” Harris stresses the continuity between those kinds of  en-
hancements that humans have resorted to in the past, and the new kinds of  
biomedical enhancements that are being developed today, thanks to the most 
recent advances in biotechnology and biomedicine. But, as Erik Parens cor-
rectly pointed out: “It would be a mistake to think that the new biotechnolo-
gies are just more of  the same. We should give up the arguments that take the 
form, ‘we’ve always done it.’” And, while “It is true that we have always sought 
enhancement …, arguments from precedent glibly excuse us from thinking 
about how new means to achieve old ends make a moral difference.” (Parens 
1998, 13) I agree with Parens on this point: it is not the existence of  other es-
tablished practices in society that justified the emergence of  new ones which 
can be “brought back” to the former ones. Quite on the contrary, I think that 
it is the emergence of  the latter ones that makes us reflect on what has been 
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going on up to now. Note that this is also the approach I adopt (Camporesi 
2013) that is included in this work in a revised form as section 3.4, where I 
discuss the application of  genetic technologies to scout out a child’s talent, 
which are by some scholars justified on the basis of  other older and already 
established child-rearing practices.
Carl Elliott also discusses how enhancement technologies offer us new 
means to achieve old ends. Elliott outlined five problems created by these new 
means, which I will discuss in turn, pointing out how they relate to the analy-
ses carried out in this work. (Elliott 2009)
Cultural complicity
The problem of  cultural complicity was first identified by Margaret Olivia 
Little, who acutely pointed out how the demand for certain technologies is 
construed by cultural forces that can be harmful to the individual engaging 
in those practices. (Little 1998) Some examples include cosmetic surgery to 
delete markers of  ethnicity, in order to enhance conformity to accepted Eu-
ropean standards, or cosmetic surgery for breast or anti-ageing for women. 
What Little sees as problematic in these practices is that “by giving in” to these 
cultural forces, and agreeing to have a surgery, the underlying problematic 
societal trends become reinforced, and the individual who engages in them 
becomes in turn culturally complicit with them. (Little 1998) Cultural com-
plicity seems to go hand in hand with the contemporary widespread rhetoric 
of  self-fulfilment and the pursuit of  happiness. As described by Scripko, the 
pursuit of  wellbeing permeates the daily lives of  Americans and enhancement 
technologies are seen as a way to liberate one’s considered “authentic self,” in 
a narrative where “being well becomes being one’s optimal self  in the society 
in which a person lives.” (Scripko 2010, 294). Erik Parens also writes on this 
point:
Given that many of  us Americans feel it is our duty to pursue self-fulfillment 
and happiness on the Weberian model, it would not be surprising if  many of  
us came to feel it our duty to use any means possible to fulfill it – including 
taking drugs like Prozac. (Parens 1998, 12)
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Partly for this reason, much of  the work in this book is focused on the US 
system. I also find that many of  the ethical issues related to enhancement 
technologies are first applied in the US context, where the regulatory system 
is more liberal, and then find in the UK and Europe. For example, direct-to-
consumer (DTC) genetic tests to scout out children’s talents, which I analyze 
in chapter 3, first occurred in the US, while potential customers are not limited 
to US citizens. The analysis of  the ethical permissibility of  choosing to have 
deaf  children through preimplantation genetic diagnosis (section 2.4) is also 
based on real-world case studies based in the US.
Relative ends
The problem of  relative ends was already introduced in section 1.3, when 
discussing the intertwining of  the qualities of  absolute and positional goods 
in the same biomedical technology. The fact is that enhancement technolo-
gies are mostly sought by individuals because they can confer a positional 
advantage, not because they are “intrinsically” good. In other words, individu-
als seek enhancement technologies with the hope of  gaining a “competitive 
advantage.” Elliott discusses this in relation to the use of  performance-en-
hancing drugs in sports, but it can be applied also to cognitive enhancements, 
and in general to all biomedical technologies. I analyse the problem of  relative 
ends in my discussion of  the use of  gene transfer technologies applied to raise 
one’s own tolerance to pain in endurance races, in section 3.4. 
The role of  the market
The third problem identified by Elliott relates to the role of  the market, in 
particular to the US widespread practice of  advertising enhancement tech-
nologies online or on television through DTC advertising. This has been pos-
sible in the USA since 1997, when the FDA relaxed its restriction on DTC 
advertising for prescription drugs. In particular, this is especially prevalent 
for anti-depressant drugs, and more recently for DTC-genetic tests to predict 
children’s talent (discussed in sections 3.3).
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Authenticity and human nature
The problem of  authenticity relates to the narratives of  restoration to 
“authentic self ” through antidepressants that individuals resort to. These 
kinds of  “restitution narratives,” as put by Elliott (2009), are very common 
for people who consume antidepressants. Elliott points out how “restitution” 
may not be the most appropriate term since the self  to which individuals say 
they are aspiring to never existed before, but was only desired or wished for. 
Note that the same language of  authenticity can also be used for opposite 
ends (even though less frequently) by individuals who claim that they do not 
feel like themselves anymore when on antidepressants. Erik Parens (2005) has 
written extensively on the idea of  “authenticity” and the role it playes in the 
discussion of  enhancement technologies. (Parens 2005) Parens argues that the 
idea of  “authenticity” is at the centre, even if  not explicitly, of  the debate on 
enhancement. He defines it as follows:
While the idea of  authenticity has a complex history, the core of  it is that we 
are authentic when we exhibit or are in possession of  what is most our own: 
our own way of  flourishing or being fulfilled. To be separated from what is 
most our own is to be in a state of  alienation. (Parens 2005, 35)
According to Parens, the current polarization of  the debate on enhancement 
harks back to the different understandings of  authenticity that the opponents 
and supporters of  enhancement take as implicit assumptions of  their argu-
ments. These different understandings grow out of  what Parens refers to as 
two different ethical “frameworks,” where by framework he means a “constel-
lation of  commitments that support and shape our responses to questions 
about, among many other things, new enhancement technologies.” (Parens 
2005) One framework revolves around the concept of  “gratitude,” while the 
other revolves around the concept of  “creativity.” Parens points out how in 
the academic debate scholars often shift from one framework to the other, 
without being explicit about the meaning of  “authenticity” they refer to. As I 
already pointed out at the beginning of  this chapter, it is particularly important 
to spell out the values underlying the arguments when discussing a particular 
technology, especially when moral judgments are used to inform policy.
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Arguments against enhancements and rooted in concerns about threat to 
human nature must be distinguished in two sorts of  concerns: a) the threat 
of  surpassing (or crossing the boundaries of) human nature; and b) the threat 
of  altering human nature. Francis Fukuyama is one of  the most prominent 
scholars opposing enhancement technologies, on the basis of  an essential no-
tion of  human nature that would be undermined by the application of  such 
technologies. (Fukuyama 2003) This essentialist notion of  human nature is 
problematic on several fronts, as pointed out by David DeGrazia and Allen 
Buchanan among others. While recognizing that there are “powerful theoret-
ical and intuitive grounds for maintaining that certain kinds of  things have 
essential features” (DeGrazia 2012, 79) (“humanity” being one of  those), De-
Grazia objects to the argument that there is a single characteristic that could 
be regarded as the basis for the special moral status possessed by human be-
ings. In other words, it is a logical fallacy to assume that human nature must 
involve “essential” features, where an essential feature for a kind of  thing is 
defined as a “feature that X necessarily has in order to be a member of  that 
kind.” (DeGrazia 2012, 80) Buchanan also debunks these arguments on other 
grounds: (a) that on all plausible accounts, human nature “contains bad as 
well as good characteristics and there is no reason to believe that in every case 
eliminating some of  the bad characteristics would so imperil the good ones as 
to make the elimination of  the bad impermissible”; and (b) that modifications 
of  human nature will not affect our ability to make judgment about the good. 
(Buchanan 2009) I concur with the analyses by DeGrazia and Buchanan, as 
I do not think that biomedical interventions would change the way a person 
perceives herself  more than other kinds of  parental intervention early in life 
already shape the kind of  person one is and perceives herself, (see also: Camp-
oresi 2013) nor that human nature should be considered as the basis of  the 
moral self-understanding of  a person. I also do not think that genetic inter-
ventions, only by virtue of  being genetic, are substantially different from other 
kinds of  interventions and that as such they should deserve a special scrutiny 
(See: Kakuk 2008 for a full argument debunking the genetic exceptionalism 
perspective, and my co-authored paper: Camporesi and Maugeri 2011 for a 
critical discussion of  the exceptionalist perspective of  the “Beyond Therapy” 




The final problematic issue of  the enhancement debate identified by Elliott 
(2009) is exemplified by the following argument: enhancement technologies 
will in any case be pursued “somewhere else” in the world, once the 
technologies that enable them are developed, notwithstanding their moral 
justification. Consequently, as noted by Nicholas Agar, discussions on the 
ethical permissibility of  enhancement technologies run the risk of  falling prey 
to “technological determinism” about morality, defined as the certainty that 
“moral pronouncements have little or no influence on which technologies 
will be developed and who will use them.” (Agar 2008, 170) Examples of  
technological determinism abound, as there will always be the possibility that 
some researcher “somewhere else” in the world, where regulation is more 
lax, could put in place and implement the biomedical technologies. Think for 
example of  the claims, then revealed spurious, made by Panos Zavos and 
Severino Antinori in the early 2000s about reproductive cloning being achieved 
in Cyprus (Camporesi and Bortolotti 2008). Another example is China, where 
the regulation for gene therapy are more lax than in the US or Europe, and 
where gene therapy products have been approved that have been not elsewhere. 
(Wilson 2005) Many more examples can be found in (Meghani 2011; Cohen 
2012), who discuss the migratory fluxes of  medical and reproductive tourism 
and their multifaceted ethical and social implications.
It would therefore seem that we are left with a kind of  “biotechnological 
catch-22,” borrowing from Joseph Heller2: on the one hand, if  we deliberate 
that research on the latest development of  biomedicine is ethically impermis-
sible, it would seem plausible to speculate that somebody else in another part 
of  the world will still develop it, irrespective of  our deliberation. If  that were 
the case, we will be left with the not easy question of  what to do with the 
products of  knowledge developed elsewhere with means that we have deemed 
ethically impermissible (for example, the results of  clinical trials developed 
without a proper informed consent in developing countries, or on prisoners, 
or on other ethically problematic situations etc.). On the other hand, we could
2  Joseph Heller, Catch 22, 1961.
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recognize the fact that somebody else, elsewhere in the world, will develop the 
technology, and we could renounce deliberating in this field of  morality. 
That the latter choice would be a very dangerous move since a consistent 
application of  this reasoning would lead to a retreat on morality on many 
different fronts. To escape this biotechnological catch-22, we must recognize, 
with Agar, that “technological determinism does not render morality 
redundant. There will almost certainly never be a human society in which 
there is no murder – but this is no reason not to pass moral judgements on 
murderers.” (Agar 2008, 172) 
Having concluded that a philosophical analysis of  enhancement technol-
ogies (and therefore, this work!) is not completely useless, I will now proceed 
to the contextual analysis of  case studies. In the next chapter I turn to the con-
sideration of  arguments against genetic technologies aimed at enhancing indi-
viduals and future generations, analysing first the arguments based on parallel-
isms with the old eugenics, and then proceeding to consider the application of  
genetic technologies to choose what kind of  children to bring into the world.
Chapter 2 
From bench to bedside: Genetic technologies 
to choose children’s traits
2.1 Genetic enhancements and the ghost of  eugenics
Arguments against enhancement often single out genetic technologies as be-
ing especially unacceptable from a moral point of  view. Both pre-implantation 
diagnosis (PGD) and other genetic techniques aimed at human enhancement, 
along with screening programs to detect genetic disorders, have prompted a 
fierce controversy about the resurgence of  eugenics. The recent writing by 
Gina Maranto exemplifies this current trend:
The unfortunate truth is that discredited ideas never do die, they just rise 
again in slightly altered forms – witness eugenics. Despite the horrors per-
petuated in its name, including forced sterilization and the Holocaust, the 
eugenic impulse is with us still. One of  the forms it takes is schemes for 
“improving” offspring through the selection and manipulation of  embryos.
(Maranto 2013)
In the first part of  this chapter I shall address the question of  whether such 
parallelisms between the Holocaust, old eugenics and contemporary modes of  
improving ourselves and others through genetic technologies are indeed justi-
fied. Before discussing whether contemporary modes of  genetic interventions 
can be classified as eugenics, and what if  anything is wrong with that, it is nec-
essary though to take a step back to understand what we talk about when we 
talk about “eugenics,” borrowing again from Raymond Carver. In order to do 
that, I will provide a brief  comparative historical overview of  eugenics in the 
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UK, the US and Scandinavia, dividing the analysis into the periods: a) “classi-
cal eugenics” (1883-1945), b) “modern eugenics,” from the end of  WWII to 
the first “test tube baby” (1946-1978), and c) “contemporary eugenics,” from 
the birth of  Louise Brown until now (1978-2014). I will highlight similarities 
and differences between the three periods and address whether the objections 
to classical and modern eugenics are still valid today.
Classical eugenics: 1883-1945
I refer to “classical eugenics” as the first period, spanning from the invention 
of  the word in 1883 by Francis Galton to the end of  the WWII. The word 
“eugenics” comes from Greek, meaning “good in birth.” As the story goes, 
after reading Charles Darwin’s The Origin of  Species, Galton concluded that 
much human misery was caused by physical problems that were passed down 
through generations. Galton thought that such misfortunes could be avoided 
through positive measures aimed at actively encouraging reproduction among 
the “fittest,” and actively discouraging reproduction among the less fit. On 
May 16, 1904 Galton delivered a lecture on the definition, scope and aims 
of  eugenics before the British Sociological Society at a meeting held at the 
School of  Economics and Political Science in London (currently the London 
School of  Economics). While Galton defined eugenics in positive terms as 
“the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities 
of  a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage,”(Galton 
1906, 35) he did not necessarily exclude negative measures in the interest of  
the State and the British race. At that time, fear of  “race degeneration” and of  
the decline of  the British Empire from the international scene were pervasive.
Indeed, Galton considered efforts aimed at improving race a duty both 
for the individual and the society. He wrote, “An enthusiasm to improve the 
race is so noble in its aim that it might well give rise to the sense of  a religious 
obligation.” (Galton 1906, 25) He also thought that the means justified the 
end, as he wrote: “We are justified in following every path in a resolute and 
hopeful spirit that seems to lead towards that end.” (Galton 1906, 33) For Gal-
ton, eugenics was to become a new, “orthodox religion,” as he was persuaded 
that “few things are more needed by us in England than a revision of  our 
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religion, to adapt it to the intelligence and needs of  the present time.” (Galton 
1906, 59) The creed of  eugenics for Galton was founded upon an active idea 
of  human evolution towards the “fittest race.” In this regard, his assumptions 
are not that different from those contemporary scholars who view biomedical 
enhancements as a means to evolve the human species. (John Harris 2007; A. 
Buchanan 2011) Wrote Galton more than one hundred years ago: “Evolution 
… assumes an infinitely more interesting aspect under the knowledge that the 
intelligent action of  the human will is, in some small measure, capable of  guid-
ing its course.” (Galton 1906, 69) Writes John Harris today: “This ‘progress 
of  evolution’ is unlikely now to be achieved accidentally or by letting nature 
take its course. If  illness and poverty are indeed to become rare misfortunes, 
this is unlikely to occur by chance. … It may be that a nudge or two is needed: 
nudges that will start the process … of  replacing natural selection with delib-
erate selection, Darwinian evolution with ‘enhancement evolution’.” (Harris 
2007, 11)
Galton developed a biometric model of  heredity that he thought could 
be “harnessed to a social programme for improving the human breed through 
selective mating.” (Porter 2011, 272) As said above, “selective mating” included 
both positive and negative measures to prohibit the less fit from breeding, and 
as pointed out by Dorothy Porter (2011), the combination of  degenerationist 
fears about the decline of  the British race, and the fear of  Britain’s imperial 
decline, were the two main movers of  the eugenics movement in the UK, 
which aimed at reversing the degenerative trends. (Porter 2011) The Victorian 
poor were considered a “race apart,” and described as “noticeably smaller, 
stunted, scrawny, potbellied, rickety, scarred by sores, scrofulous lumps, 
and other stigmata of  sickness.” (Porter 2011, 220) An Interdepartmental 
Committee was set up in England to investigate the question of  physical 
deterioration, and in 1904 produced a report reaching the main conclusion that 
physical deterioration was due to bad environment and unsuitable nutrition, 
and not to biological causes of  the degeneration of  race. Notwithstanding the 
conclusions of  the 1904 report, the fear of  racial degeneration continued to 
propel eugenics policies in England. In 1907, the British “Eugenics Education 
Society” was founded, with declared both positive and negative aims: to 
“protect the unborn” through selective breeding, to perform “voluntary 
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sterilization” on the lower classes and to “sequestrate the unfit.” In the UK, 
negative eugenics measures targeted mainly the feeble-minded with sterilisation 
or life-long detention (sequestration) upon certificates by two doctors. This 
was made possible after the enactment of  the Mental Deficiency Act in 
1913. To note also that a bill introduced by Winston Churchill advocating 
compulsory sterilisation of  the “feeble minded and insane classes” was only 
narrowly defeated in 1913. (Porter 2011) After this failed attempt, England 
was never to pass laws restricting marriage among the “feeble-minded” nor 
compelled their sterilisation.
Contrary to what happened in England, forced sterilisation laws were 
passed in over thirty states in the US before 1914, the first being Indiana 
in 1907. (Lombardo 2011) In the US, fear of  “degeneration” focused on 
immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as non-whites. The 
Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, published by the US Eugenics Record 
Office in 1914, provided for the sterilisation of  quite a large category of  
individuals including the “feeble-minded, insane, criminalistic, epileptic, 
inebriate, diseased, blind, deaf, deformed, and dependent.” (Lombardo 2011) 
Then in the 1920s the ideas stemming from Mendel’s genetics came into 
fashion, and with them came a long list of  ill-defined traits, collected under 
the category of  “feeble-mindedness.” This in practice became a “catch-all 
category linked more closely to poverty and perceived anti-social behaviour 
than to organic mental deficiency” (Dorr 2011, 164). Again as pointed out 
by Dorothy Porter, in the US eugenics was “moulded by racialist concerns 
with immigration restriction” (Porter 2011, 273), and its principles were 
incorporated in the Immigration Restriction Act of  1924, which set quotas 
limiting the immigration of  “biologically inferior” ethnic groups into the 
United States (South and East Europe) and favoured the entrance of  Northern 
Europeans. (Suter 2007, 907) In 1908 the American psychologist Henry H. 
Goddard introduced the I.Q. test, which then became the main barrier for 
immigration at Ellis Island.1 Keeping “unfit” immigrants from entering the 
US though was not  considered a sufficient measure by eugenicists. Negative 
eugenics measures aimed at reducing or prohibiting the reproduction of  the 
1 For a powerful and historically accurate fictional representation, see also the 
2006 movie “Golden Door” directed by Emanuele Crialese.
30 Camporesi
feeble-minded were also soon implemented. In the United States, Charles 
Davenport, who would become the leader of  American eugenics, received 
funds to study evolution from the Rockefeller Society and develop therein a 
eugenics research facility, a testament to the close link between the two. The 
Rockefeller Society was to fund eugenics studies worldwide, including in Italy in 
the aftermath of  the 2nd World War, as described in the next section. In 1909, 
Davenport became the Director of  the Cold Spring Harbor laboratory on 
Long Island, where in 1910 he founded the Eugenics Record Office. (McCabe 
and McCabe 2011). Between 1968 and 1972, the US witnessed a sterilisation 
explosion: approximately 2 million Americans underwent sterilisation in 1973 
alone (!) (Dorr 2011, 175) Often the sterilisations were performed under the 
guise of  other abdominal surgeries on unaware patients, in what became 
known as “Mississippi appendectomies.” (Roberts 2000) 
In a similar fashion to what happened in the UK, the US definition of  
“fitness” and “unfitness,” and consequently the targets for sterilisation, corre-
sponded to American’s white Protestant racial class prejudices (the contempo-
rary “WASP,” or “White Anglo-Saxon Protestant” racial, political and religious 
ideal). Baby contests and “fitter families” contests were very popular up to the 
1970s all over the US in state fairs, and some have persisted even up to today, 
as represented in the 2006 movie “Little Miss Sunshine” directed by Dayton 
and Faris, and in the TV series “Toddlers & Tiaras.” (Dorr and Logan 2011, 
70–71) 
Note also that in the US, in the State of  California, a recent report pub-
lished by the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) uncovered the sterilisa-
tion of  more than 50 female inmates from 2006 to 2010 without required state 
approvals. (Johnson 2013) The report made the headlines and stirred a fierce 
controversy about the resurgence of  eugenics, which is still on-going. (Easley 
2013; Ohlheiser 2013; Sullivan 2013)
Sweden and all of  Scandinavia witnessed extensive sterilisation efforts just 
before WWI. These were prompted by eugenic policies that emerged together 
with the emergence of  the social welfare state, which developed in Scandinavia 
in the 1930s and ‘40s. (Broberg and Roll-Hansen 2005) For this reason, the 
authors have coined the term “welfare state eugenics” for Sweden, Norway, 
Finland and Denmark, where eugenics policies were seen as a subclass of  a 
broader “Hygiene Movement,” precursor of  the much praised North European 
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model of  the welfare state. (Broberg and Roll-Hansen 2005) The interests of  
the individual were to be subordinated to the interests of  the state. At that 
time, as already pointed out for the US and the UK, there was a pervasive 
worry about “race degeneration,” and the declining birth rate, which pushed 
forward the eugenic policies. In all of  Scandinavia sterilisation was used mainly 
for the mentally retarded (elsewhere referred to as the “feeble-minded”), and 
to a lesser extent as a measure of  social control towards alcoholics, criminals, 
and in general – along similar lines to what happened in the US – towards 
all those who were considered incapable of  caring and raising children. This 
category was stretched to include the category of  “exhausted mothers,” or 
mothers who had too many children and were considered incapable of  raising 
them/taking proper care of  them. (Broberg and Roll-Hansen 2005) 
Notably, there was very little public opposition, and in general very little 
if  any debate about the passing of  eugenic and sterilisation laws in Scandina-
vian countries. Contrary to what happened in Sweden, in Denmark, Norway 
and Finland, sterilisation remained on a “voluntary” basis, but even if  direct 
coercion was not used, many other indirect means of  coercing people to con-
sent to sterilisation were used, including having sterilisation as a condition 
for leaving an institution, getting an abortion, or getting permission to marry. 
As already pointed out, these measures were not so distant from the sterilisa-
tion laws implemented in the US up to the 1970s. Also to note that there was 
no revision of  the eugenics laws after WWII, and that the social democratic 
belief  in eugenics continued up to the 1950s. In Sweden (the most ‘efficient’ 
of  Scandinavian countries for the implementation of  eugenic laws, with up to 
60,000 people sterilised between 1935 and 1975) the Sterilization law were not 
abrogated until as recently as 1975. (Broberg and Roll-Hansen 2005) Eugenics 
policies and laws were also implemented in Italy, though they were aimed  at 
a different ideal of  individual, which incorporated Fascist and Catholic values 
in fertility and privileged quantity versus quality of  offspring. (Cassata 2011) 
It is also of  interest to note that US eugenic laws, and not Germany laws 
as it might be thought, served as a model for the eugenic laws of  Sweden 
and Norway. (Dorr 2011, 172) As already noted, Sweden had compulsory 
sterilisation and both in relative and absolute number it was the most efficient 
Scandinavian country at implementing sterilisation. The uniqueness of  
Scandinavian countries in this regard is that they were the only countries in 
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Europe (with the addition of  Estonia) that introduced sterilisation laws in 
the 1930s under democracies. In Scandinavia, sterilisation was considered a 
rational and humane solution to the problem of  economic and social burden 
of  mentally retarded individuals. (Broberg and Roll-Hansen 2005) The welfare 
state helped many, but also demanded much from few.
Therefore, as this brief  excursus shows, eugenics policies were the results 
of  different ideological motivations and backgrounds in Scandinavia, Ger-
many, UK, Italy, and the US. In England, eugenics policies focused more on 
“class” than on “race,” and as pointed out by Dorothy Porter, eugenics was 
“less a scientific pursuit than a lay, voluntary movement of  social reform in the 
Edwardian period.” (Porter 2011, 250) Always in England, the “unfit” were de-
fined within the conventional terms of  Victorian-British reform movements, 
where the social status combined with the considered anti-social behaviour 
produced the “unfitness” that included many different categories of  deviant 
behaviour (alcoholism, promiscuity, criminality …) which were understood as 
hereditary traits and lumped together with other traits, such as mental retar-
dation, considered to be “inborn errors of  metabolism.” (Porter 2011, 250-1) 
Note that this is not so different from the definition of  the “unfit” in the US 
on the basis of  the “WASP” model (“White Anglo-Saxon Protestant”).
In Sweden, however, race biology became a subject of  institutionalised 
scientific research before the WWI, and eugenics was considered a “philosophy” 
of  social efficiency that fitted easily within a welfare ideology. Of  the more 
than 60,000 sterilisations that were performed in Sweden between 1935 and 
1975, over 90 % were performed on women, although it must be noted that 
these numbers do not distinguish the sterilisations that were performed as 
a measure of  contraception for women who had no other means. Swedish 
proponents of  eugenics were very vocal in stressing the difference of  Swedish 
eugenic laws with German eugenic laws, claiming that in Sweden sterilisations 
were not compulsory except for the “legally incompetent.” But, as noted above, 
other less coercive means were abundant, and sterilisation was a precondition 
for release from an institution, and for getting married.
As a matter of  fact – and as exemplified in the quote by Maranto reported 
at the beginning of  this chapter – it is the atrocities committed in Germany in 
the name of  racial purity which gave the contemporary bad connotation to the 
word “eugenics.” Such a view though is over-simplistic, as highlighted below. 
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Indeed, in the US before the war the term “eugenics” started being used in 
the broader acceptation of  “good,” not only “good in birth.” As pointed out 
by Lombardo, the term “encompassed everything from proud pedigrees to 
healthy births” and over time the invocation of  “eugenics” became so wide-
spread that in 1915 a Chicago politician run for alderman as ‘the eugenics 
candidate.” (Lombardo 2011, 45)
After WWII the use of  the word deliberately fell out of  practice. But note 
though that even now in the US, only a handful of  states have repealed their 
eugenics sterilisation laws, although the programs have been inactive for years 
in those states that still retain such legislation. (Suter 2007) 
Modern eugenics: 1945-1978
I refer to “modern eugenics” as the period that goes from the end of  WWII to 
the first “test tube-baby,” Louise Brown, who was born in Oldham, England, 
on July 25, 1978. (BBC News Health 2013) In those thirty years the practice 
of  genetic counselling was established. Initially, it was limited only to prenatal 
screening for a very limited number of  genetic diseases that present an 
abnormal karyotype (i.e. number and form of  chromosomes), such as Down 
syndrome and other trisomies. During this period, choices concerning the 
future genetic pool shifted from the State to the parents, whose aim in using 
genetic screening was to have children free from disabilities. The nascent 
practice of  genetic counselling was seen as a way for prospective parents 
to exercise autonomy and reproductive freedom. There was no mention of  
race or the community’s gene pool in the prospective parents’ decisions, but 
in the great majority of  cases there were parents who wanted to give their 
children the best chance in life possible. (Suter 2007) The parents’ decision 
was exercised without coercion from the State, even though as noted by Suter 
some kind of  social pressure aimed at avoiding severe disabilities was still 
present. (Suter 2007)
Italy played a prominent role in the international scene of  medical genetics 
in the second post-war period, as it was chosen as the seat of  the International 
Congress of  Genetics in 1948. (Cassata 2011) This decision placed the Italian 
Society of  Genetics and Eugenics (SIGE) in a prominent position in relation 
to the international scientific community. In Italy, as pointed out by Francesco 
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Cassata, applied medical genetics to the new practice of  genetic counselling 
was generally presented – and received – as a worthy and modern form of  
eugenics. (Cassata 2011) In Italy, the spectre of  Nazism did not obfuscate 
in the public’s eyes the possibility of  a good eugenics based on “irrefutable 
scientific knowledge, and above all, conducted with liberal, non coercive 
methods.” (Cassata 2011, 304) Italian eugenics during the second World 
War indeed differentiated itself 2 from the Nordic measures of  eugenics by 
encompassing a natalist approach to population policies supported by the 
Fascist regime. This approached favoured “quantity” versus “quality” of  the 
Italian race, and supported the power of  a “regenerative eugenics” through 
the values of  fertility and prolificity in contrast to the “conservative eugenics” 
of  Anglo-Saxons or Germans which aimed at the sterlisation or elimination 
of  “defective” individuals. (Cassata 2011)
Milan became the new capital of  eugenics after the second World War: 
the first Italian genetic counselling centre was established at the Milan State 
University in 1946, and two years later the first public, “municipal eugenic 
counselling centre” was also established at the Milan Policlinic. (Cassata 2011, 
309) The two centres were working primarily with premarital counselling for 
thalassemia and other kinds of  microcytic anaemia which are endemic in Italy, 
especially in Sardinia and in other isolated regions of  the country, as healthy 
carriers (heterozygous for the mutation) had from an evolutionary standpoint 
an advantage by being more resistant to malaria than the homozygous individ-
ual. (Luzzatto 1981) In 1954, the Rockefeller Foundation already mentioned 
above financed research conducted by a group based in Rome and aimed at 
tackling “the eugenic aspect of  the microcythemic problem, the establish-
ment of  official registers of  persons carrying this gene, marriage counselling 
in some form.” (Cassata 2011, 324) Even Pope Pius XII intervened, publicly 
advising in favour of  the necessity of  premarital counselling, but advising 
against marriage prohibition based on genetic incompatibilities, as genetics 
“could not regard the human being in the same way as any other animal and 
vegetable species,” meaning that human beings had inviolable rights (including 
the right to marry, and to have children) that – and this was presumably the 
2 SIGE officially withdrew its membership from the International Federation of  
Eugenic Organisations in 1932.
  From bench to bedside           35
implicit comparison underlying the Pope’s statement – Mendel’s peas did not 
have. (Cassata 2011, 328, 342)
As correctly noted by Suter though, even if  parental decisions in this sec-
ond phase were “voluntary,” they were still taking place within a normative 
context biased towards prophylaxis (Suter 2007, 923), and prospective parents 
could very well feel societal pressure regarding the use of  genetic technologies:
All of  these factors – advancing technologies and cultural norms – may 
exert a coercive effect on individuals’ reproductive choices. As the American 
Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs has stated, the 
most likely risk today is not “overt eugenics” or “government imposed con-
straints on marriage and reproduction” but instead that the aggregate result 
of  individual choices creates societal and cultural norms which substantially 
influence or limit the scope of  autonomous decision making in regard to the 
use of  genetic technology. (Suter 2007, 936)
In general, though, it can be said with a reasonable degree of  confidence that 
during this second phase genetic counselling strived toward an ideal of  “non-
directiveness,” advising but not directing – keeping in mind the limits of  this 
in practice – prospective parents. Moreover, the actions of  the parents were 
always aimed at bringing into the world children free from disabilities. As we 
will see, this was going to change in the current era of  eugenics, as the choice 
of  which traits parents were able to screen for was also expanding, and with 
it the motivation of  the parents for using genetic technologies for selective 
reproduction..
Contemporary eugenics: 1978 to now
This period in eugenics, beginning with the birth of  the first test tube baby Louise 
Brown in 1978 and continuing to today can be considered as “contemporary 
eugenics,” though in section 2.2 I will argue that a more appropriate term 
for this period would actually be “eligogenics.” This period comprises the 
use of  various assisted reproduction techniques or AR techniques (such as 
in vitro fertilization or IVF, and intraplasmic sperm injection or ICSI) for 
couples having problems conceiving, and, from 1989 on, the possibility of  
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pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) in certain countries, depending on 
regulations. The motivations behind the couples’ decisions are initially similar 
to those present in the second period, but people now have many more tools 
to exercise their reproductive freedom and to choose what kind of  children 
they want to bring into the world.
The year 1989 represented a landmark year not only for the fall of  Berlin 
wall and the lifting of  the Iron Curtain, but also because it was the year when 
the first babies who had been selected as free from a genetic condition using 
PGD were born. UK scientists Alan Handyside and Robert Winston used this 
technique to select embryos free from cystic fibrosis, adrenoleukodystrophy 
(a severe neurodegenerative disorder due to the accumulation of  fatty acids in 
the neurons) or X-linked mental retardation. (Handyside et al. 1992) 
PGD encompasses a series of  different methods aimed at testing the em-
bryo for genetic conditions, and it involves the removal of  a single cell at the 
stage of  blastomere from the 6 to 8-cell embryo stage using a fine glass needle 
to puncture the zona pellucida (i.e., coat) and aspirate the cell. (SenGupta 
and Delhanty 2012) As PGD is technically more challenging than IVF, it is 
estimated that only a couple of  thousand babies around the world have been 
born following PGD, against an estimated more than 5 million children fol-
lowing IVF (up to 2012). (Harper et al. 2012) PGD is currently offered at only 
eight centres in the UK, all of  which are fertility clinics licensed by the Brit-
ish Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA). The list of  the 
conditions available for screening for PGD is also constantly updated, and in 
2012 it was altered to include only conditions deemed particularly severe. The 
entire list of  licensed conditions for PGD can be found on the website of  the 
HFEA and is periodically revised. (HFEA 2013) 
PGD is prohibited in several countries, including Austria and Switzer-
land, and permitted with very strict limitations in Germany and Italy. (Soini 
2007) In Germany, PGD was completed prohibited until recently, when on 
July 11, 2011, the Parliament passed a law allowing couples to resort to PGD 
to screen embryos only if  the parents have a predisposition to a “serious ge-
netic disease.” All applications for PGD must pass an ethics panel and couples 
are required to undergo genetic counselling. The bill outlines an exception 
to the 1990 Embryo Protection Act that bans PGD and any embryo experi-
mentation. The Act remains intact and recommends a three year jail term for 
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anyone using an embryo in a way that fails to promote its survival. (Beier and 
Beckham 1991; Gottweis 2002) Previously, PGD was banned in Germany on 
“eugenic” grounds and many people went abroad (to Switzerland, the UK, 
and France, for example) on “medical tourism” trips, which are increasingly 
common especially for reproductive purposes within Europe. (Tuffs 2011; 
Zanini 2011) The more severe limitations to any kind of  embryo manipulation 
or discard in Germany can and should be understood in their historical con-
text as a moral and political response to the heinous crimes of  the Holocaust.
In Italy, PGD has been prohibited since 2004, with the promulgation of  
law 40/2004, on different grounds from the German prohibition, but also to 
be understood historically due to the strong and persistent Vatican influence. 
(Fineschi, Neri, and Turillazzi 2005) In 2012, the European Court of  Human 
Rights (ECHR) ruled the Italian law 40/2004 unconstitutional as it “violates 
the right to respect for private and family life” guaranteed by Article 8 of  
the European Convention on Human Rights. (White 2012) In addition, the 
judges noted the inconsistency of  the Italian law, which “on one side deprives 
the applicants access to PGD and on the other authorizes them to perform 
therapeutic termination of  pregnancy when the fetus is affected from this 
same disease.” (White 2012; Turone 2012) The case was brought to the ECHR 
through the case of  Rosetta Costa and Walter Pavan v. Italy (no. 54270/10). 
(ECHR 2012) Costa and Pavan are asymptomatic carriers of  cystic fibrosis 
who were seeking AR techniques to conceive in vitro and PGD to select an 
embryo free of  the cystic fibrosis mutation. The couple complained they were 
“forced to abort” their potentially disabled child in 2010, while had they been 
able to resort to PGD earlier on, abortion would not have been necessary. 
The ECHR awarded the couple €15,000 as compensation, but denied further 
complaints of  discrimination. (White 2012) To note that, unlike a national 
court, the ECHR does not directly have the power to overturn Italian law, and 
the government has the right to appeal the decision, which the Italian govern-
ment did under Prime Minister Biondi in November 2012.3 (Maggiorelli 2012; 
Biondi 2013) As noted above, the Italian ban on PGD was part of  a law on 
assisted reproduction, introduced in 2004, which ruled that assisted reproduc-
3 A decision on the appeal has not been reached at the time of  finalizing this 
work (July 2014).
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tion was only available to infertile heterosexual couples. (Fineschi, Neri, and 
Turillazzi 2005) The same law ruled that it was illegal to freeze or destroy 
human embryos or use donated sperm and eggs. This has led to a dramatic 
decrease in the rates of  successful delivery following IVF (in vitro oocytes do 
not freeze as well as embryos and are not viable upon thawing) (Levi Setti et al. 
2013) and to a dramatic increase in the flux of  reproductive tourism from Italy 
to Spain, Switzerland and other more permissive countries in the EU. (Manna 
and Nardo 2005; Zanini 2011)
The US has a more permissive approach to PGD. As described by Mc-
Cabe and McCabe (2011), in the US there are state-based regulatory authori-
ties that establish the rules of  medical practice conduct and misconduct. In 
addition to state-based regulation, corporate incentives and pharmaceutical 
lobbies have a strong influence on the regulation of  AR and PGD clinics. 
(McCabe and McCabe 2011) What happens is that while in theory, clinics 
are allowed to provide PGD for any possible technical reason for which it is 
requested, in practice, clinicians in the US adhere to professional guidelines 
issued by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine.4 (Practice Com-
mittee of  the ASRM 2006)
In the last ten years, PGD has been used not only to avoid traits tradition-
ally considered as “disabilities,” but also to choose the sex of  the child. The 
use of  PGD to select babies of  a particular sex for “family balancing reasons” 
(an expression very broadly applied also in cases where the couple seeking 
PGD has only one child, or has no child but has a preference to conceive 
a child of  a determined sex) is permitted in the US, (Ethics Committee of  
the American Society of  Reproductive Medicine 2004) whereas it is currently 
banned in the UK by the HFEA. The HFEA allows sex selection only to 
avoid passing of  conditions that are X-linked, i.e. for which a girl, having two 
X chromosomes, would not manifest the disease but only be a carrier, whereas 
a boy would manifest the disease. (HFEA 2002; HFEA Act 2008) Many ethi-
cists (see for example McCarthy 2001; Dahl 2004; Harris 2005; Wilkinson and 
Garrard 2013) and members of  the public (Adam 2012; Connor 2013) have 
recently argued in favour of  lifting the HFEA ban. I would not be surprised 
that the HFEA were to reconsider its decision and announce a new public 
4  http://www.asrm.org/PGDSIG/ [accessed July 18, 2014]
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consultation on the topic in the next couple of  years or so.
As mentioned above, the period that I refer to as ‘contemporary eugenics’ 
differs from modern eugenics not only because the range of  traits available for 
screening with PGD has been expanding, but also because the motivations of  
parents to use PGD have been expanding too. For example, in the US, PGD 
has been used to choose for traits traditionally considered a disability, such as 
deafness or achondroplasia (genetic dwarfism). A 2006 survey of  190 Ameri-
can PGD clinics found that 3% reported having intentionally administered 
PGD “to select an embryo for the presence of  a disability.” In section 2.3 of  
this chapter I analyse the case of  choosing deafness with PGD. 
2.2 Eugenics and “Eligogenics”: past and present objections
As we have seen, the aim of  eugenics was the improvement of  the overall 
quality of  the gene pool, to be achieved both through positive and negative 
means. Reproduction was understood as an act with social consequences, not 
a private matter. The interests of  the state always took precedence over the in-
terests of  the individuals, and there was little or no discussion about it. Direct 
and less direct means of  coercion were used to restrain the mentally retarded, 
those considered feeble-minded and in general all those considered a burden 
to society from reproducing. 
Are the ethical objections against classical eugenics still valid toward mod-
ern practices of  reproductive genetic choices? The key question to address is 
whether eugenics was wrong in its very inception. Gina Maranto, quoted at 
the beginning of  this chapter, argues that wrong ideas never die, but come 
back under a new guise. (Maranto 2013) But her statement needs qualifying. 
First of  all: can the contemporary use of  genetic technologies to choose to 
have deaf  or dwarf  children still be called “eugenic”? There is no word, yet, 
to define such practices. The only attempt to date is by Isabel Karpin, who in 
2008 defined it as “negative enhancement.” Such a definition, though, seems 
to carry a negative connotation which is foreign to the intentions of  the 
parents, who consider deafness or dwarfism not to be disabilities, but “only 
“differences” that will enable their children to “enter into a rich, and shared 
culture.” (Sanghavi 2006) As an alternative, Sonia Suter (2007) suggested the 
word “neo-eugenics” for all contemporary uses of  genetic technologies to 
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choose for selective reproduction. Writes Suter:
I refer to these modern practices as “neoeugenics” to suggest that they share 
some key features with classic eugenics – e.g., the goal of  increasing “good 
birth” – and that they differ because they occur primarily at the individual, 
rather than state, level. (Suter 2007, 898) 
Therefore, in contemporary practices the locus of  what is “good” has changed 
from the level of  the state to the level of  the individual. For this reason, it 
seems to me that another word that could better capture the full spectrum of  
parental choices to also include choosing deafness and dwarfism may be “eligo-
genics,” where “eligo” comes from the Latin “eligere” or “to choose”. It seems 
to me that the term “eligogenics” better captures the narratives used by the 
prospective parents when asked why they are resorting to PGD, i.e. they are 
claiming to be “choosing” what is good for their children. In the rest of  this 
chapter I will refer to contemporary uses of  genetic technologies to choose 
traits for the offspring, including choosing traits traditionally considered dis-
abilities, as eligogenics. 
Buchanan and co-authors argue that, reprehensible as much of  the eugen-
ic program was, there is something unobjectionable and perhaps even morally 
required in the part of  its motivation that sought to endow future generations 
with genes that might enable them to live better lives. The authors also argue 
that these motivations need not to be abandoned, if  they can be pursued just-
ly. (Buchanan et al. 2000, 27-60) Suter writes along similar lines, (referring to 
contemporary eugenics practices as “neo-eugenics”): 
Neoeugenics (and even eugenics), I shall argue, is not per se problematic. 
That is, many of  the underlying goals are legitimate. This is not to say that 
neoeugenics is not problematic in practice; … The analysis, however, is high-
ly contextual, depending both on social factors and individual circumstances. 
(Suter 2007, 899)
I will now consider the objections to classical eugenics and discuss whether 
they can be applied also to eligogenics practices, following the analysis by 
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Buchanan et al. (2000), who identify five possible answers to why eugenics was 
morally wrong. (Buchanan et al. 2000, 27–60)
Replacement
The first objection identified (replacement, not therapy) is one of  the 
arguments often brought forward today by the disability rights movement 
scholars. (Parens and Asch 2000, 3-44) These scholars argue that the use of  
genetic technologies aimed at choosing “better people” is de facto devaluing 
disabled existing people, and also harming them as it takes away from them 
important resources to improve their conditions in society. This objection 
is often referred to as the “expressivist objection,” which at its core claims 
that the use of  PGD or termination of  pregnancy expresses discriminatory 
attitudes towards disabled people. However, it is important to note that not all 
disability right scholars unavoidably see PGD or other attempts at preventing 
impairments (including termination of  pregnancy) as necessarily sending 
negative messages about disabled people. According to Tom Shakespeare, 
for example, it is “not inconsistent to support the rights of  existing disabled 
people, while seeking to prevent more people from becoming impaired.” 
(Shakespeare 2013, 120) What is important, adds Tom Shakespeare, is to put 
in place measures so that the practice of  PGD, as it is practiced in a particular 
society, is not discriminatory towards disabled people. 
John Harris argues that the expressivist objection is logically flawed,  as 
choosing not to bring disabled people into the world does not logically imply 
devaluing existing people. (Harris 2005) On the basis of  this consideration 
Harris simply dismisses the objection. Holm, though, correctly pointed out 
how considerations of  logical necessity such as the one raised by Harris are 
largely irrelevant outside academia. (Holm 2008) Moreover, while it is possible 
to conceive in theory of  a “socially embedded practice of  prenatal diagnosis 
and termination of  pregnancy that did not, as an empirical fact about that 
practice, express any negative attitudes towards the disabled and could not jus-
tifiably be construed to express such negative attitudes” (Holm 2008, 25) (as 
for example in a particular context, where the problem of  allocation of  scarce 
resources did not exist), this scenario is not the one, or not even close, to the 
one we have at the moment in our society. Instead, it is plausible to say that at 
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least to some degree, our current practices of  prenatal diagnosis and termina-
tion of  pregnancy do express those attitudes that disability scholars claim. The 
burden of  proof, therefore, rests on those who claim that current practices are 
not devaluing individuals with disabilities, not on individuals with disabilities 
to demonstrate that the practices are not devaluing them. Indeed, Holm notes 
that it is justified for individuals with disabilities to draw certain inferences 
(about the devaluing of  themselves) from practices aimed at not conceiving 
individuals with such disabilities, as such inferences seem to be epistemically 
warranted (Holm 2008, 25). As an example, Holm offers the image of  burning 
a flag: people seeing a flag being burnt are justified in drawing the inference 
about the symbolic meaning attached to the action, unless explicitly stated 
otherwise (for example, it would need to be clear that those burning a flag 
were doing it within the context of  a “flag burning” festival, where flags of  all 
nationalities where being burnt, or something like that where the traditional 
symbolic meaning attached to burning a flag would be displaced by another, 
new meaning). Not only do I find myself  intuitively agreeing with Holm on 
this point, but I would also add that explaining away the devaluing of  individ-
uals with disabilities with logical necessity would probably not be sufficient, as 
Harris offers, but practical changes would be asked for. I will take a closer look 
at the expressivist arguments when I discuss DeGrazia (2012) in section 2.5.
Value pluralism
The second objection (“value pluralism”) is a very powerful objection to clas-
sical eugenics practices, which subordinated the “good” of  the individual to 
the “good” of  the state that was considered objective and univocal. In this 
sense, contemporary eligogenic practices seem to be distant from classical 
ones, as parents are able to choose subjective conceptions of  the good (e.g. 
deafness, achondroplasia), at least in countries where the approach to PGD is 
more permissive. Of  course, the possibility of  societal pressures or of  cultural 
complicity, as pointed out by Little, is not to be dismissed. (Little 1998) See 
also the discussion of  the following objection.
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Coercion
As to the problem of  coercion, it would seem easy to dismiss this concern 
at first sight as invalid in contemporary practices of  reproductive genetic 
choices. The parents claim that they exercise their autonomy, right to self-
determination and reproductive freedom in deciding whether to undergo 
IVF or PGD. Current eligogenics practices are not socially enforced, contrary 
to the positive and negative measures implemented in classical eugenics. As 
defined by Beauchamp and Childress, “coercion occurs if  and only if  one 
person intentionally used a credible and severe threat of  harm or force to 
control another.” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001) Along these lines, a 
subjective response in which individuals comply with a practice because they 
feel threatened does not qualify as coercion. I agree which Beauchamp and 
Childress, who criticize the tendency in contemporary biomedical ethics 
debate to render “coercion” an all-purpose term of  ethical criticism. Other 
terms that should be used are persuasion, where a person is led to believe in 
something through the merit of  reasons, and manipulation, where persons are 
swayed into doing what the manipulator wants by means other than coercion 
or persuasion, e.g. informational manipulation. (Beauchamp and Childress 
2001) It needs to be noted that some kinds of  current social “pressure” 
toward the best possible children could be described as forms of  persuasion 
or manipulation. To what extent does the society in which these practices 
occur persuade or manipulate parents into taking such measures – to screen 
for children who have traits that mirror the values of  that particular society? 
Robert Sparrow (2011) points out the pervasiveness of  this problem in the 
practices of  contemporary eugenics (see discussion below), and Margaret 
Olivia Little already mentioned above was the first scholar to identify the perils 
of  cultural complicity inherent in enhancement technologies. (Little 1998)
Statism
The objection of  “Statism” refers to the role of  the State in shaping individu-
als’ wishes and desires. Some distinctions though need to be drawn concern-
ing the validity of  this objection to contemporary eligogenic practices. As 
Suter pointed out, while a distinction is often drawn between eugenics and 
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what she refers to as “neougenics” insofar as the former had the interests of  
the State as its goal, while the latter has the interests of  the individuals (Suter 
2007, 946), such an analysis is over-simplifying, as a closer look reveals that in 
both periods, the motives were actually mixed. Writes Suter:
The classic rationale for eugenic sterilization included benefits to the steril-
ized individual … Just as classic eugenics was not motivated solely by social 
well-being, current and future reproductive technologies are advocated not 
solely to allow individuals to make decisions compatible with their values 
and goals. The technologies are also promoted and encouraged as socially 
responsible. (Suter 2007, 946) 
Similar arguments supporting contemporary eligogenics practices and based 
on the promotion of  a common societal good can also be found in the 
consequentialist arguments that some genetic enhancements will increase 
the total welfare of  society, by increasing the percent of  fit people in society. 
This kind of  argument leads to the discussion of  differential access to the 
enhancement technologies, and to the last objection identified by Buchanan 
and co-authors, i.e. the problem of  justice or equality.
Justice
The fifth and last issue identified by Buchanan and co-authors, “justice,” 
hinges on two problems: a) the problem of  distribution of  burdens and 
benefits in the eugenics programs, where the most disadvantaged were always 
the target of  the eugenic policies which made them even worse off; and b) 
to the problem of  equality of  access to the technologies. As pointed out by 
Sparrow: 
The real danger posed by the development of  effective technologies of  hu-
man enhancement is not that religious conservatives will prevent couples 
from making use of  these technologies, but that parents will eventually have 
no choice but to make use of  them. Without them, their children will stand 
no chance of  competing effectively in the world. (Sparrow 2011, 40) 
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The analysis by Sparrow is important as it points to a very concrete 
consequence of  the use of  genetic technologies to choose what kind of  
children to bring into the world. Even if  there is no coercion from the State 
and parents are free to exercise their choices (to the point that they are free 
to choose traits traditionally considered “disabilities”), the pressures exercised 
by society and the problem of  cultural complicity need to be taken into 
account when evaluating the ethical permissibility of  genetic technologies 
for selective reproduction. Sparrow points out also the “very unattractive 
consequences” that we would have to accept if  we endorsed some of  the 
libertarian claims made by Harris and Savulescu, who argue in favour of  a 
moral obligation, or duty, to bring into the world the best possible people. 
(Savulescu 2005; Savulescu 2007; Harris 2007; Harris 2012). One of  these 
“very unattractive consequences” would be the increase in cultural complicity 
with socially problematic practices of  discrimination towards minorities and 
conformism towards a “dominant” conception of  the good. Quoting again 
Sparrow:
In many parts of  the world today, prevailing social circumstances are likely 
to have a much greater impact on the welfare of  individuals than are other 
environmental factors. When thinking about which genes are best for our 
children, then, Harris and Savulescu’s argument implies that we should take 
these factors into account. Thus, for instance, in a racist society, where 
children born with particular racial markers – skin color, hair type, shape of  
nose and lips, presence or absence of  an epicanthic fold, and so on – will 
have reduced life prospects, a proper concern for their children’s well-being 
requires that parents work to mitigate the impact of  racism by altering the 
child’s environment, or by manipulating the genes associated with these 
markers, or both. … Unfortunately, it will often be much easier to alter a 
child’s genetics than the social conditions that will shape the ultimate impact 
of  their genetics. (Sparrow 2011, 35)
Are we ready to accept this “repugnant conclusion” (borrowing from (Parfit 
1984)) as a consequence of  our obligation to enhance? As pointed out again 
by Sparrow, in many parts of  Europe, North America, and Australia, this 
would probably mean that prospective parents would use PGD to bring into 
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the world “white male children who would grow up to be tall and (probably) 
blonde haired and blue eyed.” (Sparrow 2011, 35) Recently the Silicon Valley 
company 23&Me made the headlines after patenting a computerized process
 for selecting gamete donors to achieve a child with a “phenotype of  inter-
est” with in vitro fertilization.5 Sparrow would presumably be concerned at 
how prospective parents could use this computerized process, although the 
company has denied all claims that it would be used to “design babies” for 
eugenics purposes. (Grant 2013) 
Nicholas Agar indirectly replied to Sparrow and his concern over contem-
porary eugenics practices in his book “Liberal Eugenics. In defense of  human 
enhancement.” (Agar 2008, 5) Agar argues that the main difference between 
liberal eugenics and what he refers to as “authoritarian eugenics” is that the 
former is grounded in the principle of  liberal societies (for which there are 
many and often incompatible ideas of  the good life and of  human flourish-
ing), while the latter says that individuals should be left free to pursue their 
own idea with the tool of  enhancement technologies. Agar’s conception of  
liberal eugenics is not, though, to be unbounded or unregulated. On the con-
trary: while individuals should be left free to pursue and choose with whom 
to mate/to reproduce, they should not be left completely free to choose what 
kind of  children to have. This is because, according to Agar, in the latter 
endeavour individuals will need to resort to the assistance of  the state (or 
of  a private organization) which can and should impose conditions in this 
cooperation, “refusing to assist reproductive choices that are morally defec-
tive in some significant ways” (Agar 2008, 16). As examples of  these morally 
defective choices, Agar includes the “very unattractive consequences” pointed 
out by Sparrow, as choosing to have a straight child instead of  a possibly gay 
one, or choosing to have a white child instead of  a black one. Doing so would 
contribute to reinforcing ethically problematic societal practices, such as rac-
ism. Therefore, from a liberal viewpoint such as Agar’s, the new freedom of  
choice opened up by new genetic technologies can be seen as an extension of  
parental reproductive freedom, which could be bounded in “morally defective 
cases.” The judgment on the “moral defectiveness” needs to be made on a 
case-by-case analysis, though not further explored by Agar in his book. 
5  http://blog.23andme.com/news/a-23andme-patent/ [accessed July 18, 2014]
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Suter is also in favour of  a contemporary eligogenic practice:
Some of  the attitudes and concerns of  eugenics remain today - a focus on 
the heritability of  traits, a tendency toward genetic determinism, a privileg-
ing of  science, a focus on societal benefits of  genetic technologies, and most 
important, societal pressure to increase the chances of  having “well-born” 
children or to decrease the incidence of  “less fit” children. … I argue that 
the propriety of  neoeugenics, or eugenics for that matter, depends on moti-
vation, context, and results; it cannot easily be categorized as always or never 
problematic. (Suter 2007, 948)
I agree with Suter’s point on the necessity of  a contextual analysis of  
contemporary eligogenic practices to spell out all the dimensions of  the use 
of  a particular genetic technology by parents to select specific traits. Indeed, 
this is what I try to do in analysing genetic technologies used to choose what 
kind of  children to bring into the world (sections 2.4 and 2.5 in this chapter), 
and in my analysis of  the use of  genetic technologies to scout out children’s 
talent. (sections 3.3 and 3.4) Finally, other important objections to eligogenics 
practices aimed at “choosing children” can be raised in terms of  what values we 
are leaving to future generations. The possibility of  exacerbating inequalities, 
and of  differential access between people who can avail themselves of  genetic 
technologies and others who cannot, are also pressing questions. Moreover, 
as already noted above in the case of  PGD, the discrepancies in regulation 
of  genetic technologies among countries provide the conditions for medical 
and reproductive tourism within and outside Europe, further exacerbating the 
problem of  equality of  access. (Meghani 2011; Zanini 2011)
To conclude this section, it seems to me that current eligogenic practices 
are indeed morally problematic, but on different grounds than the possible 
consequences on the future of  our species. They seem to me to be problem-
atic as they may infringe on children’s right to an open future, on their devel-
oping autonomy, and on their possibilities of  human flourishing (of  “eudamo-
nia”). In addition, they seem to be problematic as they participate in the issue 
of  cultural complicity described above. In the next section I will a closer look 
at the conflict that may arise in the context of  genetic technologies between 
parental procreative liberty and children’s interest. 
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2.3 Procreative liberty, and self-determination
Individuals resort to genetic technologies to engage in new ways to reproduce. 
They also avail themselves of  genetic technologies to shape the creation of  
what kind of  people to bring into existence. Both these actions can be consid-
ered within the scope of  “reprogenetics” borrowing from Silver who coined 
the term in his 1997 book “Remaking Eden.” (Silver 1997) These kinds of  
choices take place both at the pre-natal and at the post-natal level. In this sec-
tion and the following one I will focus on the former, while in sections 3.1 and 
3.2 I will consider the latter. 
“Procreative liberty” (PL) has been defined by Robertson as a “liberty or 
claim-right to decide whether or not to reproduce.”6 (Robertson 2003, 447) 
Robertson distinguishes between two components of  PL: a negative com-
ponent, and a positive component. The negative component amounts to the 
liberty to avoid reproducing, which includes the liberty to “avoiding inter-
course, using contraceptives, refusing the transfer of  embryos to the uterus, 
discarding embryos, terminating pregnancies, and being sterilized” (Roberston 
2003, 447) The positive component amounts to the liberty to reproduce which 
involves “the freedom to take steps or make choices that result in the birth of  
biologic offspring, such as having intercourse, providing gametes for artificial 
or in vitro conception, placing embryos in the uterus, preserving gametes or 
embryos for later use, and avoiding the use of  contraception, abortion, or 
sterilization.” (Roberston 2003, 447) Each component has an independent 
justification and can be conceived as a different claim-right. Like most rights in 
a liberal society, the PL claim-right is to be understood primarily as a negative 
right, i.e., a right against interference by the state or others with reproductive 
decisions. A positive right of  PL would entail a heavier burden on the state, 
i.e., to provide resources for assisted reproduction, facilities, infertility treat-
ment, abortion, etc. While PL has both negative and positive components, in 
what follows I will concentrate on when we should refrain from interfering 
with PL, therefore on the negative component. 
Why is PL so important? Buchanan and co-authors identify the interests 
6 In this work I use the terms “reproductive freedom” and “procreative liberty” 
as synonyms.
  From bench to bedside           49
and values that determine the moral importance of  PL, namely self-determi-
nation, individual good or wellbeing (the precise form of  this argument de-
pending on the account of  wellbeing chosen), and equalitiy of  expectation and 
opportunity. (Buchanan et al. 2000, 204–256) Self-determination is defined as 
the interest of  an individual in making significant decisions about one’s own 
life, according to own values or conceptions of  a good life. It is also important 
to note, as pointed out by Robertson (2003), that recognizing the importance 
of  PL (or even recognizing it as a moral or legal right) does not mean that it 
is an absolute value that cannot ever be overriden. Rather, it means that there 
is “a strong presumption [emphasis, added] in its favor, with the burden on oppo-
nents to show that there is a good case for limiting it.” (Robertson 2003, 448) 
If  this is the case, when is it justified to drop the presumption, and interfere 
with PL? Before answering this question I first distinguish between six aspects 
of  the scope of  PL, following the analysis by Buchanan et al., (2000):
The choice of  whether to procreate, with whom, and by what means;
The choice of  when to procreate;
The choice of  how many children to have;
The choice of  what kind of  children to have;
The choice of  whether to have biologically related children;
The social conditions that support reproductive choices. 
(Buchanan et al. 2000, 204–256)
Buchanan and co-authors note how a justified interference may be specific 
only to one component or another of  PL. Genetic technologies used for cur-
rent eligogenic practices focus on the fourth component of  PL, i.e. the choice 
of  what kind of  children to bring into the world. This, though, seems to be a 
component more closely related to the determinations of  others, than to one’s 
self-determination, and the overall moral case for determining what another 
is like is substantially weaker than the moral case for determining how one’s 
life should be. I apply this argument to object to the use of  pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis to choose what kind of  children to bring into the world, in 
a paper where I analyse the case of  parents that use PGD to choose a trait 
traditionally considered a disability: deafness, (Camporesi 2010) and included 
in this work in a slightly revised form in the next section.
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2.4 Choosing deafness with preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis: an ethical way to carry on a cultural bloodline? 7
Consider the theoretical possibility of  screening to ensure that only a dis-
abled child would be conceived. This would surely be monstrous. And we 
think it would be monstrous because we do not believe it is just as good to 
be born with a disability.
These words were written by ethicist Jonathan Glover in his paper “Future 
People, Disability and Screening” in 1992. (Glover 1992) Whereas screening 
and choosing for a disability remained a theoretical possibility twenty or so 
years ago, it has now become reality. In 2008, Susannah Baruch and colleagues 
at John Hopkins University published a survey of  190 American PGD clin-
ics, and found that 3% reported having the intentional use of  PGD “to select 
an embryo for the presence of  a disability.”(Baruch, Kaufman, and Hudson 
2008) Even before, in 2002, a controversy was generated by the case of  Can-
dace A. McCullough and Sharon M. Duchesneau, a lesbian and deaf  couple 
from Maryland who set out to have a deaf  child by intentionally soliciting a 
deaf  sperm donor. (Spriggs 2002)
The discourse on using PGD in order to choose what kind of  children to 
bring into the world has been monopolized by the discussion of  the different 
notions of  “disability” and by the related topic of  the treatment–enhancement 
distinction. In this discourse, different definitions of  “disability” seem to 
imply different normative judgments about parental reproductive choices. I 
choose here to adopt a different perspective, and to shift the debate from the 
level of  disability to that of  “impairment.” I will argue that it is still possible 
to claim that choosing deafness with PGD is morally wrong, without arguing 
that deafness is a disability, but framing the case in terms of  justice toward 
the future children and limitation of  a reasonably broad array of  different 
life plans. I also support my view in terms of  the balance between self-
7  This section first appeared with the same title in a slightly modified form 
in Cambridge Quarterly of  Healthcare Ethics (2010), 19, 86–96. doi:10.1017/
S0963180109990272
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determination of  parents within their sphere of  reproductive freedom and 
their determination of  future children.
Different Regulations
Deafness is the most common sensory disorder, present in one of  every 500 
newborns. (Hilgert, Smith, and Van Camp 2009) With almost fifty genes 
implicated in nonsyndromic hearing loss, it is also an extremely heterogeneous 
trait. The most frequent genes implicated in autosomal recessive nonsyndromic 
hearing loss are GJB2, the gene for connexin 26 (Cx26), followed by SLC26A4, 
MYO15A, OTOF, CDH23, and TMC1. A Cx26 mutation can be detected in 
~30% of  sporadic cases of  prelingual hearing impairment. The likelihood of  
detection of  a Cx26 mutation increases to more than half  of  the families with 
identified autosomal recessive transmission. Up to 95% of  deaf  children are 
born to parents with normal hearing. (Hilgert, Smith, and Van Camp 2009)
Countries have adopted very different legal approaches to the regulation 
of  PGD. The United States has no federal regulation at all, but PGD issues 
are regulated by professional standards. In Canada, sex selection is permitted 
only to prevent the transmission of  a genetic disease. (Deonandan and Bente 
2014).8 In Australia, PGD is regulated partly by state legislation and partly 
under the National Health and Medical Research Council guidelines on the 
use of  assisted reproductive technology (NHMRC ART Guidelines). Europe 
is very heterogenous in this respect, as laws range from prohibitive (PGD 
is not allowed in Austria, Ireland, and Italy, and only in very limited cases in 
Germany since July 2011) to restrictive (where PGD is permitted only in cases 
of  screening for disorders or in cases of  tissue typing, as in Scandinavian 
countries, Spain, Belgium, and France). The lack of  harmonized regulation at 
the European level has resulted in an increasing number of  couples crossing 
borders seeking PGD. (Soini 2007; Zanini 2011) The UK approach is certainly 
the most liberal, as PGD is allowed also for tissue typing and for screening for 
disease susceptibilities. In the UK, PGD is licensed by the Human Embryol-
ogy and Fertilization Authority (HFEA) for around fifty conditions, including 
cystic fibrosis, familial hypercholesterolemia, blood disorders such as thalas-
8 At the time of  writing, July 2014.
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semia and hemophilia, muscular dystrophy, deafness, achondroplasia, Down 
syndrome, Huntington’s Chorea, X-linked mental retardation and other X-
linked disorders, and so forth.9 (HFEA 2013) For an up-to-date comparative 
review of  assisted reprodution and PGD policies, see (Deonandan and Bente 
2014).
In spring 2008, the debate on choosing children with a “disability” sur-
faced again in the UK on Clause 14(4) (9) of  the draft of  Human Fertilization 
and Embryology Bill, which stated that “embryos” known to have a genetic 
abnormality “with a significant risk of  transmitting a serious mental or physi-
cal disability, serious illness, or any other serious medical condition … must 
not be preferred to those that are not known to have such an abnormality.” 
(Wales Online 2008) A petition was filed to drop the clause 14(4) (9) of  the 
HFE bill, and was rejected on August 20, 2008, on the ground that “[i]t is in 
the best interests of  the child not to prefer embryos that have a significant risk 
of  developing a serious medical condition.” (“Petition Against Clause 14(4)
(9) of  HFE Bill and Government Response” 2008) The consequent debate 
revolved around the interpretation of  the clause and its relevance for the deaf-
ness case, because, according to one interpretation, it could imply that a deaf  
couple undergoing PGD would not be able to choose embryos carrying a 
gene associated with a genetic hearing impairment.
The Impairment–Disability Distinction
Do we need to define “deafness” as a disability to argue that it is morally 
wrong to choose deaf  children with PGD? And do different definitions imply 
different normative judgments about the ethical acceptability of  parental 
choices regarding genetic traits? In that follows I will try to provide an answer 
to the first question and make some suggestions relevant to the second one.
There are several notions of  disability: a purely medical definition such 
as the one given by the World Health Organization (WHO), (World Health 
9 The list of  conditions for which PGD is allowed is constantly revised and 
updated, and more conditions are awaiting consideration at the time of  writing. 
See [http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/hfea/gen/pgd-screening.htm] [accessed 
       July 18, 2014]
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Organization 2001) a purely social definition such as the one formulated by 
Michael Oliver (Oliver 1996) and a “harmed-condition” account of  disability 
by John Harris. (Harris 2007, 91-93) Here I do not wish to argue in favor 
of  a particular notion of  disability, but I take as a premise a particular no-
tion and then shift the discussion to the level of  impairment. As Jonathan 
Glover also argued in his book Choosing Children. Genes, Disability and Design, it is 
time to abandon the “unfruitful” disability debate. (Glover 2007) On the one 
hand, “disability” is defined as the possible functional consequence of  impair-
ment (e.g., inability to hear certain sounds or inability to speak clearly). (World 
Health Organization 2001) This definition is close to the commonsense no-
tion of  disability and impairment. On the other hand, the 2001 revision of  
the WHO’s International Classification of  Functioning, Disability and Health 
defines “impairment” as “an abnormality of  a structure or function of  the 
body” that can be congenital (present at birth) or acquired, through disease 
or trauma. According to the definition by Oliver, impairment is “lacking part 
or all of  a limb, or having a defective limb, organ or mechanism of  the body,” 
whereas “disability” is defined as “the disadvantage or restriction of  activity 
caused by a contemporary social organization which takes no or little account 
of  people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them from par-
ticipation in the mainstream of  social activities.”(Oliver 1996, 22) Therefore, 
accepting Oliver’s view, impairment has to do exclusively with the body; while 
disability also necessarily involves other factors. While impairments often re-
sult in disabilities, they need not necessarily do so. A disability is inherently re-
lational: being disabled is being unable to do something, to perform some sig-
nificant range of  tasks or functions that individuals in some reference groups 
(e.g., adults) are ordinarily able to do. How do these notions of  disability, and 
of  impairment relate to the deafness case? Being deaf  in a deaf  community is 
not a disability understood in these terms, but is still an impairment. In other 
words, one can have a physical impairment without being disabled, for exam-
ple, a person in a wheelchair living in a town devoid of  architectonic barriers. 
For this reason someone’s race, ethnicity or sexual preference is not a disability 
under a social constructivist approach, precisely because all its disadvantages 
are socially imposed, but can become so in particular societies.
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Deafness as a “variation”?
Empirical research suggests that deaf  people often have a degree of  prefer-
ence for a deaf  child, and a rather smaller number would consider acting on 
their preference with the use of  selective techniques. (Middleton, Hewison, 
and Mueller 1998; Stern et al. 2002) It turns out that such parents do not view 
certain genetic conditions as disabilities, but as a passport to enter into a rich, 
shared culture. They see being deaf  as defining their cultural identity and sign 
language as a sophisticated, unique form of  communication. Parents contend 
that not hearing is just a form of  human variation, and one that has given rise 
to a culture of  its own, with members who want to see their community con-
tinuing into the future. (Mundy 2002)
Darshak M. Sanghavi, a pediatric cardiologist at the University of  
Massachusetts Medical School, supports the parental choices:
Controlling a child’s genetic makeup, even to preserve what some would 
consider a disease, is the latest tactic of  parents in an increasingly globalized 
society where identity seems besieged and in need of  aggressive preservation. 
Traditionally, cultures were perpetuated through assortative mating, with 
intermarriage among the like-minded and the like appearing. … Viewed in 
this context, the use of  PGD to select for deafness may be merely another 
ritual to ensure that one’s children carry on a cultural bloodline. (emphasis added) 
(Sanghavi 2006)
According to many deaf  parents, deafness is a condition that opens up as 
many and as valuable options as it closes down. In this sense, they argue, 
deafness is analogous to an ethnic minority status, as both communities suffer 
socially imposed disadvantages because of  their condition, in particular social 
contexts. But is it plausible to claim that not hearing is equivalent to an ethnic 
minority status? I contend that it is not, on the ground that deafness is an 
impairment that limits a broad array of  different life plans, independently of  
the social context.
Let us, then, imagine how Oliver’s definitions could be applied if  we lived 
in a much more liberal and nondiscriminatory society than ours. Of  course, 
it is true that different shades of  disability could go with certain impairment, 
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depending on the social context, but the hearing impairment would still be 
limiting the person in some activities even in the most advanced societies, 
whereas the social constraints imposed on other kinds of  minorities would 
disappear because they are completely socially determined. Thus, under 
Oliver’s account, being deaf  would still be an impairment in any kind of  
society, because of  the underlying asymmetry of  this trait. Therefore, even 
accepting a social constructivist model of  disability and defining deafness as 
an impairment which does not necessarily go with a disability, the question 
whether it is morally wrong to choose children with a physical impairment 
stays with us. Let us elaborate a bit more on this and imagine two groups of  
people living in an ideal society with no societal barriers toward deaf  people. 
In this society, the only differences between the two groups would be that one 
group is able to hear and the other cannot; that one communicates with sign 
language and the other with a verbal, spoken language. Even in our progressive 
and nondiscriminatory society the relationship between the two groups would 
remain asymmetrical, as hearing people could be part of  the deaf  culture by 
learning how to communicate with sign language, but not vice versa. (Levy 
2002) Of  course, to this it can be objected that being born genetically deaf  
is not the same thing as learning to be deaf  and learning the sign language. 
As Mackenzie and Scully have argued, the embodiment of  a disability is the 
necessary premise to make certain ethical claims. (Mackenzie and Scully 2007) 
While I agree on this point, and on the point that the deaf  culture may have 
its compensations that hearing people cannot fully experience, I still think 
that the fundamental point here is that deaf  parents do not need to choose 
to exclude their children from the hearing world in order to include them 
in theirs (however imperfectly, as parents may counterargue), because both 
worlds and languages are open to their children: both the hearing and the not 
hearing worlds, both the verbal and the nonverbal languages. Tom Shakespeare 
made a very similar point in his most recent work: “There seem to be internal 
contradiction in the Deaf  approach to cochlear implants. First, if  Deafness 
has really nothing to do with impairment, then logically there would be no 
reason for Deaf  people to oppose impairment reduction. Second, if  Deafness 
is about being a member of  a sign language community, there is nothing to 
stop hearing children of  Deaf  adults being members of  that community too: 
indeed, there is a thriving Children of  Deaf  Adults (CODA) movement which 
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enjoys membership in both Deaf  and hearing world.” (Shakespeare 2013, 152) 
Sanghavi also wrote that:
The small number of  PGD centers selecting for mutations doesn’t bother 
me greatly. After all, even natural reproduction is an error-prone process … 
I’ve learned to respect a family’s judgment. Many parents share a touching 
faith that having children similar to them will strengthen family and social 
bonds … . But it’s not for me to say. (Sanghavi 2006) 
While granting that parents have good intentions concerning the future of  
their children, I would like to question the equivalence between natural repro-
duction being an “error-prone process,” and deliberately choosing to have a 
deaf  child with PGD. In addition, even though I agree with Sanghavi that it 
should not be up to him or to individual practitioners to decide on these mat-
ters, it does not follow that it is up to nobody to decide. In other words, I think 
that there is still ground to argue that parental reproductive freedom should be 
regulated in some way, avoiding the technological Catch-22 mentioned before.
Why it is Morally Wrong to Choose Deafness with PGD
Framing the issue in terms of  justice toward the future children avoids not 
only the thorny discussion of  what a disability is but also the related and 
somewhat underlying discussion of  the treatment – enhancement distinction. 
This distinction has been strongly criticized (for one, see Bortolotti and Harris 
2006) and forces us to treat relevantly similar cases in dissimilar ways, by mak-
ing some “morally arbitrary” ad hoc assumptions, as illustrated in 1.2. Such a 
distinction cannot play a moral role, because it is useless in helping us to draw 
both an obligatory/nonobligatory boundary and a permissible/impermissible 
boundary. 
In our society, there is a presumption in favor of  not interfering with 
parents’ decisions, and they are allowed a large degree of  discretion in choos-
ing what is good for their children (e.g., education, religion). (Buchanan et al. 
2000, 156–8) Some argue that this should not be the case (and parents should 
be licensed by the state, as it is required from people applying for an adoption). 
(LaFollette 2010) Other scholars have made the case for compulsory parental 
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education, a less extreme proposal to which I am sympathetic. (Bortolotti and 
Cutas 2009)
Reproductive freedom is one of  the fundamental rights of  the person 
and finds its justification (at least in part) in the democratic presumption. (Bu-
chanan et al. 2000, 204–222; Harris 2007, 72–4) According to this principle, 
citizens should be free to live according to their own values, and the state 
should not interfere with their freedom unless there is a direct danger to other 
citizens or to society in general. Note that it is not sufficient that other people 
disagree with the choices of  a person or find her values “fastidious” or “dis-
gusting” for a limitation to freedom; otherwise all our fundamental freedoms 
of  speech, expression, religion, sex, and reproduction would vanish together 
with the very concept of  democracy.
This said, I believe that in case of  parents choosing deaf  children with 
PGD, the condition of  a “direct danger to other citizens” (i.e., future children) 
is satisfied, and the state (through some authority such as HFEA in the United 
Kingdom) could, and indeed should, interfere with the parental reproductive 
freedom. The direct danger to the children would be the restriction of  a broad 
array of  possible, future life plans due to deafness. The extensive character of  
the hindrance makes the case for the limitation of  the democratic presump-
tion and therefore of  the reproductive freedom, whereas it does not make the 
case for limiting parental freedom in more general terms (as other arguments 
would be needed to support such a claim). Along lines of  reasoning similar to 
those by Buchanan and coauthors, I believe that a certain degree of  neutral-
ity must be expected from parents toward different conceptions of  the good 
for their children. (Buchanan et al. 2000, 167–70) Parents, qua persons, can, of  
course, have a particular conception of  the good and lead their lives accord-
ing to it (which brings us back to the democratic presumption), but parents, 
qua parents, should maintain a certain degree of  neutrality toward different 
conceptions of  the good for their children. In other words, parents should not 
be allowed to make their children suitable for only one particular conception 
of  a good life that the parents happen to have, such as the conception of  the 
rich and shared culture of  the deaf  community. Any intervention that would 
greatly restrict this range of  choices, as a hearing impairment would do, would 
be unjust to the child. 
Finally, the notion of  “self-determination” is one of  the values that 
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determines the moral importance of  reproductive freedom (together with 
individual wellbeing, equality of  expectations, and opportunities. (Buchanan 
et al. 2000, 204–22) Self-determination can be understood as the interest in 
making significant decisions about one’s own life for oneself, according to 
one’s own values and conception of  a good life. John Rawls characterized this 
interest as based on people’s capacity to form, revise over time, and pursue a 
plan of  life and conception of  the good. (Rawls 1971) This said, the impact 
of  peoples’ actions on others (i.e., future children) must be understood as a 
competing moral consideration that can, and must, place a limit on the parents’ 
self  determination and, therefore, on their reproductive freedom. Shaping the 
nature of  children is not primarily a matter of  individual self-determination 
but as well, and more importantly, the determination of  another. I would like 
to stress here that I am not questioning the motivations of  the parents reported 
and interpreted by Sanghavi. Such parents may all have good intentions – and 
thinking to choose “the best” for their children – when choosing to have a 
deaf  child through PCD, but considerations of  justice suggest that parents 
should not maintain their currently accorded discretion toward such broad 
scope capabilities such as hearing, because this would factually amount to 
determine the lives of  others.
I am aware that an important problem of  threshold is looming in the 
background here, namely: Where should the threshold be set, and when could 
reproductive freedom be limited, on the basis of  justice considerations and 
the limitation of  a reasonable array of  different life plans? In section 3.4 I 
discuss the case of  parents using genetic technologies (direct-to-consumer 
genetic tests) to supposedly measure their children’s talents, and steering their 
education aggressively in the direction of  pre-professionalisation of  sport on 
the basis of  the results of  these tests.
The Social Construction of  Impairment
So far, my arguments have been based on the definition of  disability and im-
pairment by Michael Oliver. One objection could be raised on the basis of  the 
more radical claim that impairment is also socially constructed. Cole (2007)
argues that disability arises always in a particular social context and that the 
combination of  “social structure + impairment” causes the disability. 
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Certainly, the disability is the product of  the interaction between bodily im-
pairment and social context, but it is the social context that gives the action 
or ability its form and context. (Cole 2007, 172) 
Cole concludes that “it is the political idea of  disability that determines what 
counts as bodily impairment,” (Cole 2007, 175) because persons wearing 
glasses to correct some minor eyesight defect have an “eyesight that is im-
paired to some extent” (at least he concedes this point!) but we “would not 
want to describe them as bodily impaired.” (Cole 2007, 175)
I would like to remark on two points touched upon by Cole that are useful 
for the discussion of  the deafness case. The first revolves around the issue of  
the normativity of  definitions. Cole aims at defining “deafness” or “blindness” 
as “something less than an impairment,” as a “mere inability,” with the purpose 
of  deriving a normative judgment about the permissibility of  making some 
kinds of  parental choices or of  society adopting certain kinds of  policies. But 
the derivation of  ethical prescriptions from a definition cannot be taken as 
straightforward, it requires a justification. Therefore, while we could accept 
Cole’s point that under some circumstances deafness would not count as an 
impairment, no ethical judgment about PGD screening permissibility could 
be automatically derived. Secondly, I do not think it is necessary to define 
“deafness” as disability, impairment or inability to infer some kind of  ethical 
judgment on the parental choices. In other words, it is not necessary to possess 
a normative definition to argue that choosing deafness with PGD is morally 
wrong. Indeed, it can still be argued that it is wrong to choose deafness with 
PGD even if  it is not defined as an impairment on the ground that there is 
an underlying asymmetry between hearing and non hearing people, and that 
not hearing is a broad limitation of  the future child’s life plans. Even disability 
rights scholar Tom Shakespeare writes along similar lines objecting to a radical 
social model of  disability: “… Even in the most accessible world practical, 
there will always be residual disadvantage attached to many impairments” 
(Shakespeare 2013, 42) and in addition, with specific reference to the case of  
deaf  parents choosing to have deaf  children as quoted above, he has written 
along similar lines as mine of  the existence of  an intrinsic asymmetry between 
hearing and non hearing people. (Shakespeare 2013, 152)
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To conclude: as defined by Oliver, deafness remains an impairment, even 
if  in some societies, and in deaf  communities, it may not count as a disability. 
Parents who choose to impose on their children their idiosyncratic vision of  
the good, be it in relation to the deaf  culture or to some other conceptions 
of  the good, are acting unjustly toward the future child, who should have a 
sufficiently large array of  opportunities to decide on her own what is good 
for her later in life. Moreover, the advantages of  being part of  a deaf  com-
munity are asymmetric, as also a hearing person could learn the sign language 
and be part of  it (even if  only “imperfectly”). To those scholars, like Phillip 
Cole, who view “impairment” as socially constructed, I replied that we could 
abandon the quest for a normative definition valid for several traits (e.g., deaf-
ness, dwarfism, blindness) and reason on a case by case basis. In other words, 
we can decide to call deafness simply “deafness”: Is it or is it not “not being 
able to hear”? If  we agree on this, then we should agree that it is a limitation 
on the future of  the child, and not a minor one, as it is a broad capability and 
a necessary condition for a vast array of  plans of  life. In other words, I am 
adopting here a critical realist perspective as the one adopted by Tom Shake-
speare (2013), where he recognizes medicine will never completely erase the 
problems and limitation of  embodiment, and that impairment is a condition 
that sooner or later faces each one of  us faces in life (in this sense, we are all 
“temporarily abled”).
What are the consequences of  my claim? Should parental reproductive 
freedom in terms of  PGD choices be regulated from a legal point of  view? 
What about parental discretion for other kinds of  choices? Where should 
we put the threshold, if  we decide that we need one (as I argued)? And who 
decides?
I cannot here respond fairly to these complex questions and will only 
suggest two possible directions to elaborate elsewhere. For what concerns 
regulation, the issue here is subtle and manifold: As Sanghavi (2006) rightly 
noticed, humans have always been mating the “alike” to have children like 
them. I believe this kind of  reproductive freedom should not be constrained, 
as we would not want to live in a paternalistic society where deaf  couples are 
discouraged from having children for the “good” of  future generation or for 
improving the gene pool, as was done with forced sterilization back in the 
classical eugenics period. Somehow different is the case of  the lesbian couple 
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who seeked a deaf  donor to have a very high probability (although not a 
certainty, because of  the heterogeneity of  the genetic trait) to conceive a deaf  
child, as Candace and Sharon McCullough did. Can this still be considered a 
kind of  assortative mating? I doubt it.
The case is even more straightforward for parents who choose PGD to be 
“sure” (medical errors not considered) to have a deaf  child. Unlike Sanghavi, 
I do think that there is a morally relevant difference between the natural 
errors of  reproduction and the intentional choice to have a deaf  child. This 
morally relevant difference makes the case for the justified natural assortative 
mating, but it does not make it for cases of  PGD screening for deafness or of  
couples soliciting a deaf  donor. Finally, who would be entitled to limit parental 
reproductive freedom, and on which authority? Such a decision should not 
rest on the shoulders (and discretion!) of  individual practitioners, as Sanghavi 
pointed out. Exactly for this reason the UK and other countries have 
developed institutions to regulate such issues, such as Human Fertilization 
and Embryology in the United Kingdom.
I am willing to accept the consequences of  a consistent application of  
this line of  thought, including further limitations on parental discretion con-
cerning other kinds of  interventions that could limit a reasonable array of  
different life plans of  the future children. Decisions in terms of  education 
(e.g., is it justified for parents belonging to the Amish community to withdraw 
their children from school at 14 years, two years before the normal age limit 
for compulsory education? (Mameli 2007)), religion (e.g., should parents be 
allowed to impose their choice of  religion of  their children) could also fall 
within those that need to be regulated. 
2.5 Disabilities, or just differences? An analysis of  the 
expressivist objection
In the last section of  this chapter I consider an alternative way of  framing the 
case of  choosing deafness with PGD based on the “expressivist objection” 
that deafness is only a “difference,” and not a disability. According to the ex-
pressivist objection, traits such as dyslexia, deafness, achondroplasia are not to 
be considered disabilities, but mere differences. Such traits, the objection goes, 
are not more disadvantageous per se than being born black in the U.S. South 
62 Camporesi
in the 19th century, or being gay in contemporary Ughanda, as it is the social 
structure that confers on these traits their disadvantage. From this perspective, 
all disadvantages are contingent on the socio- and cultural context the indi-
vidual finds herself  in. Those who resort to this argument reject the medical 
model of  disability (according to which disability is a relatively long-lasting, 
biologically grounded condition that impairs the individual in one or more 
significant ways) and adopt the social model of  disability, which maintains that 
disability involves a loss or limitation of  opportunities due to institutional or 
social barriers. As already mentioned above, Mackenzie and Scully argue that 
a particular embodiment is a necessary condition to make claims about one’s 
own quality of  life, and therefore that the incorporation of  narratives of  the 
disabled individuals becomes a necessary step when deliberating about PGD. 
They write:
We do not dispute that the capacity for imaginative projection, or simulation, 
is central to our ability to understand other people’s mental states. However, 
there is a significant gap between the kinds of  simple cases of  belief  and 
desire attribution about which philosophers of  mind are concerned, and 
imaginatively entering into another’s point of  view sufficient to understand, 
for example, how that person experiences disability or evaluates her quality 
of  life. (Mackenzie and Scully 2007, 339–40)
Scully also points out the potential exacerbations of  equality of  existing prob-
lems of  access to the genetic technologies, and of  differential treatment in 
society that could be raised by the use of  preimplantation genetic diagnosis to 
prevent individuals with disability to come into the world. (Scully 2008)
I am sympathetic with the writings of  Tom Shakespeare, who is a disabil-
ity rights scholar and a disabled person affected by achondroplasia and skeletal 
displasia. Along similar lines to what I argued in the previous section, Tom is 
not concerned with the diagnosis or the label given to a particular condition, 
but with the very real and concrete consequences arising from the condition. 
He writes:
Diagnosis is not my problem, and nor is the label which you give to my 
skeletal dysplasia/restricted growth/dwarfism/achondroplasia, let alone my 
  From bench to bedside           63
spinal cord injury and consequent neuropathic pain. My problem is my phys-
ical embodiment and my experience of  negative symptoms arising from my 
impairment. ... I want to say that impairment and illness is often experienced 
not just as a difference, but as difficulty and limitation and pain and suffering. 
… Having an impairment is not like being gay or from a different culture: the solution 
is not just revaluing diversity. (emphasis added) (Shakespeare 2013, 66-67, 84)
Therefore, as it is clear from the quote above, while the conditions of  society 
have of  course a substantial impact on the lives of  those with an impair-
ment, even the elimination of  all social barriers would not eliminate all the 
symptoms inherent in a condition. This is what is known as a “critical realist 
perspective.” DeGrazia objects to the argument that disabilities are not only 
“differences” with an excursion into value theory that takes into account the 
voices of  many people with major disabilities, who claim nonethless to be 
happy with their lives. (DeGrazia 2012, 108) As a matter of  fact, disabled 
individuals often assert that the disability adds value to their lives, that it made 
them “better persons,” and that if  they could choose to be born again without 
the disabilities, they would not do so. What weight should this kind of  claim 
be given in relation to the discussion of  cases such as that of  individuals re-
sorting to PGD to choose deafness?
Some authors object to these narratives by arguing that individuals with 
major disabilities are subject to self-deception as an unconscious objection to 
cope with their difficult lives. This, though, does not seem to be a successful 
strategy for at least two reasons: a) it is quite a common phenomenon for 
individuals with disabilities to argue that they are happy with their lives and b) 
the presumption should be that the best judge of  what is best for one’s own 
life is the individual living that life. I agree with the analysis by DeGrazia, who 
is cautious in attributing self-deception to individuals. He writes: “Generally 
speaking, it is the person herself  who best knows how her life is going for her.” 
(DeGrazia 2012, 112) Even if  DeGrazia acknowledges that some individuals 
may think they are satisfied with their lives as a consequence of  the dampening 
of  their desires due to the loss of  functioning they experience, this judgment 
of  “comparative achievement might not be relevant to the issue of  how well 
the subject’s life is going for her.” (ibid) Therefore, on the one hand, DeGrazia 
adopts subjectivist theories of  values in contrast to objectivist theories of  
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values, which he argues are ‘theoretically presumptuous” and require a heavy 
burden of  justification. On the other hand, though, DeGrazia does not accept 
subjectivist accounts of  value tout court. In order to avoid the seemingly absurd 
implication of  subjectivism that a person is happy when all her beliefs are 
systematically and profoundly distorted (deluded individuals), we need to 
define happiness in a way that is more plausible than the mere reduction to 
either pleasurable feelings or desire-satisfaction. This more plausible definition 
is to define happiness in terms of  “life-satisfaction,” i.e., satisfaction with how 
one’s life on the whole is going. Also, this would require a reality-based check, 
understood as: “a person’s happiness makes her well-off  only if  it is based on a 
more or less accurate understanding of  her circumstances.” This reality check 
for DeGrazia avoids defining happy an individual who is subject to delusions.10 
To try to reconcile objectivist and subjectivist element of  his account, 
DeGrazia argues that we should take into account the subjectivist report of  
individuals with disabilities and avoid the argument of  self-deception. As an 
example (and a way out of  disability discourses), DeGrazia introduces the case 
of  the “happy slave”: “If  a slave is happy despite having no illusions about 
his situation then he has overcome the odds and is actually doing well. He is 
not less well-off  just because his desires and expectations have been partly 
shaped by oppression.” (DeGrazia 2012, 114) Other authors have discussed 
the apparent unsolvable contradiction of  the happy slave case. Among these 
authors, Hannah Arendt’s analysis seems to me to be able to capture better 
the nuances of  the  condition of  happiness. Arendt distinguishes between two 
aspects of  happiness of  the slave: eudaimonia, defined as “an objective status 
depending first of  all upon wealth and health” (something the slave could not 
enjoy by definition because they were subjected both to physical necessity and 
to man-made violence), and the actual subjective wellbeing as declared by the 
slave. (Arendt 1958, 31) The analysis by Arendt makes sense of  the possibility 
that a slave – or another person in a severely disadvantage condition – could 
still claim to be “happy” without being deluded or subjected to self-deception, 
but could not possibility enjoy the possibility of  human flourishing captured 
by the concept of  eudaimonia.
10  I am not going to enter here into the discussion of  delusions and happiness, to 
which I could not really contribute (see Bortolotti 2010).
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Therefore, returning to the discussion of  whether disability are just dif-
ferences or not, we could say that disabilities need not be disadvantageous, as 
a person can fare just as well overall as a person without the disability, but it 
does not follow from this that disabilities are mere differences. “Disabilities 
involve the absence of  a kind of  functioning that plays a significant role in 
human life” (ibid, 115) and are “presumptively disadvantageous” [emphasis added] 
since they present an obstacle to wellbeing (even in the best possible societal 
scenario) but are not necessarily disadvantageous, for despite their obstacles, 
people can – and indeed, do – fare well. But if  they do so, they have overcome 
their odds. To conclude, “because disabilities are presumptively disadvanta-
geous, it must be considered harmful to inflict a disability on an individual” 
(115). In this sense, the arguments by DeGrazia are not too far from mine 
included in section 2.4, as I also argue that impairments such as deafness 
are disadvantageous for children. The right to an open future seems to be 
one of  those arguments predominantly used in the context of  children, while 
DeGrazia’s analysis focuses more on arguments of  individuals who reached 
adulthood with a disability. 
We also need to acknowledge the increasingly prominent role and 
significance of  patients’ narratives in bioethics, which has been witnessing a 
shift in the last fifteen years from a “principled” default to a reflective mode, 
in particular in the analysis of  the doctor/patient dilemma that arise at the 
bedside. (Lindemann 1997; Charon and Montello 2002) Though I will not 
enter here into this discussion, I would like to recognize the importance 
of  incorporating, and giving proper weight, to the narratives of  patients 
or individuals with disability when discussing the ethical permissibility of  a 
particular technology such as for example PGD as used to choose to have 
deaf  children “like themselves,” quoting from Sanghavi (2006). This though 
does not mean that I would be prepared to accept the use of  PGD to choose 
deafness, as I am of  the opinion that the child’s possibilities for a full human 
flourishing would be unjustly diminished. To reiterate, I am not saying here 
that the child could not grow up to be a happy and flourishing person, but if  s/
he did so, s/he would have done so at the expenses of  an initial disadvantage.
In the next chapter I discuss genetic technologies applied to enhance 
athletic performance, discussing gene transfer, gene enhancement, and gene 
doping scenarios from a scientific, regulatory and ethical point of  view. In 
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the second part of  the chapter I discuss the ethical and social implication of  
the recent boom of  direct-to-consumer genetic tests to scout out children’s 
athletic potential.
Chapter 3
From bench to track & field: Genetic 
technologies to enhance athletic performance
3.1 Gene transfer, gene enhancement and gene doping: 
infringing the spirit of  sport?
Sport can be considered the first area where performance enhancement has 
been heavily regulated, and has thus served as one of  the first testing grounds 
for enhancement technologies, for anti-enhancement regulation, and for pub-
lic reaction to enhancement. Contrary to what may be thought, the adminis-
tration of  substances with the aim to enhance athletic performance has not 
always been viewed with a negative connotation, but is instead a relatively re-
cent acquisition. For a long time, what we now consider “doping” was viewed 
as a legitimate way to extend the athlete’s capabilities, and sport was seen as 
the experimental terrain par excellence where it was possible to do so. Trying to 
enhance one’s own athletic performance with any available means was under-
stood as the natural human reaction to coping with fatigue, and competition 
in sports was understood first as a challenge between athletes and fatigue, and 
only secondly between athletes and their competitors. The professional athlete 
was using her own body as the subject of  experimentation, and the athlete her-
self  became an experimental subject. This identification of  the athlete’s body 
with an experimental terrain can be dated back to 1894, when the pioneering 
French sports physician Philippe Tissié started administering several types of  
beverages to cyclists to test their value as performance enhancer. (Hoberman 
2009) In this sense, Tissié was regarding the elite athlete as an experimental 
subject whose exertions and traumas could shed light onto the unexplained 
human physiology in a kind of  reverse extrapolation from the track & field to 
the bedside. (Hoberman 2009) 
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This “functional view” of  doping was promoted throughout the 1950s by 
a sharp distinction between amateur and professional athletes that does not 
exist anymore in our conception of  sport. The professional athlete was seen 
as inhabiting a different moral universe in which the use of  performance-
enhancing drugs was tolerated, and promoted, because it was regarded as the 
only way for the individual professional athlete to win competitions, remain 
a professional athlete, and ultimately to make a living. This was not the case 
for the amateur athlete, who was considered the privileged one, and did not 
have to take on the risks associated with the consumption of  often dangeours 
performance-enhancing substances. For this reason, the permission to dope 
was not accorded to the sports amateur, whose image became encapsulated as 
the British gentleman practising sports as a hobby, as a pastime. Going even 
further back in time, to the ancient Olympics, it is important to remember that 
the amount of  time to be devoted to training before competition was severely 
constrained, on the basis of  the same reasoning that the real athlete was not to 
be a professional,  “menial” labourer, but a healthy person merely expressing 
natural talents. (Mathias 2004) 
It is not easy to determine when and where the idea that doping vio-
lates the spirit of  sport (the current stance of  the World Anti-Doping Agency 
discussed below) came into existence. Plausibly, it was not something which 
emerged suddenly, but rather came into existence gradually in the first two 
decades of  the 20th century. As noted by Hoberman, nationalism was one 
medium for the emergence of  this idea, as in the first decade of  the 20th 
century scientists were accusing each other across the Atlantic to hide the pos-
session of  a supposedly secret formula to combat fatigue. (Hoberman 2009) 
At the beginning of  the 20th century, objections of  “reprehensible doping” 
focused more on the medical dangers for the athlete’s health than on the idea 
that doping was a form of  cheating which would violate the spirit of  sport. 
Then, in the 1920s and ‘30s, the idea that doping behaviours violated the ide-
als of  sportsmanship as fair play emerged in parallel to the commercialization 
of  sports and their increasing importance as mass culture. Though still in the 
1950s, Sir Adolphe Abrahams, an Honorary Medical Officer to the Interna-
tional Athletics Board and the British Olympic Team, was expressing difficul-
ties regarding how to distinguish between legitimate and less legitimate means 
to enhance athletic performance. He wrote:
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It is not easy … to draw the line where legitimate stimulation ends and rep-
rehensible “doping” begins; the distinction is largely a matter of  opinion and 
of  conscience. (Abrahams 1958)
The Establishment of  the World Anti-Doping Agency
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) established its first list of  banned 
substances in 1967, and in 1999 convened the World Conference on Doping 
in Sport. This event, which can also be seen as a reaction to the widespread 
Tour de France doping scandals in 1998, led to the creation of  the World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA), on November 10, 1999. WADA is based on the 
cooperation between sports organisations and governments, and is financed 
by sports organisations and governments on an equal basis. 
In March 2003 WADA released its first World Anti-Doping Code 
(WADC), now in its 3rd revised edition. The rationale behind the WADC is 
to harmonise anti-doping rules and measures. Nearly all international sports 
federations have accepted the WADC, and governments support WADA fi-
nancially. (McNamee and Tarasti 2010) WADA defines a substance as doping, 
and therefore prohibits it, if  it meets two of  the following three criteria: 
It has the potential to enhance or enhances sports performance; 
It represents an actual or potential risk to the athlete; 
It violates the spirit of  sport. (WADA Code 2012)
WADA is now in the process of  revising its Code, expected to come into 
effect with a new version in 2015. I discuss the revisions and the desirability 
of  a shift towards the inclusion of  the necessary condition of  performance 
enhancement in this work in section 3.5 and more at length in Camporesi and 
McNamee (2014).
In 2001, shortly after the creation of  WADA, the IOC convened the first 
working group on gene doping. The group’s finding affirmed support for the 
medical applications of  gene therapy but advised taking measures to keep 
genetic modification out of  the realm of  sports. Quoting from the official 
WADA publication, “Play True”:
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We endorse the development and application of  gene therapy for the pre-
vention and treatment of  human disease. However, we are aware that there is 
the potential for abuse of  gene therapy medicine and we shall begin to estab-
lish procedures and state-of-the-art testing methods for identifying athletes 
who might misuse such technology. (Haisma and de Hon 2006)
In March 2002, the first workshop on gene doping was organized by WADA 
at the Banbury Center in New York.1 Shortly thereafter, in 2004, WADA also 
created a “Gene Doping Expert Group,” with Theodore Friedmann as Chair 
(Friedmann is the Director of  the Gene Therapy Lab at the University of  
California San Diego), and Professor Lee Sweeney (Professor and Chairman 
of  Physiology, University of  Pennsylvania) as one of  its members (see below 
for the role of  Professor Lee Sweney on research on insulin-like growth factor 
1 and the so-called “Schwarzenegger mice”).
While it may sound surprising, WADA has included gene transfer tech-
nologies in the Prohibited List since 2003, under the umbrella of  “gene dop-
ing.” The very act of  labelling this type of  genetic modification as “doping” 
is a significant act, clearly connoting an official negative attitude towards the 
practice. But can gene transfer techniques be classified as doping? Before ad-
dressing this question, we need to understand – adopting a similar strategy as 
the one adopted in the previous chapters – what we are talking about when 
we talk about gene enhancement from a scientific point of  view, distinguish-
ing scientifically feasible from fictional scenarios. This should be the first and 
foremost responsibility of  all bioethicists involved in the discussions around 
gene doping, as highlighted by Atry and co-authors (2011). Only afterwards 
can we analyse whether, and on what basis, gene transfer technologies for 
enhancement purposes can count as doping. 
1 http://www.wada-ama.org/en/Science-Medicine/Science-topics/Gene-Dop-
ing/ [Accessed, March 18, 2014]
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The Targets of  Gene Enhancement
Gene transfer aimed at enhancing athletic performance (hence gene 
enhancement, or GE) employs the same techniques used in gene transfer 
for therapeutic purposes, which is referred to as gene therapy (GT). Gene 
transfer is based on the delivery to a cell of  a gene through a carrier (usually a 
modified virus, but also a liposomic particle, or no carrier at all), with the aim 
of  compensating an absent or abnormally functioning gene in GT, and with 
the purpose of  reinforcing muscular systems, increasing the number of  red 
cells, or increasing the threshold for pain in GE, as discussed in detail below. 
Gene transfer differs from other more traditional modes of  doping insofar as, 
instead of  administering the doping substance (e.g. erythropoietin, or EPO) 
to the athlete exogenously, a gene is administered to the body via a carrier, so 
that the body itself  will produce EPO in higher quantities.
The following are some of  the most plausible targets for gene enhancement: 
• Growth hormone (GH): has a multitude of  effects on the body associated 
with growth, including a well-documented stimulatory effect on carbohy-
drate and fatty acid metabolism, and a possible anabolic effect on muscle 
proteins. To note that recombinant GH is already being used as a doping 
agent in sports. (Baumann 2012)
• Insulin growth factor 1 (IGF-1): stimulates cellular proliferation, somat-
ic growth and differentiation. In 1998, Dr Lee Sweeney (to note, now a 
member of  WADA Gene Doping Expert Group) was the first to conduct 
in vivo gene transfer studies in mice using IGF-1. (Barton-Davis et al. 
1998) The gene transfer successfully increased the strength of  the mice, 
leading the press to dub them as “Schwarzenegger mice.” (Bartlett 2003) 
Macedo and co-authors created a mouse model of  gene enhancement 
based on the AAV-mediated delivery of  the IGF-1 cDNA to multiple 
muscles. (Macedo et al. 2012) This treatment determined marked mus-
cle hypertrophy, neovascularization and fast-to-slow fibre type transition, 
similar to what happens to athletes during endurance training. In func-
tional terms, IGF-1 transferred mice showed impressive endurance gain, 
as determined by an exhaustive swimming test. The authors warn against 
the potential misuses of  AAV-IGF1 as a “realistic way to achieve a greater 
athletic performance.” (Macedo et al. 2012) 
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• Myostatin: is a protein that acts as a negative regulator of  muscle mass. 
Mice in which the myostatin gene has been inactivated show marked 
muscle hypertrophy (Li et al. 2010) and a recent report described similar 
muscle hypertrophy in a child carrying mutations in both copies of  the 
myostatin gene. (McFarlane et al. 2011) Therefore, blockade of  myostatin 
action has the potential to allow athletes to rapidly increase muscle mass.
• Erythropoietin (EPO): is a glycoprotein produced by the kidney in re-
sponse to a low oxygen concentration. EPO expression leads to an in-
crease in red blood cell production and hence an increase in the blood’s 
oxygen carrying capacity. EPO is one of  the most widely used doping 
agents. (Leuenberger, Reichel, and Lasne 2012)
• Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor (VEGF) and other angiogenic fac-
tors: their expression improves microcirculation in muscle and hence 
increases oxygen and nutrient supply as well as removal of  waste prod-
ucts. (Wells 2008) There are already clinical trials underway or completed 
employing gene transfer techniques for angiogenesis purposes following 
an ischemia (peripheral or heart) (http://clinicaltrials.gov/). In a paper 
co-authored with Mike McNamee and included in this work in a slightly 
revised form in next section, we analyse one of  these clinical trials em-
ploying VEGF and investigate its permissibility from an ethical point of  
view in a research and in a professional sport context. (Camporesi and 
McNamee 2012) 
• Hypoxia-inducible factor 1 alpha (HIF-1-alpha): transcription factor 
activated under conditions of  endurance exercise and muscle hypoxia: 
induces both the endogenous expression of  EPO and VEGF. Consequently, 
increased expression of  HIF-1-alpha has the potential to substantially improve 
oxygen delivery to the skeletal and cardiac muscles. (Borrione et al. 2008)
• Peroxisome-proliferator-activated receptor gamma (PPAR-gamma): 
the expression of  the activated form of  this protein in skeletal muscle 
increases the running endurance of  transgenic mice to double that of  
wild-type littermates. Gene transfer of  PPAR-gamma in athletes may 
improve endurance capacity by increasing the proportion of  oxidative 
slow twitch fibres. (Østergård et al. 2005)
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The Repoxygen case
The first documented case of  gene transfer aimed at enhancing athletic per-
formance dates back to 2006 in Germany. Thomas Springstein, track & field 
coach, was found guilty of  trying to procure a gene transfer product called 
Repoxygen to administer to supposedly oblivious athletes. Repoxygen was a 
viral delivery vector carrying the human EPO gene under the control of  a 
hypoxia response element, based on the principle of  increasing the number 
of  red cells in the athlete, consequently increasing the cellular oxygen carrying 
capacity. (G. Reynolds 2007; Fantz 2010) Repoxygen was also an example of  a 
direct bench to track & field transfer of  technology (without passing through 
the bedside and the clinical trials step), as in 2006 it was in pre-clinical animal 
studies for a company called Oxford Biomedica. Therefore, at that time, there 
were no data at all on the effects and possible risks of  the use of  gene transfer 
for EPO in humans. 
As it will be evident now, even though gene doping had been included 
under the WADA Prohibited List since 2003, it is only since 2006 and the Re-
poxygen case in Germany that gene enhancement has become a documented 
reality. Meanwhile, WADA has actively been building a confident narrative on 
the possibility of  detecting gene doping through “sheer good-will” and gener-
ous funds2. Indeed, foreseeing a massive use of  gene enhancement techniques 
in the London 2012 Olympics, WADA invested nearly $15 million to support 
research laboratories to develop methods for gene doping detection since its 
first investment in 2002. (Daiji World 2013) The funded laboratories include 
the Molecular Medicine-Gene Therapy laboratory at the International Centre 
for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, which received WADA funding 
to develop mouse models of  genetic enhancement, as the one mentioned 
above. (Macedo, 2011) In London, the King’s College Drug Control Centre 
directed by Dan Cowan was appointed by WADA as the only laboratory in 
the UK responsible for gene doping detection and for “championing Olym-
pic integrity.” (Reynolds 2012) King’s College London then partnered with 
2 The full list of  up-to-date WADA-funded research projects can be found here: 
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/science-medicine/research/funded-research-
projects/ [Accessed, July 18, 2014]
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GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) to enable its world-renowned Drug Control Centre 
to operate a WADA accredited satellite laboratory during the London 2012 
Olympic and Paralympic Games. (E. Reynolds 2012) 
In 2010, WADA Director David Howman reported to the Telegraph that 
he was quite confident that gene enhancement strategies would be able to be 
detected, (Telegraph Staff  2010), but his optimism seems unjustified for rea-
sons explained below.
 
Challenges to detection 
Gene transfer techniques pose several unique challenges to detection. 
(Baoutina et al. 2008) To start with, the protein produced through gene 
transfer will not be different in sequence or structure from the endogenously 
produced one. Anti-doping techniques aimed at identifying the “markers” of  
the viral vectors deployed have low probability of  success, as the viral vectors 
may be measurable only shortly after administration, lowering therefore the 
probabilities of  discovering their presence. In addition, detection would 
require repeated tissue sampling, as the administration of  the vector would 
be performed directly into the muscular target tissue. Obviously, muscle 
biopsies would not be a feasible option for the athlete, therefore excluding 
this mode of  detection. (Baoutina et al. 2008) Alternative modes of  detection 
called “transcriptional profiling” aimed at detecting changes in protein levels 
(compared to the physiologically measured basal level of  the athlete) would 
require simultaneous and repeated measuring of  around 1,000 proteins. 
(Rupert 2009) 
The London 2012 Olympics did not witness those scandals of  “gene dop-
ing.”  There were, though, gene doping speculations on Chinese swimmer Ye 
Shiwen, who won the mixed 400 meters setting a new world record in 4’28” 
and swimming the last 100 meters faster than the male US swimmer and gold 
medallist Ryan Lochte. This detail led to the public accusation by John Leon-
ard, executive director of  the World Swimming Coaches Association (US of-
fice), that her victory was “disturbing” , and that she may have “gene-doped.” 
(Naish 2012) This episode calls to mind a parallel with the case of  South Af-
rican runner Caster Semenya, whose gold medal at the Berlin World Track & 
Field Championship in 2009 was also deemed “disturbing” because it was on 
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par with male athlete performances, leading to accusations of  cheating. (Dis-
cussed in Camporesi & Maugeri 2010). The British tabloid Daily Mail pounced 
on the Shiwen case and conjectured on the possibility of  genetic modification 
(from Naish 2012):
The astonishing suggestion seems to be that London 2012 may be the first 
Olympics in which competitors are attempting to cheat by altering their genes 
to build muscle and sinew, and boost their blood’s oxygen-carrying powers. 
Shiwen later tested negative at the anti-doping control, and John Leonard 
had to deliver a public apology. The result of  the anti-doping control did not 
quench completely, though, the speculations that China may have undertaken 
state-sponsored genetic modification experiments to breed athletes. This sce-
nario is not too far from documented Chinese-based boot-camps for very 
young children where traditional modes of  talent-scouting have been coupled 
with new genetic technologies (see sections 3.3 and 3.4).
Risks for the health of  the athlete
Gene enhancement techniques pose several risks to the health of  the athlete 
that relate both to the kind of  vector used (usually a modified virus), and to 
the encoded transgene. (Harridge and Velloso 2008) As to the former, while 
gene transfer has proven relatively safe in clinical trials so far (with some major 
exceptions, such as the death of  18-year old clinical trial subject Jess Gelsinger 
due to immunoshock to the viral vector in 1998), (Lehrman 1999; Hollon 
2000) it is plausible to infer that gene enhancement, since outlawed, would 
be carried out in laboratories with less stringent regulations, therefore posing 
even more health hazards. Gene enhancement represents indeed one perfect 
example of  technological determinism as discussed by Agar (Agar 2005) and 
presented in section 1.4: even if  we were to reach an agreement through pub-
lic deliberation that gene enhancement is an ethically problematic technology, 
it is plausible to speculate that somewhere else in the world techniques of  
gene transfer aimed to enhance athletic performance would be developed. As 
explained at the end of  chapter 1 though, this should not discourage us from 
tackling the issue of  gene doping from an ethical point of  view.
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As to the latter risks relative to the encoded transgene, they are similar 
to the risks encountered in more traditional doping modes, but in addition 
both the level and the duration of  protein expression are less amenable to 
control. For example, growth hormone and insulin-like growth factor 1 are 
both potent mitogen (i.e. stimulate cellular proliferation) and anti-apoptotic 
(i.e. inhibit physiological death mechanisms) agents, leading to an increased 
risk of  oncogenesis. Overexpression of  EPO causes an increase in haema-
tocrit (i.e. the ratio of  the volume of  red blood cells to the total volume of  
blood), which in turn makes the blood more viscous and increases the load on 
the heart. Potential consequences include blockage of  microcirculation, stroke 
and heart failure. In addition, the uncontrolled expression of  the transgenes 
may in itself  be harmful. Adenoviral vectors have been clearly associated with 
morbidity and in one case death after vascular administration in 1998, as men-
tioned above.
WADA’s Definition of  Gene Doping
As illustrated above, WADA has included gene enhancement techniques in the 
blacklist of  prohibited substances since 2003. As we can read in the follow-
ing statement published on WADA’s official publication Play True, it is evident 
that WADA considers gene transfer technologies aimed at enhancing athletic 
performance as a form of  doping:
Gene doping represents a threat to the integrity of  sport [c] and the health 
of  athletes [b], and as the international organization responsible for promot-
ing, coordinating and monitoring the global fight against doping in sport in 
all its forms, WADA is devoting significant resources and attention to ways 
that will enable the detection of  gene doping. (WADA Official Publication 
Play True 2008)
As mentioned above, two of  the three criteria are currently sufficient for in-
clusion of  a substance in the Prohibited List.3 The most recent version of  the 
3 WADA is now in the process of  revising its Code, expected to come into effect with 
a new version in 2015. (For a discussion, see Camporesi and McNamee 2014)
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Prohibited List contains the following definition for Gene Doping:
The following, with the potential to enhance sport performance, are 
prohibited:
1. The transfer of  polymers of  nucleic acids or nucleic acid analogues;
2. The use of  normal or genetically modified cells.
Gene doping is therefore defined by WADA to include the non-therapeutic 
use of  genes, genetic elements, or cells that have the potential to enhance ath-
letic performance. Note that this is a very broad definition that encompasses 
both gene and cellular therapy, and by choosing to adopt such a broad defi-
nition WADA aims to ensure that all possibilities of  gene or cellular transfer 
aimed at enhancing athletic performance are covered under the wide umbrella 
of  “gene doping.” In the second issue of  Play True, WADA spokesperson and 
Chair of  the expert group on Gene Doping, Professor Theodore Friedmann, 
explains why gene doping is unethical:
This technology is highly experimental and completely inappropriate where 
the goal might be something other than the cure of  life-threatening disease 
like cancer, neurological degenerations and so on. To apply this very imma-
ture technology to athletes or to any young, healthy people for the purpose 
of  increasing some already-normal function, in my mind, is unethical and 
constitutes deliberate professional malpractice. (WADA Official Publication 
Play True 2007)
Note that Friedmann’s concern about gene doping is merely a concern on the 
safety of  the athletes, and while the concern for safety may make, at the pres-
ent state of  knowledge, a persuasive case to prohibit the use of  gene modifica-
tion in sports at a later point in time, this does not seem to constitute sufficient 
ground to ban it. The most important question, which I will address below, 
is whether genetic modification would still be ethically unacceptable in condi-
tions where the technology were sufficiently safe. I will therefore examine and 
unpack WADA’s position regarding doping, and discuss whether it can be ap-
plied to gene transfer technologies, focusing my analysis on the third criterion 
for inclusion of  a substance in the Prohibited List, i.e., the “spirit of  sport.” 
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Infringing the “spirit” of  sport?
What is it to talk about the “spirit of  sport”? Murray defines sport as “the 
paramount public expression of  our embodied humanness” and argues that 
the achievement of  excellence in athletic performance requires a combination 
of  both physical natural talents and of  character traits such as “perseverance, 
dedication, and a willingness to suffer in pursuit of  a valued goal.” (Murray 
2009a) Catlin and Murray write that the spirit of  sport is about winning “with 
the best combination of  natural ability, stamina, courage, willingness to un-
dergo intense and difficult training, and strategic cunning.” (Catlin and Murray 
1996) In 2008’s second issue of  Play True, Murray writes:
We need to go back again to a key question: What is sport about? What 
contributes to its beauty and its value? What gives sport its meaning? I don’t 
want my children or grandchildren to have to go through genetic enhance-
ment to compete on a level playing field. … we can do with the natural 
talents we have, perfecting them through human excellence, persistent ef-
fort and dedication, and not with artificial enhancement and engineering. 
(WADA Official Publication Play True 2008)
Sigmund Loland points out that the prospect of  gene transfer for enhancement 
purposes is so disturbing for sports ethics because it forces us to acknowledge 
that the “natural lottery” of  genetics is increasingly getting less random as our 
knowledge of  human genetics expands. Writes Loland: “It is an individual’s 
genetic predisposition to develop phenotypes of  relevance to performance 
in the sport in question. The distribution of  talent in the natural lottery is 
a random process.” (Loland 2002, 69) In this sense, gene transfer would 
challenge the spirit of  sport as defined by Murray as above, because genetic 
interventions would undermine the very ability of  sport to distinguish those 
who passively inherit their talents from their progenitors, from those who 
actively acquired them from their physicians, or through some other external 
means. Michael Sandel also wrote on genetic enhancement as corrupting the 
spirit of  sport:
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The real problem with genetically altered athletes is that they corrupt athletic 
competition as a human activity that honors the cultivation as display of  
natural talents. (Sandel 2004, 55)
Implicit in Murray’s and Sandel’s statements and in WADA’s definition of  
doping there is a deeply value-laden interpretation of  sport, comprising 
an “intrinsic value” or an “essence” of  Olympism. Neither WADA nor its 
spokespersons, though, attempt to spell out what this essence is. This is what 
the WADA Code says in regard to the mission of  preserving the “spirit of  
sport”:
Anti-doping programs seek to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about 
sport. This intrinsic value is often referred to as the “spirit of  sport,” it is 
the essence of  Olympism; [it] is characterized by the following values: ethics, 
fair play and honesty, health, excellence in performance, character and edu-
cation, fun and joy, teamwork, dedication and commitment, respect for rule 
and laws, respect for self  and other participants, courage, community and 
solidarity. Doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of  sport. (WADA 
Code 2012)
But the explanation of  what these values amount to and of  why certain kinds 
of  enhancement actually threaten them is missing. As argued extensively in 
Camporesi and Maugeri (2011)4, while an appropriate analysis of  the ethi-
cal justifiability of  genetic enhancement in sports must take into account an 
analysis of  the values of  sports, the assumption of  “essentialism” in sports 
seems to be unwarranted.
Indeed, professional sport is highly technological, as athletes nowadays 
are able to improve their performances with a larger array of  aids than in the 
past. Talk of  purity of  sports overlooks that all elite sports are both “play and 
display,” i.e., they thrive both on “internal goods” after MacIntyre (MacIn-
tyre 1984) (such values as commitment, channelled concentration, controlled 
aggression and power, courage in the face of  suffering, dedication, strategic 
intensity, tenacity, to name but a few of  the virtues of  sports), and on external 
4  Partly included in this work in section 4.4.
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goods or rewards, as the achievement of  considerable esteem, glory, honour, 
and wealth. (McNamee 2008). It is also important to note how the norms that 
govern sports are highly heterogeneous. Therefore, when evaluating the im-
pact of  gene enhancement on athletic performance, we should ask ourselves 
to what extent, if  any, genetic technologies enhance or diminish our admira-
tion for human athletic achievements, in relation to a particular sport. 
As argued by Tom Douglas (2007), the case for restricting enhancement is 
stronger in sports than outside sports, due to the different values intrinsic in 
the practice of  sports and in other practices. This distinction depends on how 
genetic technologies affect the way in which we admire elite athletes and their 
achievements. Douglas spells out two main models for what it is that that we 
admire most in elite athletes, namely the “Athenian” model, where the value 
and meaning of  sports lies in revealing the natural potential of  athletes; and 
the “effort” model, where the value and meaning of  sports lies in rewarding 
and praising athletes for their hard work and effort.
The adoption of  the Athenian model only though seems unrealistic, as 
we normally allow all kinds of  external edges to enhance the natural potential, 
i.e., training/equipment/facilities (eye and knee surgery, training in hyperbaric 
rooms, and so on). But a position based only on effort does not correspond 
either to how we normally value and perceive sports, as we do not praise or 
admire professional athletes only for ‘trying hard’ without succeeding. Neither 
of  the two models, taken alone, can be a plausible account of  what we value 
in sports. A more realistic view is one that combines the two and holds that 
the outcomes of  sport should be determined by natural ability and effort, and 
that we value sport because it serves as a test of  these two characteristics. For 
these reasons, I think that a better approach to define the ethical permissibility 
of  a gene enhancement technology is the following, which reflects on how a 
technology affects a sports practice in a contextualized way:
Cooper defines technology as a “human-made means to serve human in-
terests and goals.” (Cooper 1995) Elaborating on Cooper’s definition, Loland 
defines sports technology as a human-made means to serve human interests 
and goals in or related to sport. (Loland 2009) Murray, when evaluating the 
role of  a technology in sports, outlines three possible outcomes in relation to 
an ethical standard (Murray 2009a, 157–9):
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A technology may be ethically desirable: insofar as it may, for example, reduce 
the impact of  factors other than natural talents and their virtuous perfection 
by reducing unequal access to the legitimate means of  enhancing performance. 
Example: hypoxic chamber (levelling the playing field for athletes who because 
of  geography or lack of  money, cannot “live high, train low”). 
A technology may be ethically permissible: they are ethically “neutral” in 
respect to the relation between talent, virtue and performance. For example, 
inequalities of  access to superb coaching and training facilities are very per-
vasive. Normally the differential access of  athletes due to their geographical 
and economical conditions to different degrees of  coaching and of  training 
facilities is regarded as a tolerable inequality, a status quo.
A technology may be ethically prohibited: this should be the case when it un-
dermines the meaning of  sport by interfering significantly with the relation-
ship between natural talents, their virtuous perfection, and athletic success. 
Examples: blood doping, EPO.
The question then becomes: In which of  the above categories can we find 
genetic enhancements? I argue that is a matter of  context, and of  spelling 
out the values intrinsic in the practice under scrutiny. In the following section 
I consider one of  the latest applications of  biomedical innovation applied 
directly from the bench to track & field, namely the use of  gene transfer to 
increase circulation and tolerance to pain in patients and in athletes engaged 
in endurance races. 
 
3.2 Gene transfer for pain: A tool to cope with the intractable, 
or an unethical endurance-enhancing technology? 
We consider here5 two plausible scenarios in which an individual is seeking 
treatment with gene transfer tools to cope better with pain. In the first sce-
5 This section first appeared in a slightly different form in Life Sciences, Society and 
Policy Journal (2012):8(1):20-31 with title “Gene Transfer for Pain: A tool to cope 
with the intractable, or an unethical endurance-enhancing technology?,” co-
authored with Mike McNamee.
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nario the individual is a patient; in the second an athlete. The general question 
explored here is whether it is ethically justifiable for the individual to seek an 
experimental gene transfer treatment in order to raise her tolerance to pain. 
We employ here a comparative strategy to highlight the similarities and dis-
similarities between the ethical frameworks used to evaluate the two scenarios, 
and to reach conclusions regarding the justifiability of  the potential practice.
Untreatable pain represents an enormous problem to society. As estimat-
ed by current statistics, approximately 20 per cent of  the adult population 
suffers from chronic pain, and the financial cost to society is estimated at 
more than €200 billion per annum in Europe, and $150 billion per annum in 
the US. (Tracey and Bushnell 2009) Treatment options are limited, with many 
patients either not responding or having incomplete pain reduction. (Breivik 
et al. 2006) In the last decade, several translational clinical trials have been 
carried out that employed gene transfer tools to try to overcome this medical 
need. Gene transfer trials certainly qualify as translational trials, as they are 
designed to bring to the bedside the tools developed at the bench of  a mo-
lecular biology laboratory. A search performed with keywords “gene transfer” 
and “pain” on the National Health Institutes clinical trials revealed 20 clinical 
trials that are either completed or in recruitment. (Clinicaltrials.gov 2014a) 
To date eleven clinical trials have been completed. (Clinicaltrials.gov 2014a) 
Some of  these trials are aimed at treating intractable cancer pain, some at 
treating pain associated with angina pectoris, others at epidermolysis bullosa 
(a heritable condition where connective tissue disease causes painful blisters 
in the skin and mucosal membranes), and others to treat the pain associated 
with peripheral arterial occlusion (a mini-stroke in the leg which causes the ne-
crosis of  muscular tissue leading to impaired functionality and chronic pain). 
This last kind of  pain, and the related clinical trial, serves as a case study for 
our comparative evaluation between a medical context and a sports context, 
where the former is a traditionally conceived therapeutic intervention, and the 
latter is one where the intervention rests in the grey zone between therapy and 
enhancement – or as it has been labelled, therapeutic enhancement. (Tannsjo 
2010) We set out the two scenarios below and evaluate them ethically accord-
ing to two different frameworks.
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Scenario (a): The Patient
In scenario (a), the protagonist of  the US TV series Dr Gregory House, 
suffered from peripheral ischemia to a leg, which left him limping and with 
intractable chronic pain, due to the extensive necrotic muscular tissue in 
his thigh muscles. He is seeking an alternative solution in a gene transfer 
clinical trial. Dr House can perhaps be seen as a contemporary instance of  
the archetypical mythological figure of  the “wounded healer” Chiron, who 
is able to heal others but unable to heal himself. After having tried many 
standard and less standard treatments unsuccessfully, our protagonist is now 
seeking experimental treatments, i.e. treatments that are currently being tested 
in clinical trials and not yet approved by national regulatory bodies such as the 
US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) or the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA), and are unavailable on the market. Among the gene transfer trials 
currently active or recruiting, one study stands out as the perfect match for a 
patient like Gregory House. The trial (Identifier # NCT00304837) is a Phase 
1 study that seeks to transfer the DNA codifying for Vascular Endothelial 
Growth Factor (VEGF) in the legs of  patients with peripheral artery disease 
(PAD). (Clinicaltrials.gov 2014b) PAD encompasses a range of  conditions 
presenting with blockages in the arteries in the limbs. The nature of  the 
disease is progressive, so that it frequently leads to patients presenting with 
claudication (i.e. limping) or critical limb ischemia (CLI). (Mughal et al. 2012) 
It is this former manifestation of  PAD that I will discuss in what follows. 
Most Phase 1 studies are aimed at testing the safety of  a new pharmaceutical 
or treatment in a restricted number of  patients, after the treatment has 
proved efficacious in laboratory testing and animal models, but some – like 
this one – may also test the efficacy of  the agent under study. According to 
the trial protocol, the DNA codifying for the VEGF protein is injected into 
the affected legs of  the trial subjects on three separate occasions, each two 
weeks apart. The DNA codifier then directs the cells of  the artery wall to 
increase production of  VEGF, which has been shown to cause new blood 
vessels to grow around the blockages in the leg arteries. (Mughal et al. 2012) 
It has also been demonstrated that increased VEGF expression through gene 
transfer techniques improves microcirculation in muscle, and hence increased 
oxygen and nutrient supply, as well as removal of  waste products. (Giacca 
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and Zacchigna 2012) Kim et al. have observed evidence of  growth of  new 
collateral vessels, relief  of  ischemic pain and ulcer healing in patients with 
CLI. (Kim et al. 2004) The NCT00304837 trial aims not only at testing the 
safety of  VEGF-gene transfer, but also at improving rest pain and/or healing 
the ulcers caused by PAD. (Clinicaltrials.gov 2013b) Generally speaking, 
safety concerns about gene transfer are related both to the kind of  carrier/
vector being used (usually a modified virus) and to the encoded transgene. In 
this case study, the former are eliminated by injecting the DNA coding for 
the VEGF protein directly into the patients’ leg muscles, without any viral 
or non-viral carrier, thus eliminating the risks inherent in the vectors and 
common to many other gene transfer trials. As to the latter risks, it has been 
shown that overexpression of  VEGF causes haemangiomas (benign tumours 
characterised by an increased number of  normal or abnormal vessels filled 
with blood) in skeletal muscle in mouse animal models. (Springer et al. 1998) 
In addition, angiogenesis can have detrimental consequences in non-target 
tissues. In particular, it can facilitate tumour vascularization (and therefore, 
increased growth) or plaque angiogenesis in non-target tissues. (Baumgartner 
2000) Transient peripheral edema (swelling) due to increased local perfusion 
is a relatively common and mild side effect. More serious adverse effects 
have rarely been observed and are mostly related to the use of  viral vectors, 
therefore are not pertinent to this trial where DNA is injected in the form of  
a plasmid (a circular molecule of  DNA). (Muona et al. 2012) A recent study 
conducted by Muona and co-authors and aimed at assessing the long-term 
side effects (10+years) of  local VEGF gene transfer to ischemic lower limbs 
found that adenovirus or plasmid or liposome mediated intravascular local 
gene transfer does not increase the risk of  malignancies, diabetes or any other 
disease in the long term. The authors also identified as a key element to safe 
gene transfer the local delivery, which reduced the risk of  systematic spread of  
the vector, as well of  adverse side-effects to other organs. This suggests that 
the technique described here could be safely applied both in trial subjects and 
in healthy individuals (which is pertinent to Scenario (b), below).
As noted by Mughal et al., PAD cannot be attributed to one specific ge-
netic cause, and greater therapeutic efficacy could be obtained by targeted 
gene transfer using multiple growth factors. (Mughal et al. 2012) Indeed, an-
giogenic gene transfer strategies such as VEGF gene transfer are by no means 
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the only ones being explored in the treatment of  chronic pain, (Goins, Cohen, 
and Glorioso 2012) but appear to be among the most advanced in terms of  
clinical development, while other strategies are still at the pre-clinical level 
(animal studies). While a certain degree of  speculation is necessary in this 
thought experiment, there seems to be sufficient scientific and medical evi-
dence to argue that gene transfer for pain has very plausible applications for 
enhancing athletic performances.
Scenario (b): The elite athlete
In scenario (b), the would-be protagonist is an elite athlete competing in an 
endurance event, such as cross-country skiing, marathon running, tour cycling, 
triathlon, or another event of  similar extended duration. This hypothetical elite 
athlete is seeking VEGF-gene transfer for two reasons: a) to cope better with 
the pain inherent in the event, and b) to perform better and gain a competitive 
advantage. The growth of  blood vessels in the limbs, as demonstrated by the 
clinical trial described above, is likely to aid the athlete in her performance 
by increasing the oxygen-carrying capacity to the limbs (nutrient supply) and 
the removal of  waste products. It is also obvious that an athlete feeling less 
pain could perform better, ceteribus paribus, than other athletes experiencing a 
greater degree of  pain.
Comparing the scenarios
How are we to understand the similarities and differences between these two 
scenarios, and to what extent will the context determine whether it is ethically 
justifiable for an individual to seek an experimental gene transfer treatment 
to cope better with pain? To what extent is the ethical permissibility of  the 
practice dependent upon the context of  gene transfer? We respond to these 
questions by spelling out two ethical frameworks that might be adopted in 
order to analyse the two scenarios.
Scenario (a): Ethics of  translational research
We do not normally regard pain as an essential or valuable part of  our 
lives. On the contrary, we take measures to diminish or if  possible eliminate 
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pain from our daily lives, and from the lives of  those who are dear to us. Even 
in illnesses where pain is present, we try to eliminate it, although it may not 
be possible to cure the patient of  the underlying cause. Palliative care, which 
we consider an essential part of  treating a sick human being with dignity, is 
predicated on such an understanding.
The first framework we use to analyse the scenarios is (a) is the “ethics of  
translational research” approach recently developed by Jonathan Kimmelman. 
(Kimmelman 2010) Kimmelman develops the concept of  ‘translational 
distance,’ which refers to the space created between cutting-edge biomedical 
research, and clinical applications. This new concept is necessary as it is not 
possible to apply the concept of  “clinical equipoise,” as defined by Freedman 
as “a state of  honest, professional disagreement in the community of  experts 
about the preferred treatment,” (Freedman 1987) to translational trials such 
as gene transfer trials. This happens because the level of  uncertainty is so 
high in first-in-human research employing gene transfer techniques that the 
robust epistemic thresholds required for clinical equipoise cannot be secured. 
In its place, the concept of  translational distance is a useful and insightful kind 
of  “epistemic heuristics” to understand the bidirectional flow of  knowledge 
between the bench and the bedside. While traditionally the value of  early 
clinical trials has been regarded only in terms of  their “progressive value” 
towards later Phase 2 and Phase 3 studies, in Kimmelman’s model Phase 1 
translational studies have a “bidirectional, non -progressive” epistemic value 
if  they stimulate preclinical research or if  they stimulate further clinical 
development. In addition, adopting a translational distance model with 
a non-progressive epistemic value for these trials would help to dispel the 
“therapeutic misconception” (Henderson et al. 2006; Horng and Grady 
2003) which is a widespread phenomenon among (often desperate) Phase I 
clinical trials participants. Therapeutic misconception arises when subjects 
misinterpret the primary purpose of  a clinical trial as therapeutic, and conflate 
the goals of  research with the goals of  clinical care. As shown in a study of  
consent documents of  gene transfer clinical trials, 20 per cent of  consent 
documents for gene transfer trials fail to explain their purpose as establishing 
safety and dosage, while only 41 per cent of  oncology trials identify palliative 
care as an alternative to participation. Moreover, the term gene therapy is 
used with twice the frequency of  the term gene transfer. (Kimmelman and 
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Levenstadt 2005) As defined by Kimmelman, the concept of  translational 
distance “is intended to prompt researchers, review committees, and policy-
makers to contemplate the size of  the ‘inferential gap’ separating completed 
preclinical studies and projected human trial results,” (Kimmelman 2010, 118) 
and should inform both the design of  the studies (that need to incorporate 
endpoints that make it possible for the knowledge produced to have an impact 
in terms of  further research), and the ethical approval of  the trial. This needs 
to take into account the concept of  translational distance rather than that of  
clinical equipoise, as the former better captures the reality of  how information 
flows in translational research. As for the individual seeking to be enrolled 
in such an experimental trial, we recommend that researchers spell out the 
potential risks and benefits of  the experimental procedure to the would-be 
volunteer. Researchers should also evaluate the severity of  the pre-existing 
condition in the subject and its refractoriness to other standard treatments; 
and they should evaluate the subject’s decisional autonomy, which will be 
predicated on reasonable comprehension (and voluntariness) in relation to 
the foregoing.
Returning to our fictional protagonist, we can see that in this particu-
lar case the risks inherent in gene transfer trials due to the viral vectors are 
eliminated by injecting VEGF directly into the leg muscles of  the patients, 
and therefore the translational distance between the bench and the bedside 
can also be considered a modest “inferential gap.” In addition, the pre-existing 
condition of  chronic pain caused by peripheral artery ischemia is severe and 
refractory to standard treatment. Finally, Dr Gregory House seems to be in a 
position to make an autonomous decision, one that is not clouded by thera-
peutic misconception. As autonomy plays a fundamental role in the ethical 
framework describing the medical context, there would need to be strong rea-
sons to justify interference with the patient’s self-regarding and autonomous 
choice to participate in the trial, even recognising – as we do – that the patient 
may have no available option (apart from palliative care) other than participat-
ing in the trial, due to the severity of  his condition and the unavailability of  
therapeutic alternatives. Provided that all the above conditions were met, we 
might reasonably conclude that his informed consent to participating in the 
VEGF-clinical trial would be valid.
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Scenario (b): Ethics of  sports enhancement
How should we frame the request of  an athlete seeking VEGF-gene 
transfer for the purposes of  better coping with pain during a competition? In 
the first instance, her participation might look like a case of  what we could call 
“physician-assisted doping.” As already mentioned, the World Anti-Doping 
Agency (WADA) sets out three criteria used in the decision to call a product 
or process “doping.” (WADA Code 2012) These pertain to (i) the (potential) 
performance-enhancing effects; (ii) the potential harm to health; the (poten-
tial) health risks. Only two criteria need apply for a product or process to be 
prohibited. The Anti-Doping Code recognises the rights of  athletes to secure 
healthcare, and that this right supersedes anti-doping regulations. This does 
not, however, allow the patient-athlete carte blanche. Prior to utilising banned 
products or processes athletes on a registered testing pool (who are on notice 
that they may be randomly tested) must submit a Therapeutic Use Exemption 
(TUE) Certificate signed by a relevant medical authority. This certifies that 
the therapy is necessary for the athlete’s condition and that no nondoping 
alternative is available. Clearly, the process is open to abuse. Leaving aside for 
the present the added complexities of  unethical behaviour, let us assume that 
our athlete is asking for a TUE from the relevant authority. In addition to the 
World Anti-Doping Agency, this might be an International Federation, such 
as the International Association of  Athletics Federations (IAAF), or an event 
organiser such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) or the Inter-
national Paralympic Committee, who (interestingly) take exclusive charge of  
in-competition testing during the Olympic and Paralympic Games. There is 
very little to suggest that a TUE would be achievable in this scenario. Despite 
TUE precedents for beta-blockers in relation to cardiac patient-athletes in 
target-accuracy events (such as archery), it is highly unlikely that a TUE would 
be given for mere pain relief  where that pain is simply a marker for injury 
(and where there may be performance enhancement side effects). The deputy 
director of  the World Anti Doping Laboratory in Cologne, widely recognised 
as one of  the premier testing laboratories, recently remarked upon the practice 
of  using analgesics as analogous to doping:
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It is a grey zone. In my opinion pain killers fulfil all requirements of  a dop-
ing substance because normally pain is a protection mechanism of  the body 
and with pain killers you switch off  this protection system. (McGrath 2012)
Given the longstanding routine use and abuse of  painkillers in elite sport, 
(Huizenga 1995; Nixon 1992; Nixon 1993) it might be argued that the intro-
duction of  VEGF would represent merely an extension of  everyday practice. 
In both scenarios analyzed here, consideration would have to be given to the 
autonomy of  the decision-making of  the individual in reaching an ethically 
justifiable intervention. While in the second scenario, this could be deemed a 
necessary condition, in the first scenario it might be considered both a nec-
essary and sufficient condition, provided that the conditions for a modest 
translational distance were met, as they are in our case study. Why then can 
an autonomous decision not be regarded as a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion also in the context of  elite sports? Well, in addition to determining the 
conditions of  consent, additional factors regarding the ethical permissibility 
of  VEGF-gene transfer in an athletic context must be considered:
In contrast to scenario (a), pain can be seen as an essential, integral part 
of  endurance sports. Performing at an elite level in endurance sport and not 
experiencing pain are mutually exclusive. Indeed, an athlete’s ability to tolerate 
pain is one of  the fundamental characteristics that determine athletic perfor-
mance and provide an advantage in competition. Lance Armstrong famously 
referred to the Tour de France as “an exercise in pointless suffering.”(Fry 
2006) He and others have talked insightfully about wanting to take opponents 
(metaphorically) to places that they could not endure. (Hamilton 2012) The 
capacity to endure high levels of  pain over significant time is a highly prized 
trait in multi-day/week Tour event cycling. (Hamilton 2012) Indeed one may 
refer to endurance cyclists as “communities of  suffering.” (McNamee 2008) 
Not only is it the case that we must distinguish the experience of  pain from 
suffering, (Cassell 2004) in sports (Lurie 2006; McNamee 2006), but in addi-
tion there are, of  course, different kinds of  pain an athlete can experience in 
competition. (Koessler 2006) One is the acute kind that can be defined as an 
intense and specific pain that occurs suddenly, frequently a result of  injury, and 
often experienced by athletes competing in football or other contact sports. 
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Moreover, one can experience such pain in endurance events too – the cycle 
crash, the herniated disc in running, and so on. VEGF-gene transfer treatment 
would be meaningless for this kind of  pain, so it is irrelevant to this discus-
sion. Rather, we wish to discuss the kind of  pain that occurs during endurance 
exercise. This may include muscle soreness or a burning sensation in the lungs, 
the feeling that one’s heart will explode if  the same level of  intense effort is 
maintained much longer, and so forth. The strength of  these sensations can 
range from unpleasant to what is typically thought of  as unbearable pain. 
This second kind of  pain is typical of  endurance sports such as marathons, 
triathlon, long distance swimming and cycling, cross-country skiing, and so 
on. Among athletes, the former kind of  pain is often referred to as a “bad” 
kind, as it impairs the ability of  the athlete to continue playing or competing, 
while the latter is referred to as a “good” kind of  pain, as it pushes the athlete 
to compete and perform at a higher level. Indeed, many athletes regard this 
second or “good kind” of  pain as an achievement, and as an essential part of  
their life and identity as elite athletes. (Howe 2004)
The level of  physical training of  an athlete can raise the level of  pain 
that he/she is able to endure, and make a difference in his/her performance. 
Athletes also report that the level of  their “mental toughness” (Crust 2007; 
Gucciardi, Gordon, and Dimmock 2009) makes a difference in their ability to 
cope with pain. Different individuals, though, start from very different base-
lines in their abilities to endure pain, (Dolgin 2010) and this is one of  the fac-
tors, among many other biological and environmental factors, that affect an 
athlete’s performance. Among these are: their birth place (contrast pre-athletic 
life at altitude, and how this affects phenotypic factors, with competitors born 
at or near sea level); wealth and other non-athletic factors that can enhance 
the possibilities of  success (contrast athletes or teams with and without sports 
psychological services, or sponsorships that improve equipment access), ge-
netic conditions that may confer an advantage over fellow athletes by increas-
ing the amount of  erythrocytes and oxygen supply to muscle cells (consider 
for example the case of  Finnish skier Eero Mäntyranta who won two gold 
medals in cross-country skiing at the 1964 Winter Olympics). It was later discov-
ered that he had primary familial and congenital polycythemia (PFCP), which 
causes an increase in red blood cell mass and haemoglobin due to a mutation in 
the erythropoietin receptor (EPOR) gene. (Tannsjo 2005; Epstein 2013) 
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There is no absolutely agreed upon standard or trigger as to when sports 
administrators or regulatory bodies like WADA try to even out genetic and 
biological differences to reach a sufficiently “level playing field” for all athletes: 
some inequalities are systematically excluded, while others are ignored. (Loland 
2002) What happens in practice is that we do not usually try to level out 
biological and genetic factors affecting athletic performance, even where we 
know that those factors confer an advantage (as with Mäntyranta), although 
there has been a lively debate about new IAAF and IOC rules which exclude 
women athletes with hyperandrogenism from competing in women’s events 
on the basis of  a supposed unfair advantage derived from increased levels of  
testosterone. (Camporesi and Maugeri 2010; Karkazis et al. 2012) Typically, 
philosophers generally agree that the question centres around notions of  
fairness and equal opportunity, or what Loland calls Fair Opportunity 
Principle. (Loland 2009)
Let us think counter-factually here: if  we were to try to equalise all the 
starting conditions (of  which tolerance to pain is, again, merely one example) 
we would move in the direction of  having all athletes crossing the finish line 
at the same point, and then what would be left of  the meaning of  sport and 
athletic performance? After all we are precisely interested in distinguishing 
among excellent performers and performances. Only in certain circumstances, 
such as horse racing, do sports institutions initiate handicapping systems. And 
this, it might reasonably be argued, is to keep the competition tight and pro-
mote gambling interests. In other scenarios, where a league system – heavily 
underwritten by commercial media interests – has an incentive to prolong in-
terests and more broadly spread opportunities to win, we find systems like the 
lower teams gaining access to the best new potential players in a draft system 
(such as in American Football). But in the main, we would not normally level 
out the effects of  the genetic lottery in sports. If  an athlete is 1 metre 40 we 
steer them away from high jump. If  they are 2 metres tall, we do not encour-
age them to pursue a career as a professional jockey, and so on. 
As mentioned above, different athletes have different baselines and 
different abilities to cope with pain. While we do try to give people tools 
better to cope with pain in everyday life, where pain is not seen to be an 
essential or meaningful part of  the activity we are performing, in the elite-
sports context we do not give people those tools, because pain, as described 
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above, is a fundamental part of  practising and competing at an elite level. Pain 
can be distinguished from non-relevant inequalities, as for example the kind 
of  shoes or swimsuits or bikes the athletes run, swim or cycle with, which do 
not impact upon the mental and physical qualities that are the source of  our 
admiration for athletes and which are instrumental to the securing of  victory. 
For these sorts of  products, however, we can and do insist upon degrees 
of  standardisation. Thus, in baseball, cricket, or tennis there are regulations 
regarding the size and composition of  the striking implement and the ball. 
Curiously, in Formula 1 racing there are prizes for both the best driver and the 
best constructors: the best supporting team of  engineers and technologists. 
But even here there are strict rules about engineering variations. In European 
football, there are even suggestions that there should be financial fair play, 
so that team owners cannot “buy” victory by purchasing sufficiently large 
numbers of  the talent pool. We cannot, however, “level-out” the capacity 
for enduring pain in endurance events without usurping or compromising 
a key psychological variable inherent within the test. By levelling the ability 
to endure pain, we would also diminish a substantial part of  the meaning 
of  athletic performance, which can be understood as trying to break one’s 
own limits given the starting conditions one has. That is why the toleration 
of  pain qualifies as a relevant inequality that serves inter alia to demarcate 
athletic merit. That is also why we consider that genetically based therapy for 
pain should not be permitted as it would undermine the meaning of  sport by 
interfering significantly “with the relationship between natural talents, their 
virtuous perfection, and athletic success.” (Murray 2009a) In other words, 
our view of  the athlete’s capacity for pain tolerance is that it should be seen 
as a relevant inequality and essential for the meaning of  competition. In the 
model developed by Loland and Hoppeler that combines a biologically based 
approach with a Fair Opportunity principle, the use of  VEGF transfer could 
be understood as a way to go beyond human phenotypic plasticity, and thus 
to go against the Fair Opportunity principle and the idea of  the virtuous 
development of  talent. (Loland and Hoppeler 2012)
To conclude, the differences between the two scenarios we have presented 
are many and varied. In the latter the choice is fundamentally a self-regarding 
one, predicated on individual autonomy together with a risk/benefits calcula-
tion as the principal factor determining the ethics of  that decision. Neverthe-
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less, in elite endurance sports contexts individual autonomy ceases to play 
the decisive role in the ethical analysis. Sports have traditionally incorporated 
paternalistic practices regarding the health of  competitors but also the fairness 
of  the structuring of  competition in order to produce admirable victors. The 
context of  gene-transfer matters for the evaluation of  the ethical desirability 
or permissibility of  the experimental practice we are analysing: while in an 
everyday life scenario, pain does not play a meaningful role (with some noted 
exceptions), pain does play a meaningful and constitutive role in endurance 
athletic competition, along with a range of  other anatomical, physiological and 
psychological factors. By increasing the capacity for pain-tolerance, or even 
subtracting it altogether from the sports picture, we would inevitably subtract 
also a fundamental part of  the meaning of  that picture. We conclude, there-
fore, that while we would not interfere with the decision of  Dr House to be 
enrolled in a trial for VEGF-gene transfer, we could not justify the request of  
the athlete seeking VEGF-gene transfer to increase her tolerance to pain. As a 
tool to cope with the intractable pain that visits afflicted patients, VEGF-gene 
transfer is ethically justifiable and desirable. In endurance sports, the use of  
VEGF-gene transfer as an endurance enhancement technology is not merely 
ethically unjustifiable; it compromises an element essential to the activity itself.
In the next section I consider the ethical implications of  genetic technolo-
gies to identify and measure children’s potentials.
3.3 Genetic technologies to scout out children’s precocious 
talents
At first glance, the use of  genetic technologies after-birth would seem to be 
less controversial than the use of  genetic technology at the embryonic or foe-
tal stage: after all, how much can genetic technologies really shape an already 
existing person? And also: do we not already grant a great degree of  leeway to 
parents in deciding how to rear and educate their children? Parents can impose 
their religion, hobbies, choice of  school and friends on their children, and go 
to great lengths to “nurture” their children’s talents: from submitting them to 
heavy training schedules, to hiring private teachers or tutors, to sending their 
children to intensive summer camps, and so on. While these practices are oc-
casionally subjected to criticisms for their strictness, it is generally accepted 
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that parents can steer their children even aggressively in a particular direction. 
Not only, but we usually think that parents whose children exhibit precocious 
talents are bestowed with a duty to nurture them, and would not be consid-
ered to be “good parents” if  they failed to do so. Michael Sandel wrote on 
this point:
We usually admire parents who seek the best for their children, who spare 
no effort to help them achieve happiness and success. Some parents confer 
advantages on their children by enrolling them in expensive schools, hiring 
private tutors, sending them to tennis camp, providing them with piano les-
sons, ballet lessons, swimming lessons, SAT-prep courses,6 and so on. If  
it is permissible and even admirable for parents to help their children in 
these ways, why isn’t it equally admirable for parents to use whatever genetic 
technologies may emerge (provided they are safe) to enhance their children’s 
intelligence, musical ability, or athletic prowess? (Sandel 2004, 7)
Parental attitudes like those described above by Sandel are not unique to 
genetic enhancements. They are, instead, new instances of  old practices of  
child-rearing, which existed before there was any talk or discussion or en-
hancement. (DeGrazia 2012, 128–9) While I agree with DeGrazia that ag-
gressive talent scouting practices are nothing new, I do not think concerns 
about these practices can be dismissed so easily only by references to other, 
established ones. Instead, the use of  genetic technologies to gain a competitive 
advantage in children should function as a “wake up call,” borrowing from 
Dena Davis (Davis 1997), to prompt an ethical reflection on other problem-
atic parental attitudes. 
In this section I would like to challenge the arguments used to justify the 
use of  genetic technologies to scout out children’s athletic talents: is it always 
permissible or admirable for parents to “help” their children in such ways? It 
seems to me that the parental quality of  nurturing children’s talents is a de-
gree-quality, i.e. it remains a quality only if  exercised to a certain extent. If  this 
is the case, it is legitimate to ask to what extent nurturing a talent is indeed an 
admirable attitude in parents, and above which, if  any, threshold it ceases to be 
6  A standardized test for most college admissions in the United States
  From bench to track & field           95
admirable, and becomes actually of  detriment to children. Therefore, instead 
of  condoning new practices of  talent-scouting and talent-nurturing on the 
basis of  established old child-rearing practices, I think we should question the 
latter ones through the light shed by the former. Let us analyse a specific case: 
genetic tests to measure children’s musical potential. 
John Robertson has discussed the case of  parents using genetic tests and 
PGD to select children with “perfect pitch.” It is known that the gene for the 
perfect pitch runs in an autosomal dominant pattern, even though it has not 
been identified yet. (Robertson 2003, 464–466) Robertson imagines a future in 
which the gene has been identified, and where parents who have a strong inter-
est in the musical abilities of  their children may be willing to undergo IVF and 
PGD “to ensure this foundation for musical ability in their child.” (Robertson 
2003, 465) While the case discussed by Robertson remains a thought-experi-
ment, it is not so far-fetched. The question is whether this request should be 
accepted or denied. Robertson argues that it should be accepted on the basis 
of  the following argument: since parents “clearly have a right to instil or devel-
op their child’s musical ability after birth” (465) therefore, “they might plausi-
bly argue that they should have that right before birth as well.” But is this really 
the case? To what extent do parents have a right to instil and develop their 
children’s musical ability? Do they have a right to do so from the age of  3, 4, 
or 5 years old? As a matter of  fact, putting talented children in music or sports 
programs at the earliest possible age is necessary to maximize the particular 
option to become a successful professional in that field. But, if  that is the case, 
how many hours a day, or a week, do parents have a right to impose musical 
exercises on their children? Do they have a right to do so at the expenses of  
children being “children,” (i.e., experiencing childhood) on the basis that the 
goal of  creating successful musicians justifies any means? 
As mentioned above, Robertson justifies the use of  genetic technologies 
to select children with the perfect pitch on the basis of  older and more 
established practices of  “nurturing” children’s athletic talents, or of  imposing 
on children the parental religion. Writes Robertson: “Parents … are free 
to instil and develop musical ability once the child is born, just as they are 
entitled to instil particular religious views.” (Robertson 2003, 465) Contrary 
to Robertson, I do not think that the broad leeway parents currently have of  
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inculcating their children with their religious views should be justified. Children 
should be left free to have a certain degrees of  options open in front of  them, 
so that they may flourish as full and autonomous human beings. Children 
should not be left to become the objects of  parental aspirations and to fulfill 
their parents’ expectation. It is important to reiterate that Robertson’s example 
of  the “perfect pitch” should not be considered only as a far-fetched thought 
experiment. As a matter of  fact, parents are now able to resort to genetic tests 
sold online to scout out their children’s potential for athletic performance, as I 
will detail in the next paragraph, and genetic tests to select for the perfect pitch 
may soon become available too.7
3.4 Direct-to-consumer genetic tests to “measure” athletic 
potential
As pointed out by Suter (2007), genetic technologies are particularly worri-
some, as they open up a plethora of  new ways in which parents can shape their 
children’s ways and lives from very early on. In this section I analise the ethical 
implications of  the recent boom of  DTC genetic tests to – supposedly - mea-
sure children’s athletic potential (Macur 2008; Stein 2011). This market is pre-
dominantly based in the United Stated, but not limited to it, as noted below.
In the United States, there are at least seven companies that sell DTC-ge-
netic tests for sports performance or related traits. (Roth 2012) As the compa-
nies’ data is proprietary, it is not clear exactly how many parents – and coaches! 
– are using these tests. A reasonable extrapolation puts the count in the order 
of  several hundreds. (Brooks and Tarini 2011) In addition, since these tests 
are available on the Internet and quite affordable (in the range of  $100-300), 
the market is not limited only to the US, but is open to potential customers in 
the UK, Europe or the rest of  the world. Customers outside the US can order 
the test online and only have to pay higher shipping expenses for the test kit. 
It needs to be noted here that European regulations recommend, but do not 
7 The following section first appeared in a slightly modified form in 
Sport, Ethics & Philosophy (2013): 7(2):175-185, title “Bend it like Beck-
ham! The ethics of  genetically testing children for athletic potential”, doi 
:10.1080/17511321.2013.780183
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require, genetic tests to be performed with a genetic counselling service.  (Mc-
Namee et al. 2009; Camporesi and McNamee 2013) With these tests, parents 
aim to gain an early advantage for their children, which would allow their chil-
dren to turn already at an early age into professional athletes. In doing so, par-
ents aim for an enhancement, which is seen mainly as a positional advantage. 
What, if  anything, is problematic with these practices? In the previous 
chapter I argued that parents should not be allowed to resort to PGD to 
choose to have deaf  children like themselves, on the basis of  the rights of  the 
children to a/an (sufficiently) open future, and on the limits of  parental re-
productive freedom when it infringes on the children’s capacity for self-deter-
mination. (Camporesi 2010) Compared to the use of  PGD to conceive deaf  
children, the use of  genetic technologies to scout out children’s precocious 
athletic talents would seem prima facie to be a much less “radical” intervention, 
and as such it could be too easily dismissed as within the remit of  parental 
education strategies. I would like to avoid here, though, such an easy dismissal. 
To start with, it should be noted that the use of  DTC- genetic tests does 
not always go alone, but at times can be paired to more ‘traditional” methods 
for talent scouting, as a story published by the CNN shows. (Chang 2009) The 
story tells of  a camp set up in Chongqing, a major city in south-west China. 
In the so-called “Children’s Palace,” about thirty children between the ages of  
3 and 12 years old were selected to participate in an “innovative programme” 
that combined traditional methods of  talent scouting with genetic testing, 
with the goal of  providing Chinese children with “an effective, scientific plan 
[of  development] at an early age” as put by Director Zhao Mingyou. (Chang 
2009) The Chinese Government would then take care of  implementing this 
“effective, scientific plan,” by rearing the children in highly specialized acad-
emies or “boarding schools.” An article appearing in the British tabloid Daily 
Mail during the London 2012 Olympics referred to these boarding schools 
as “talent factories”, and pointed out that: “The school system causes family 
separation for weeks on end but the parents do not always mind. The socio-
economic climate means many of  them welcome the education their children 
receive. It is free, as are meals and accommodation.” (McEvoy, 2012) While 
the example of  a Chinese talent-scouting camp may seem far-fetched, cases 
of  children reared in highly specialized academies are not inrefquent in the 
Western world, as the example of  tennis champion Andre Agassi cited below 
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demonstrates.
Most DTC-companies test for a panel of  what they call “performance 
enhancing polymorphisms” (PEP). All of  them test for the alpha-actinin 3 
(ACTN3) polymorphism, which was the first PEP to be demonstrated to have 
an association with skeleto-muscle formation and function, and that I will de-
scribe in detail below. Although many genes and gene sequence variants have 
been tentatively associated with performance-related traits, few if  any have ris-
en to a level that would be called conclusive. As Roth (2012) recently pointed 
out: “This is not a judgment against the existing science, but rather a cognition 
of  the infancy of  the field of  exercise and sports performance genomics.” 
Not only is the field of  genetics of  sports performance in its infancy, but the 
DTC genetic tests use data obtained in one pool of  subjects (i.e. elite athletes) 
and apply them to a substantially different one (i.e. children, teenagers) incur-
ring the problem of  “externality.” (Eynon et al. 2011) As an example of  this 
problem, I will focus on the test for ACTN3 polymorphism, which has the 
most robust scientific basis among the tests offered by the DTC companies. 
As mentioned above, ACTN3 was the first PEP to be demonstrated to have 
an association with skeleto-muscle formation and function, and is offered by 
all the companies available on the market. Therefore, any criticisms directed 
against this test will be valid also – and even more so – against the other tests, 
which rely on a shakier scientific basis. 
In 2003, Yang et al. found a significantly higher frequency of  the func-
tional 477R genotype in the ACTN3 gene (where R stands in place of  an 
arginine “R” rather than a stop codon) in both male and female elite sprinters. 
(Yang et al. 2003) Alfa-actinin is an actin-binding protein, where actin is an 
integral component of  the protein superstructure that generates contractile 
force within muscle fibers. Polymorphisms in ACTN3 are thought to contrib-
ute to the heritability of  fiber-type distribution in muscle, where the Type I 
are slow-twitch fibres that metabolise aerobically and are used in endurance 
races, while Type II are fast-twitch fibres that metabolise anaerobically, and are 
used in sprints. (Ostrander, Huson, and Ostrander 2009) The test for “ACTN3 
Sports Gene” is sold as a genetic “Power/Speed performance test,” and as we 
can read on the website of  Atlas Sports Genetics8 (one of  the companies that 
8  http://www.atlasgene.com/ [accessed March 18, 2014]
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offer the test) with the aim to give “parents and coaches early information on 
their child’s genetic predisposition for success in team or individual speed/
power or endurance sports.” We can also read that the results of  the tests will 
be “valuable in outlining training and conditioning programs necessary for 
athletic and sport development.” (ibid.) The patent exploitation of  the infancy 
of  this field of  research by the companies has been referred to by Caulfield 
(2011) as “scienceploitation,” or the “exploitation of  legitimate fields of  sci-
ence and, too often, patients and the general public, for profit and personal 
gain.” A case in point for scienceploitation: the tests for ACTN3 variant claim 
to assess the predisposition to athletic ability and prowess, while the ACTN3 
gene accounts for only 2% of  total variance in muscle performance. (Eynon 
et al. 2011)
The rest of  the variation is determined by a wide range of  genetic and en-
vironmental factors, most of  which (particularly the genetic factors) are very 
poorly understood. In addition, as pointed out by MacArthur (2008) (note 
that MacArthur is one of  the authors who demonstrated the higher frequency 
of  the ACTN3 polymorphism in elite sprinters), the fact that there is a higher 
frequency of  ACTN3 polymorphism in elite sprinters does not mean that the 
test is actually predictive of  athletic performance, (MacArthur 2008) as muscle 
performance (of  which the ACTN3 variation accounts for only 2%) clearly 
does not equate with athletic prowess, notwithstanding what the companies 
are claiming. Finally, these tests pose a potential problem with false negatives, 
as the parents will act upon the results of  these tests and the claims made by 
the companies and actively discourage their children from a particular kind 
of  sports for which they allegedly do not have a genetic predisposition. For 
example, the company Geneffect frames the results of  the ACTN3 test in 
terms of  “genetic advantage” for “Sprint, Power & Strength Sports” for a RR 
genotype, for “Endurance Sports” for a XX genotype and for a “Mixed Pat-
tern Sports” (equivalent for “any other sport”) for a heterozygous genotype.9
Following a classification by Caulfield (2011) of  DTC genetic tests into 
the three partially overlapping categories of: (a) the clearly preposterous; (b) 
the marginally pertinent; and (c) the vaguely predictive, we could say that, 
in a charitable interpretation, DTC genetic tests offered by companies such 
9  http://www.geneffect.com/actn3/en/results.html [Accessed July 18, 2014]
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as Atlas Sports Genetics, Sports X Factor, or Geneffect would be classified 
as marginally pertinent, while in a less charitable interpretation, they could 
be classified as clearly preposterous. Note that I am not saying here that the 
inability of  DTC genetic tests to predict children’s athletic performance is a 
matter of  contingency in science or the infancy of  the field. I think that DTC 
genetic tests will never be able to predict something as complex as athletic 
talent, even if  the association were replicated in larger population samples 
and, therefore, strengthened. I am not interested in discussing the ethical 
implications of  “GATTACA-like” science fiction scenarios where genetic 
tests are able to predict intelligence or other complex character traits as I agree 
wtih Atry and co-authors (2011) that it is the responsibility of  the bioethicists 
not to create unwarranted hype concerning biomedical advancements. Athletic 
excellence is simply too complex a trait to be possibly pinned down to single 
or even multiple genetic associations in a deterministic fashion. This said, it 
is a matter of  fact that information framed in terms of  genetic knowledge 
appears to the public to be charged with an extra “authoritative aura” that 
seems to be intrinsic in the G, A, T and C bases of  the deoxyribonucleic acid. 
It is also a matter of  fact that these companies market their tests, and that at 
least some parents accept their results, as if  they were deterministic in nature, 
and as if  they were really able to predict the talent of  their children. Therefore, 
parents act upon these tests and make decisions on the basis of  the results 
that involve investing in their children’s future. By doing so, the tests acquire a 
causal significance in the lives of  these children. In what follows I will analyse 
the ethical permissibility of  the parental practices independent of  the above 
criticism on the scientific validity of  the claim. 
Brad Marston, father of  nine-year-old prospective soccer player Eliza-
beth, is a satisfied customer and a testimonial for Atlas Sport Genetics. His 
testimonial can be read on the company website:10
Atlas Sports Genetics testing was very informative and the process was quite 
simple. Although my daughter is only 9 she now knows that she has the 
“Sprint, Power, & Strength advantage” which we can use to market her ath-
letic career and hopefully a wonderful scholarship from this process. 
10  http://www.atlasgene.com/index.php?do=testimonial [Accessed July 18, 2014]
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As already mentioned above, Brad Marston does not represent the emergence 
of  a new kind of  parent. On the contrary, he represents a new instance of  
parents who employ all available methods to steer their children towards a life 
of  athletic, musical or other early professionalism. Parents have always done 
so: from submitting their children to heavy training schedules, to intensive 
summer camps, to hiring private teachers and tutors, and so on and so forth. 
These kinds of  attitudes can be reinforced by the consequences, i.e. if  the 
child becomes a successful professional in her field, her success seems to con-
firm the “rightness” of  the childrearing parental behaviour, in a kind of  retro-
active approval that takes the form of: “See, it was worth it” or “I was right in 
the end,” etc. DTC genetic tests aimed at measuring the athletic potential of  a 
child can be seen as the latest tool available to parents to steer their children’s 
future, and their investments, with the expectation that their efforts will be – 
quite literally – “paid off.” Is it justifiable for parents to do so?
Feinberg has defined the child’s right to an open future (ROF) as a “vague 
formula that describes the form of  the particular rights in question but not 
their content.”(Feinberg 1980a) The rights in question are “rights in trust,” 
or anticipatory autonomy rights: they look like adult autonomy rights, except 
that the child cannot exercise her choice until later on in life. The violation 
means that when the child is an autonomous adult, certain key options will be 
already closed to her, undermining her capacity for self-determination (which 
Feinberg sees as a necessary condition for self-fulfillment in life). As already 
noted by Dixon (2007), Mills objects to Feinberg and argues that not only is it 
impossible to actually have an open future due to the finitude of  our lives, and 
to the inevitable closure of  possibilities that takes place every time we make a 
choice, but also that it would not even be a desirable option. (Mills 2003) For 
Mills, parental approaches that aim to leave their children with an open future 
consequently expose them to a frenetic “smorgasbord” of  activities, and end 
up being detrimental to a vision of  more profound and authentic experiences 
of  the life of  a child. This more profound vision would encompass also a 
meaningful “idleness,” a time for play that is not necessarily goal-directed (to 
success, or fame), and that privileges the child hic et nunc vs. the successful and 
possibly burnt-out adult that the child will grow into. 
I find the analysis by Mills very compelling: it seems true to me that some 
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parents are constantly projecting into the future of  their children, and do not 
give a proper value to the present child that they have in front of  them. What 
was once “free time” from school and homework has become time devoted 
to activities x, y, z, which by virtue of  being activities that are goal-directed 
(talent-scout, talent-development directed) lose their value of  free, idle time 
that is supposed to act as a counterbalance to the already many compulsory 
activities that a child has to undertake early on in life. But, as Mianna Lotz 
has correctly pointed out, this is only half  the story. (Lotz 2006) Lotz, while 
recognizing the validity of  some of  the worries raised by Mills against the 
smorgasbord approach adopted by some parents, shows that such criticisms 
are not really directed to Feinberg’s, but to current trends of  childrearing and 
educating driven by excessively competitive parents. In other words, striving 
to protect a child’s ROF does not commit parents to the problematic “smor-
gasbord attitudes” described by Mills. Indeed, if  we look back at the original 
source, we can see that Feinberg is well aware of  the inevitable narrowing of  
options in parenting:
Simply by living their own lives as they choose, the parents will be forming 
an environment around the child that will tend to shape his budding loyalties 
and habits. (Feinberg 1980, 735)
This narrowing of  possible futures is inevitable in the practice of  parenting 
and especially so in the case of  talented children, but does not necessarily 
violate the child’s ROF, provided that the child’s input is taken, whenever pos-
sible, into consideration. How is that possible in practice?
David Archard also argues along similar lines that parents cannot avoid 
(nor would it be desirable if  they tried) forming their children’s characters 
to some extent. He writes: “It would be a caricature of  ideal liberal parents 
to imagine them zealously striving to avoid the creation of  any particular 
personality in their children.” (Archard 2004, 56-7) Archard acknowledges that 
the choices made by parents concerning their children’s rearing and education 
have an “opportunity” cost for their children, namely the absence of  some 
other upbringing, but this is unavoidable. Moreover, self-determination of  the 
child is not the only value to take into account when evaluating upbringing. A 
good upbringing should realize the child’s talents, and these may be realized 
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sometimes only to the detriment of  self-determination, and, therefore, of  the 
child’s open future. Talented children are particularly difficult cases, as the 
nurturing of  a precocious musical or sport talent may lead to a successful adult 
(concert soloist, Wimbledon tennis player, etc.), but that will have been achieved 
at the expenses of  other skills (possibly, all other skills except that particular 
one which was nurtured) and of  the person’s self-determination. How is it then 
possible to preserve the child’s budding sense of  self-determination, while 
also nurturing her talents? As said above, Feinberg’s analysis of  the children’s 
ROF is that of  a “right in trust,” i.e. a right to be saved for the child until she 
becomes an adult. I will now try to combine Feinberg’s ROF with an analysis 
of  what it means for a child to become an adult, and what implications this 
process has on the development of  the child’s autonomy.
 Tamar Schapiro addresses a very important but fairly neglected question: 
what is a child, such that it could be appropriate to treat a person like one? 
(Schapiro 1999) In tackling this question, Schapiro is addressing also the 
following two related questions: (a) When is a parent justified in preventing a 
child from acting according to her own will? and (b) When is a child entitled 
to make her own choices? Schapiro draws a parallel between children being 
provisional, passive members of  the political community and children also 
being provisional, passive members of  the ethical community. Their status of  
passivity is provisional because of  their liminal and ever-changing status, and 
their condition of  moving towards adulthood. Indeed, as children at different 
stages of  development differ from one another in the extent to which they 
have hegemony over themselves, they also differ in the relative status of  
their passivity as members of  the ethical community. Children gain access to 
the ethical community once they gain autonomy and sovereignty, as put by 
Schapiro, by developing increasingly broader “domains of  discretion.” Once 
they have achieved sovereignty over some domain of  discretion (e.g. being able 
to eat without being fed, being able to get dressed alone, being able to choose 
which clothes to wear, and so on and so forth), children should be left to 
decide and exercise autonomy over that domain. In this way, writes Schapiro, 
the child is forced to come up with provisional principles of  deliberation that 
function then as starting points, as anchors, for “ever widening domains of  
discretion.” Along similar lines, Feinberg writes: “The child can [and should, I 
would add] contribute towards the making of  his own self  and circumstances 
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in ever-increasing degree.” (Feinberg 1980b, 736) This contribution to her 
own self-determination entails, I think, also exercising her autonomy over the 
sport she (the child) wants to play, or does not want to play. Parental attitudes 
exemplified by the use of  DTC genetic tests to provide children with a “head 
start” in life are deeply problematic because – as put by Wall (2010) – they 
interpret children “only through the lens of  what they are not yet, namely 
adults” (Wall 2010, 144) and do not take into account the in fieri moral agency 
of  the child. Borrowing again from Wall, while at first glance it may seem an 
obvious goal that the main purpose of  parenting is “helping children to grow 
up into adults,” this practice “obscures the ethical sense in which children 
are diverse and other moral agents in and of  themselves.” (Wall 2010, 144) 
Children should expect from their parents to be equipped with a range of  
broad skills that will enable them to make autonomous decisions and choose 
their path in life. On the converse, being equipped with very specific skills (like 
playing pre-professionally soccer, football, volleyball and so on) very early in 
life and having a life plan spelled out for them would constitute a brake on 
their development, and relegate them to being passive receivers of  education. 
In addition, by depriving children of  the possibility to exercise their budding 
self-determination, it relegates them to being passive members of  the moral 
community. The possession of  a “life plan” early on in life has been defined 
by Slote as both “unnatural” and “unfortunate.” (Slote 1989, 40–41) “Life-
planfulness” as a character-trait is seen by Slote as a virtue with a temporal 
aspect, i.e. a “positively good thing in individuals mature enough … to decide 
upon a career or profession,” but a trait that can become an obstacle for 
development in children, a “brake” to the existence itself  of  their autonomic 
domains of  discretion.
Returning to the focus of  our analysis: What about children with talents? 
Slote recognizes that an early start can be necessary for the fulfillment of  that 
talent, as he writes: 
All this [considering a life plan a bad thing in children] is consistent with allowing 
that those who make premature life plans concerning careers are sometimes very 
successful in those careers. But such premature choices are typically the result of  
parental pressure, and those who yield to, and succeed under, such pressure can 
hardly help being emotionally scarred by it as well.(Slote 1989, 47)
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Talented children are, indeed, particularly challenging for educators, as the 
nurturing of  a precocious musical or sport talent is often essential to the 
realization a successful adult. The examples of  successful adults (musicians, 
athletes, mathematicians, artists) who had a very difficult if  not miserable 
childhood as talented kids or prodigies are abundant. (Solomon 2012) An 
example that comes to mind is Andre Agassi, the American Hall of  Fame 
tennis player whose father allegedly tied a tennis racket to Andre’s hand when 
he was only three years old, and obliged him to hit tennis ball after tennis ball 
that were being literally spit out by a dragon-like machine built specifically 
for that purpose. (Agassi 2010) In his autobiography, Andre Agassi is very 
resentful towards his father and the education he was submitted to: even 
though Andre grew up to be one of  the world’s most famous tennis players, 
he achieved that at the expenses of  all other skills, including basic school 
education. Note also that both of  Andre’s older siblings, being also talented 
children in tennis, were submitted to a similar education, but never made it 
to a professional career. Not only does this constitute an ethical issue for the 
infringement of  the child’s capacity for self  determination, but it is also an 
ethical issue for the infringement and the lack of  capacity of  understanding 
the person in front of  us at that very moment, i.e. the child.
To reiterate this important point, talented children are tough cases ex-
actly because they embody the tension between nurturing talent and the self-
determination capacity of  the child, both of  which are considered duties of  
a good parent. Indeed, it can be plausible to argue that the particular kind of  
precocious and “absolutist” upbringing necessary to nurture the child’s talent 
was the only possible way to achieve success in a domain where early training 
and gaining of  a competitive advantage is essential. It seems, therefore, that 
parents must strive both to realize the child’s particular talents and at the same 
time to safeguard her “open future.” This is no easy task for parents trying 
to keep a difficult balance between the good of  this particular child (realising 
the present) and the good of  the adult that the child will grow up to be (the 
future). The tension between these two goals will be exacerbated when these 
goals are defined in maximizing terms, i.e. the Andre Agassi or the concert 
soloist at Royal Albert Hall. 
As noted by Mike McNamee and co-authors, if  it is appropriate to char-
acterize the field of  “sports ethics” as in its infancy, then it is even more ap-
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propriate to characterize the field of  “sports medicine ethics” as neonatal. 
(McNamee et al. 2009) The analysis of  genetic tests for athletic performance 
falls within this “neonatal” realm. Note also that the comment by Roth (2012) 
on the infancy of  exercise and sports genomics falls along similar lines. Both 
(elite) sports and medicine can be defined as goal-directed activities: the for-
mer as having “victory” as one of  its goals, the latter “health.” Both “victory” 
and “health” are regarded as goods by the subjects involved in the activities, 
and these goals may very well be, and often are, in contrast in elite sports (think 
for example of  return to play decisions after injury). (Mathias 2004) As noted 
by Mathias, “The history of  ethics in sports medicine has been driven by the 
general tension between the demands of  sport and the demands of  health” 
(Mathias 2004, 196) and, therefore, we should “not be surprised to find in the 
field where they come together, sports medicine, signs of  this tension occur in 
the form of  persistent ethical problems” (ibid.). The aim of  sports in children, 
though, need not necessarily be “victory.” Quite on the contrary, I think that 
sport in children should not be a goal-directed activity (directed to victory), 
differently from what it is for the athlete who is engaged in a professional, elite 
sport. Sport in children could instead be understood as a “practice,” defined 
by MacIntyre as a coherent and complex form of  socially established coopera-
tive human activity, through which goods internal to that form of  activity are 
realized in the course of  trying to achieve those standards of  excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of  activity. (MacIntyre 
1984, 186) In this sense, sport as a practice in childhood becomes defined 
both by goods internal to the practice (e.g. to stay healthy, enjoy the company 
of  friends, enjoy the discovery of  the possibilities of  one’s own body, learn 
how to relate with a team, learn the importance of  rules, etc.) and by the 
standards of  excellence of  the practice (i .e. nurturing and developing talent). 
Returning to Slote and his analysis of  the temporality of  virtues, we could also 
add that some goods are intrinsic to childhood (including engaging in a sport 
as a practice, and not as in a competitive profession directed to victory) and 
as such should be preserved. Therefore, parents could, and should, expose 
children to a variety of  sport activities (and other non sport-related activities) 
compatible with their financial situations, and their own preferences and ways 
of  living. In this sense, I think that parents could and indeed should be free 
to live “their own lives as they choose,” as put by Feinberg (quoted above), as 
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long as they “do not isolate children intentionally from other ways of  life, and 
make sure that children learn of  the variety of  ways of  life.” (Lotz 2006, 541) 
To conclude, I recognize the existence of  an unavoidable tension between 
the goal of  maximizing children’s talents and nurturing their self-determination, 
but I am inclined to view the latter as more important. Nonetheless, I recognize 
the impossibility and non-desirability of  non-directiveness in childrearing, 
and I find the criticism by Mills of  “smorgasbord” parental attitudes quite 
appropriate and resonant with current Western trends of  parenting. These 
arguments form my two-pronged rationale to object to the parental use of  
DTC genetic tests to (supposedly) measure their children’s athletic potential, 
and to steer their education towards an early start to a professional sports 
career. In the next section I move on to considering anti-doping governance, 
and I analyse the arguments in favour of  allowing doping under a medical 
context.
3.5 Performance enhancement and anti-doping governance: 
towards doping under medical context?
As illustrated already earlier on in this chapter, professional sport has always 
been a laboratory for biomedical and biotechnological innovations regarding 
the treatment of  injury, recovery and training regimes aimed at maximising 
athletic performance. It is a matter of  fact that elite athletes are willing to ac-
cept high degrees of  risks in exchange for the expected performance enhanc-
ing benefits derived from the consumption of  substances, from extreme train-
ing regimes or diets, to the experimentation upon themselves of  innovative 
surgeries. It is also a matter of  fact that athletes often lack information on the 
safety and effectiveness of  the agents they are taking, or of  the performance 
enhancing technologies that they are undertaking. 
This happens because the existing WADA Code (now subject to revisions 
expected to come into effect in January 2015) does not require that a substance 
has a demonstrably performance enhancing effect for it to be included on the 
Prohibited List. At present, it suffices that the substance has the “potential” 
to enhance athletic performance, in addition to meeting one of  the other two 
criteria of  the definition of  doping already illustrated in section 3.1: that it is 
harmful (or potentially so), or that it is against the spirit of  sport. (WADA 
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Code 2012) Therefore, the lack of  information on the safety and effectiveness 
of  the performance enhancing agents that are introduced in the practice of  
professional sport means that in some cases athletes may be actually taking 
on the risks of  the drugs, without experiencing any performance enhancing 
effect. In addition, the athletes lack protection against the conflict of  interest 
that can arise in the professional sport context, where short-term gains (such 
as a swifter return to play after an injury) and the gaining of  “competitive 
edge” are often in conflict with the long-term health of  the athlete-subject. 
(Huizenga 1995; Nixon 1993; Howe 2004) 
King and Robeson note how well understood problems in research ethics 
(i.e., vulnerability, voluntariness, undue influence, full disclosure, equitable 
subject selections, conflict of  interest) become particularly problematic in 
the elite sports context, as opposed to the more typical health, medical and 
scientific contexts in and through which research is already regulated. (King 
and Robeson 2007) To the best of  my knowledge, King and Robeson were 
the first authors to bring to the fore the problematic position of  the athlete-
patient, situated in a professional sport context where the introduction of  
performance enhancing technologies can be regarded as “unregulated clinical 
research.” (King and Robeson 2007) King and Robeson also note how, in the 
current system where performance enhancing substances and technologies 
are introduced into athletes’ bodies, which become the locus of  unregulated 
experimentation, three types of  potentially serious consequences follow:
First, the people who receive the innovation lack information about 
it, particularly about the limits of  knowledge about it. Second, they lack 
protection against the conflicts of  interest that can arise when the innovator 
has more than the individual’s well-being in mind (such as product 
development). Finally, the safety and effectiveness of  the innovation cannot 
be adequately determined. (King and Robeson 2007, 5-6)
Finally, they define athletes as “unwitting or unwilling research subjects,” or 
“guinea pigs.” As mentioned above, the WADC is currently under revision, 
and it appears that the 2015 Code will elevate “performance enhancement” 
from being merely one of  three criteria to a necessary condition of  doping, 
to be supported by either of  both of  the remaining (now) secondary condi-
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tions: harm to health and contrariness to the spirit of  sport. (McNamee 2012) 
Nevertheless, as I argue extensively in my co-authored paper (Camporesi and 
McNamee 2014), if  the performance enhancing criterion indeed becomes a 
necessary condition, there should be reasonable grounds for a product’s or 
process’ inclusion on the Prohibited List – reasonable grounds that, at the 
moment, do not appear to be evident, as many of  the substances included 
in the Prohibited List are merely presumed to be ergogenic. Therefore, in 
(Camporesi and McNamee 2014), we argue that a proper governance frame-
work would need to be established both to assess the performance enhanc-
ing effects of  the substances, and the risks to the health of  the athlete. I am 
aware that sometimes it will be inevitable that the inclusion of  a substance on 
the Prohibited List will involve reasonable extrapolation. For instance, there 
is good evidence to suggest that the use of  beta-blockers enhances perfor-
mance in pistol shooting (Kruse et al. 1986; Silver 2001) and that this might 
be contrary to the spirit of  sport, as it infringes the level-playing field which 
is a necessary condition for fairness equality in competition. (Camporesi and 
McNamee 2014) Thus beta-blockers are reasonably banned and considered 
doping. Yet we dispute that the ban applies not only to target sports – where 
the inference is reasonable – but also to other sports, where its performance 
enhancing effects seem less than obvious. To be clear, we would not count as 
reasonable grounds anecdotal evidence on performance enhancing effects or 
harmful effects of  a substance, such as creatine with (say) a particular popula-
tion (children). (Calfee and Fadale 2006)
As shown in section 3.1, the negative connotation of  doping practices 
is a relatively recent acquisition. More recently, there has been a return to 
those initial arguments, and several authors have argued in favour of  legalising 
doping. For one, see Foddy, Savulescu and Clayton, who argue that doping is 
not contrary to the spirit of  sport (Savulescu, Foddy, and Clayton 2004), or 
Andy Miah, who argues that a pro-doping culture will not only be inevitable 
in the future of  professional sports, but that it is also an essential part of  what 
we value in sport (and of  why we are interested in it), i.e., pushing humanity to 
its limits and beyond. (Miah 2006) Atry and co-authors have argued in favour 
of  establishing a shared responsibility for doping, which is not limited to the 
athletes, but would include also the sponsors, the fans, and in general all the 
relevant stakeholders in elite sports. (Atry et al. 2012; Atry 2013) 
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In the next chapter I continue this discussion and consider the charge that 
such arguments could lead to doping under a medical context, by analysing the 
perspective put forward by Holm (2007), and providing a possible alternative 
to alter the payoff  matrix in professional sport, without allowing doping under 
a medical context. I will also discuss the place of  enhancement research in 
society, and attempt to lay the ground for shifting the discussion of  enhance-
ments from the ethical to the political level.
Chapter 4
Shifting the debate on enhancements from the 
ethical to the political level
4.1 A proposal to alter the payoff  matrix in professional 
sports: shifting the burden of  proof  of  doping to sponsors 
It is a matter of  fact that professional athletes often discount their future 
health in exchange for desired enhanced performances.1 Some recent exam-
ples include Kobe Bryant of  the Los Angeles Lakers, who publicly challenged 
teammate Dwight Howard to play through a torn labrum in his shoulder: “We 
don’t have time for [Howard’s shoulder] to heal,” said Bryant (MacMullan 
2013). In another example from the United States, National Football League 
athletes continue to play through concussions and head trauma, leading to 
long-term brain damage that has been linked to chronic traumatic encepha-
lopathy (permanent brain damage associated with early-onset dementia), with 
disastrous consequences for the life of  the footballer after his career. (Schwarz 
2009; Kotz 2012) Professional athletes also discount their future health by en-
gaging in doping behaviours. Commenting upon the recent doping scandals of  
Jamaican track & field athletes (Asafa Powell, Sherone Simson and three other 
world-class sprinters tested positive for the banned substance Oxylofrine in 
the summer of  2013), Dr Paul Wright, a senior drug tester with the Jamaican 
Anti-Doping Commission (JADCO), said in an interview to the BBC that the 
1 This section and the next one first appeared in a longer version for 
Reflective Practice 2014, volume 15, issue 1, co-authored with James A. 
Knuckles with title “Shifting the burden of  proof  in doping: lessons from 
environmental sustainability applied to highperformance sport” and doi: 
10.1080/14623943.2013.86920
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scandals represented only “the tip of  the iceberg.” (Bond 2013) Wright added 
that since these tests occurred in competition, the athletes knew “months be-
fore” when and where they would be tested, leading Wright to infer that many 
more athletes must be planning their doping around competitions so as not to 
get caught. (Bond 2013)
Cases like these abound because high-performance athletes are focused 
more on their athletic achievements now than their future health status. They 
adopt therefore a “win at all costs attitude” as described by Krumer and co-
authors (2011) that discounts future health for current athletic success. This 
becomes the middle step in a three-rung ladder towards doping, where money 
from sponsors based on records, recognition, and victories, leads to a win-at-
all-cost mentality, which in turn leads to strong incentives for athletes to dope. 
Therefore, a vicious link between money and doping aimed at a constant im-
provement of  performances takes place, with the consequence that profes-
sional sport may not be sustainable as a practice, both because athletes harm 
themselves by engaging in doping practices, and because uncoupling money 
from increased competition and quest for records and recognition is unlikely 
to happen under the current system.
How to alter this “discounting”? One solution might be to lift the ban on 
doping, and redefine it in a medical context. Indeed, this solution was recently 
presented by several authors, including Miah (2006), Savulescu, Foddy and 
Clayton (2004), and Savulescu (2013). As shown by Holm (2007) though (see 
discussion below), even if  the ban on doping were to be lifted and doping 
were to be placed under “medical control,” athletes would still have incentives 
to dope clandestinely, and a two-tiered system of  doping would ensue. How to 
escape this seeming “Catch-22”? Here we propose an alternative way to alter 
the practice of  high-performance athletes discounting their future health for 
current performance, without engaging in doping under a medical context, 
by shifting the burden of  proof  from the regulator and athlete to the private 
sector (i.e. sponsors), as well as providing the right incentives in the form of  
penalties to the sponsors for athletes found positive. In order to do so, we 
learn from similar discussions in the sustainability field, where it has long been 
proposed to shift the burden of  proof  of  damaging the environment from 
regulators to the private sector. 
  Shifting the debate on enhancements           113
Altering the discounting of  the future health of  
professional athletes
Krumer et al. (2011) conducted a survey among professional athletes to mea-
sure subjective time discounting. Their sample included 74 professional Is-
raeli athletes from different sports and 70 non-athletes in the control. The 
survey asked participants to indicate how much they would be willing to pay 
now in order to postpone a future payment (e.g., pay $10 now to postpone 
a $20 debt), and how much they would be willing to receive now in lieu of  
receiving a payment in the future (e.g., receive $10 now instead of  $15 next 
month) (Krumer, Shavit, and Rosenboim 2011). As expected, the results sug-
gested that “athletes discounted time more heavily than non-athletes” (i.e., 
the athletes more strongly preferred access to money in the present than non-
athletes). The authors argue convincingly that athletes’ time preference is af-
fected by their sport orientation and a “win at all costs attitude.” Waldron and 
Krane (2005) have also described the adoption of  what they refer to as “what-
ever it takes” attitude in female professional athletes, who increasingly engage 
in health compromising behaviours such as playing when injured, sacrificing 
their bodies, and overtraining. Waldron and Krane write that “while the mind 
focuses on winning at any costs, the body can be compromised for the good 
of  the cause” (Waldron and Krane 2005, 320), and describe how athletes en-
dorse hiding pain and injury through an attitude of  “irreverence” which can 
be, and very often is, very detrimental to the future health of  the athlete. 
Gymnastics offers one famous example: Kerri Strug, the US gymnast 
who vaulted through a sprained ankle to ensure the US gold medal in the 1996 
Olympics. (Weinberg 2004) While her desire to push her body beyond its lim-
its was not likely a result of  her hoping it would land her a large endorsement 
contract, the sponsor endorsements that followed as a result of  her bravery 
(in fact, after the 1996 Olympics, General Mills corporation featured her on 
the front of  the Wheaties cereal box, and Strug received additional sponsor-
ship from Visa corporation and others) did send a strong message to other 
athletes: if  you push through pain, and become a hero, you will win a large 
sponsorship contract. An article written in the Chicago Tribune in 1996 aptly 
captured this sentiment: 
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Even Nike, the quasi-spiritual sportswear monster, praises pain in a com-
mercial that flashes images of  boxers with bloodied faces, runners falling 
and grimacing, and some sorry competitor vomiting. Just do it. No pain, no 
gain. Whatever it takes. What does not kill me makes me stronger. (Gregory 
1996)
Gymnastics may in fact be one of  the sports where the win-at-all-costs at-
titude is most widespread in very young female athletes, who are often sub-
jected to tortuous professional-style training when they are toddlers (Cintado 
2007; Giordano 2010). In China, for example, Nanning Gymnasium Camp 
was recently featured by the UK Daily Mail magazine which portrayed har-
rowing pictures of  toddlers crying for pain while being subjected to strenu-
ous sessions that border on psychological and physical torture. (Blake 2012) 
Nanning Camp is not an isolated example but one of  many training camps 
where children no older than 5 or 6 years old are sent by their parents to “learn 
to become champions” from an early age in preparation for the Olympics. 
(Blake 2012) More recently, these camps have been coupled to genetic tests 
to scout out children’s talents, as described in the previous chapter. These 
examples clearly illustrate instances of  professional athletes sacrificing tomor-
row’s health for today’s victory.
As a result of  this win-at-all-costs mentality, many athletes turn to doping 
to gain a competitive edge in their sport. One solution that has been proposed 
in this context might be to lift the ban on doping. For one example, see Foddy, 
Savulescu and Clayton, who argue that doping is not contrary to the spirit of  
sport, (Savulescu, Foddy, and Clayton 2004; Savulescu 2013) or Andy Miah, 
who argues that a pro-doping culture will not only be inevitable in the future 
of  increasingly technological sports at the elite level, but that it is also an es-
sential part of  what we value in sport (and of  why we are interested in it), 
i.e., pushing humanity to its limits and beyond. (Miah 2006) Commenting in 
the press on the recent doping scandals of  American sprinter Tyson Gay and 
Jamaican sprinters Asafa Powell and Sherone Simpson, Savulescu has argued 
that:
To keep improving, to keep beating records, to continue to train at the peak 
of  fitness, to recover from the injury that training inflicts, we need enhanced 
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physiology. Spectators want faster times and broken records, so do athletes. 
But we have exhausted the human potential. Is it wrong to aim for zero tol-
erance and performances that are within natural human limits? No, but it is 
not enforceable (Savulescu 2013)
Savulescu therefore proposes to legalise doping, or to put doping “under med-
ical control.” This type of  solution has been addressed and refuted by Holm 
(2007). Holm spells out the two possible scenarios that would take place were a 
ban on doping to be lifted. In the first scenario, athletes have access to data on 
the effectiveness and side effects of  the performance enhancing substances; 
while in the second scenario athletes get impartial advice from the sports doc-
tor about when and how to dope. (Holm 2007) Importantly, Holm argues that 
in both scenarios, athletes would still have incentives to cheat, and a two-tiered 
system of  doping (under a medical context and of  secretive doping) would en-
sue. Athletes have strong incentives to keep doping practices secretive in order 
to maintain an exclusive use on a drug, and therefore a competitive advantage 
over fellow athletes. Holm identifies these incentives as an instance of  a “take 
and hide” option that dominates other options in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-style 
coordination game, the other options being not doping or doping and be-
ing open about it. In addition, as Holm points out, more often than not, the 
athlete’s income is controlled by his/her employer (e.g. team and, ultimately, 
sponsor), and the degree of  control that the athlete has over the decision to 
play/to compete is often limited. For these reasons, Holm describes how it is 
not lifting the ban on doping that will incentivize athletes to stop doping, but 
changing the “payoff  matrix,” characterised by high financial rewards for cur-
rent athletic success. (Holm 2007, 139) In the next section we describe tools 
from the sustainability field that could be very useful when applied to the field 
of  professional sport to change the payoff  matrix, and therefore to alter the 
practice of  athletes discounting their future health.
4.2 What can high-performance sports learn from the field 
of  environmental sustainability? 
In the sustainability field, we can draw parallels to each of  the three elements 
of  our argument outlined above: setting the principle, levying penalties, and 
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enforcing the regulations. Regarding the first element, it has long been argued 
that the burden of  proof  in cases of  damages to the environment should not 
be on the relevant regulatory agency or local community, but instead should be 
on the entities whose actions might cause environmental damage. This con-
cept of  shifting the burden of  proof  has its roots in Principle 15 of  the Rio 
Declaration, set forth at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. (United Nations 1992) Often 
referred to as the Precautionary Principle, it was first proposed as:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of  serious or irreversible damage, lack of  full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. (UN 1992)
More recent forms of  the precautionary principle now often include a state-
ment on burden of  proof. This addition was brought to the forefront of  
international sustainability governance in 1997 with a high-level workshop in 
Lisbon, Portugal commissioned by the Independent World Commission on 
the Oceans and subsequent article in which the now famous principles for 
governing the world’s oceans in a sustainable way was published. Known as 
the Lisbon Principles of  Sustainable Governance, the third principle states:
In the face of  uncertainty about potentially irreversible environmental im-
pacts, decisions concerning their use should err on the side of  caution. The 
burden of  proof  should shift to those whose activities potentially damage the environment. 
[emphasis added] (Costanza et al. 1998)
 
The crux of  this statement rests in its call for any entity whose actions could 
potentially damage the oceans to prove before and during the action that they 
are not doing any damage. Turning to the second element of  our argument 
– penalties – we see that the Lisbon Principles do not mention penalties (or 
enforcement, which we address below). Yet other scholars have argued that 
the penalties for environmental damage should be proportional to the dam-
ages that are caused and should be imposed on the entity responsible for the 
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damage. Segerson and Tietenberg (1992) analysed penalties for environmen-
tal infractions, and conclude first that fines are preferable to incarceration 
because “the social costs associated with incarceration are so much higher.” 
(Segerson and Tietenberg 1992, 180) They then conclude that “a fine should 
be imposed on each party [that damages the environment] in an amount equal 
to the damages that result from its actions.” (Segerson and Tietenberg 1992, 
181) Finally, they find that fines should be levied against the organization and 
not the individual, primarily because events that lead to environmental damage 
are usually the result of  a complex chain of  actions and responsibilities within 
the organization (Segerson and Tietenberg 1992). 
In practice, however, while penalties – and liability – might fall on the 
organization and generally favour financial penalties over incarceration, it is 
difficult if  not impossible to set the penalty at a level equal to the costs of  
the damage. First, limits on total liability for a company enshrined in law can 
prevent regulatory agencies from seeking penalties that match the costs of  the 
damages. For example, the Canadian government limits “absolute liability” for 
offshore oil and gas drilling companies to CA$ 1 billion (for comparison, 2010 
estimates of  the BP oil spill in the Gulf  of  Mexico put the cost at around US$ 
40 billion). (Wearden 2010; Rozmus 2013) Second, it can be very difficult to 
calculate the total costs of  a particular damaging event or action, particularly 
because calculating economic costs of  environmental damage is difficult and 
imprecise. Using the BP oil spill as an example again, a panel of  experts has 
recently concluded that the United States government, after extensive research 
and countless studies, has still failed to determine the true costs of  the disaster 
because it incorrectly and incompletely accounted for the economic costs of  
the loss of  environmental services as a result of  the oil spill. (National Re-
search Council 2013) 
As to the question of  enforcement – enforcing penalties, conducting testing 
and monitoring, and taking regulatory action – a recent example comes from the 
US chemical industry. In their 2009 paper, Schwarzman and Wilson state: 
Given the size of  the chemical enterprise, the extent to which it is woven 
into the fabric of  society, and the backlog of  unexamined chemicals, a new 
approach is needed that does not rely on resource-intensive, chemical-bio-
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chemical risk assessments in which government, at great public expense, 
bears the burden of  proof. (Wilson and Schwarzman 2009, 1202)
This “new approach” is characterized by requiring chemical companies to 
prove their chemicals are safe, rather than waiting for the regulator to test 
each chemical. Addressing the issue of  enforcement, Wilson and Schwarzman 
(2009) argue that because the US regulator – in this case, the Environmental 
Protection Agency – currently bears the full burden of  proving whether or 
not a chemical causes environmental (or health) harm, it must obtain a high-
level of  certainty that the chemical is causing harm before setting its machina-
tions in motion to take regulatory action against the chemical company. Fur-
thermore, the chemical companies keep secret as much information on their 
chemicals as possible, and are known to either withhold information or create 
misleading information, causing the regulatory agency to doubt whether it has 
sufficient grounds to take regulatory action. (Wilson and Schwarzman 2009) 
In industries like the chemical manufacturing industry, where the very activi-
ties that drive profit can cause environmental harm, only the private sector has 
the capacity, information, and resources necessary to conduct adequate testing 
required to prove that their actions are not causing environmental damage. 
Enforcement – and imposing fines for noncompliance – is still the responsi-
bility of  the regulator, however, and the regulator needs to maintain its own 
testing in order to fully enforce its policies and effectively shift the burden of  
proof  onto the private sector.
After more than twenty years of  discussions around shifting the burden 
of  proof  away from regulators, it seems therefore that the current system 
in the field of  sustainability is advancing slowly towards a higher degree of  
accountability of  the companies for the consequences of  their actions on 
the environment. Still, in the majority of  cases when a company damages 
the environment, the burden of  proof  remains on the damaged region/
community and relevant regulator to show that it was the company’s fault. 
The process has been especially slow in the oil and gas industry, whose normal 
business operations can result in environmental harm. Companies in this 
industry therefore will strongly resist efforts to require them to prove that 
their actions are not damaging the environment, and in most cases, it remains 
the responsibility of  the local authorities and regulatory agency to detect and 
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prove environmental damage. 
In the examples above that describe shifting burdens of  proof  away from 
regulators and onto entities whose actions might damage the environment, 
we see that setting the general principle of  identifying a level of  penalty (e.g., 
equal to the damages that a chemical spill caused) is relatively straightforward. 
However, actually calculating that penalty (e.g., it may be easy to calculate 
the immediate clean up cost, but what about long-term effects like increased 
cancer risk or biodiversity loss?), or being legally allowed to impose the full 
amount, as well as enforcing regulations, has proven difficult in the sustain-
ability field. As we will see below, these difficulties also carry over to the field 
of  professional sports.
We can now draw some important lessons from the sustainability field 
and apply them to the professional sport context. First, the burden of  proof  
principle can be translated to the sports context as the following: the burden 
of  proof  should shift to those whose activities may lead to doping in athletic 
competitions. We can also see that it is important to shift the burden of  proof  
to the entities with the resources available to conduct case-by-case monitoring 
and testing (e.g., the chemical companies in the example above, and not the 
US EPA). Given these two lessons learned, and the link between sponsorship 
and doping that we highlight earlier, we argue that the burden of  proof  should 
be shifted to the companies that sponsor professional athletes. It should be 
the sponsors’ responsibility to prove that each athlete they sponsor is “clean” 
before they sponsor him or her, and throughout the sponsorship contract. 
Second, we see from the environmental sustainability examples that 
setting penalties on the organization and not the individual is preferable, 
as are financial penalties as opposed to incarceration. We argue similarly 
for the high-performance sports context: penalties should be imposed 
on the sponsoring organizations, and not on the specific individuals in the 
organizations responsible for the contract with the athlete who is found to 
be doping. The entity of  the penalty should not be based on the costs of  the 
damage caused by doping, but instead on amounts that would significantly 
impact the sponsoring company’s financials (e.g., a percentage of  the previous 
year’s earnings), and without a maximum cap. Calculating a penalty based on 
publicly available financial data for the sponsoring companies is significantly 
easier (and less disputable) than calculating a penalty based on the social, 
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economic, and health costs of  doping. 
Third, we argue for WADA’s continued enforcement of  its anti-doping 
policies, with strengthened testing capabilities and research into doping meth-
ods and technologies, in addition to what it already does.2 Strengthening its 
testing and research capacity and capabilities is important because if  WADA 
finds that an athlete has been doping, it levies the penalty on the sponsoring 
companies irrespective of  any test results that the sponsoring companies pro-
vide to WADA. WADA’s testing determines whether an athlete has been dop-
ing, not the sponsors’ testing; therefore, WADA’s tests set the de facto testing 
standard for the sponsorship companies. The sponsors will undoubtedly con-
duct their own testing to verify that their athletes are clean, but if  a WADA-
initiated test finds that an athlete has been doping, the WADA test overrides 
any tests that the sponsor conducted.
Conversely, in the current system in professional sport, when an athlete 
turns out positive for doping, the sponsors dump her/him (and often sue 
him/her), while all along they had been closing one or both eyes to the prac-
tice of  doping because they had an interest in the athlete continuing to win. 
The athlete suffers tremendously – in both financial, social and potentially 
health-related costs – and the sport as a whole suffers a tarnished reputation. 
The sponsors’ images may be similarly tarnished, but usually for a much brief-
er time period, and at a far lower cost relative to their overall financial position. 
Yet, it was the sponsors’ collective money that essentially paid for the athlete’s 
doping, and created a win-at-all-costs mentality in the sport. Recent examples 
include Lance Armstrong and professional cycling illustrated below, several 
prominent athletes in the US Major League Baseball Association, (McLean 
2013) and Marion Jones as a Track & Field star. (CNN Associated Press 2007)
Let us take a closer look at Lance Armstrong’s case, for example. Lance 
has been one of  the most successful, if  not the most successful, road cyclist in 
modern history, winning the Tour de France seven consecutive times between 
1999 and 2005, achieving an all-time record which has now been revoked as 
he was disqualified and banned for life from competition by United States 
2 The full list of  up-to-date WADA-funded research projects can be found here: 
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/science-medicine/research/funded-research-
projects/ [accessed July 18, 2014]
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Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) in 2012. After years of  denials and lawsuits 
against those who accused him of  doping, Lance admitted publicly to doping 
in January 2013, in an interview on television conducted by Oprah Winfrey 
(Winfrey 2013). The now “disgraced” Lance Armstrong faces a plethora of  
lawsuits: the Sunday Times, which Armstrong had previously sued in 2006 
for alleging he was doping (The Guardian Associated Press 2013); the US 
Justice Department for the US$ 40 million that the US Postal Service spent 
to sponsor Lance’s cycling team from 1998 to 2004 (Frieden 2013); and a 
group of  discontented readers in California for false memoirs which were 
sold as non-fiction (yes, that is true). (Bury 2013) While we will not comment 
on the other lawsuits here as they fall outside the direct scope of  this paper, 
we would contend that it seems unlikely that the US Postal Service was com-
pletely unaware of  Armstrong’s doping, or at least they remained purposefully 
unaware by not conducting their own testing. In this way, one could argue 
that the USPS was in some ways complicit in the doping activities (and indeed 
benefited financially from them), and therefore the current lawsuit seems to a 
certain extent to be hypocritical. In our proposed approach, the USPS, as one 
of  Armstrong’s primary sponsors, would be responsible for his doping actions 
and as we explain below there could be a contract between athlete and sponsor 
preventing the sponsor from suing the athlete. 
To recapitulate, we argue that the athlete’s sponsoring organisations 
should become accountable for their athletes’ actions, and take on the burden 
of  proving that the athlete is not doping prior to and while sponsoring that 
athlete. In addition, the penalties for doping should not fall on the athlete and 
his/her team and doctors, but instead should fall solely on the athlete’s spon-
sors. The penalties should also be severe enough to have a significant impact 
on the financial operations of  the sponsoring organizations. Finally, we argue 
that WADA should still be responsible for its own testing for doping and en-
forcement of  penalties. In this way, the payoff  matrix that leads to sponsors 
unwittingly (or otherwise) sponsoring an athlete that uses illegal performance 
enhancing drugs ceases to hold sway over professional sports, and conse-
quently, athletes would no longer have strong financial incentives to discount 
their future health in exchange for current improvements in performance. 
Of  course, we recognize that this shift in the burden of  proof  would 
not be easy to implement in practice. In particular, we identify three possible 
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criticisms:
1) Many of  the details of  how this policy would be enforced remain 
unaddressed, including how often WADA conducts tests on athletes and 
whether these are planned or surprise tests, how often WADA updates its 
testing standards and whether it shares these standards with the sponsorship 
industry, and how multiple sponsors of  the same athlete would conduct 
testing and how penalties would be assessed if  their shared athlete was found 
to be doping.
2) This policy would seem to offer sponsorship companies even stronger 
reasons than those they currently have to sue any of  their athletes found by 
WADA to be doping. The sponsorship company might argue, for example, 
that it cannot possibly monitor its athletes 24 hours per day, 365 days per 
year, and it had, to the best of  its ability, monitored and tested the athlete who 
was now found to be doping. The sponsor would then argue that the athlete 
engaged in doping on his or her own accord, despite the sponsor’s efforts to 
prevent doping, and the athlete is therefore at fault. 
3) Sponsorship money enables professional sports to exist and be shared 
by millions of  enthusiasts around the globe. Without sponsorship money, 
there would be no professional sport industry as we know it (and enjoy it) 
today. 
We recognize the validity of  the first criticism, and leave it open for dis-
cussion of  possible solutions. Indeed, implementing this proposed approach 
would be complex, as it represents a major change to the status quo. The 
elements related to enforcement and testing that we mention are likely to be 
some of  the more difficult and contentious implementation aspects of  the 
proposed shift. As to the second possible criticism, since the sponsors would 
be held responsible for the actions of  their athletes under the approach we 
propose, we suggest that the athlete-sponsor contract could be written to pre-
vent such lawsuits, but this criticism remains open for further reflection, as 
some may want to argue that the athlete should be held at least co-responsible 
together with the sponsor for his/her actions, under the assumption that she/
he is an autonomous subject making autonomous decisions. We would like to 
resist this solution of  co-responsibility, though; as we and others have identi-
fied elsewhere, (King and Robeson 2007; King and Robeson 2013; Camporesi 
and McNamee 2014) athletes are often vulnerable subjects who find them-
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selves at the centre of  a payoff  matrix which makes autonomous decisions 
very difficult if  not impossible. We argue that the only way to break this pay-
off  matrix leading to a “win at all costs attitude” and to incentives to doping 
is to hold only the sponsors responsible for the actions of  their sponsored 
athletes.
Finally, while we are aware of  the possibility that sponsors might with-
draw significant money from the field of  professional sport and of  the conse-
quences that such a withdrawal would have on the existence itself  of  profes-
sional sports, we think most sponsors would remain engaged in professional 
sport. The financial gains of  product promotion would likely outweigh the 
costs of  testing their athletes and being held accountable for their athletes’ 
actions. In addition, sponsorship companies are already negatively affected by 
doping, (Straubel 2002) and therefore we think that they may be inclined to 
take up this idea if  the proper international policy regime – including enforce-
ment, testing, penalties, and positive incentives – were in place. 
To conclude, the fields of  sustainability and professional sport likely have 
much to gain from insightful comparisons, as both need to develop ethics and 
policy tools to alter the discounting of  future good health (of  the athlete, of  
the planet) in exchange for shorter-term returns (fame, sponsorship money, 
victory, economic gains). Currently, both athletes and the environment are 
being damaged as a result of  a systematic, institutionalised payoff  matrix that 
privileges shorter term gains over longer-term sustainability. The argument 
to shift the burden of  proof  that we propose here is a way to promote the 
long-term sustainability of  professional sport by removing a key incentive 
for doping, and it draws on lessons learned from over twenty years of  similar 
discussions in the environmental sustainability field. We can only hope that 
professional sport as an industry might succeed where environmental sustain-
ability has up to now largely failed, and do so at a much quicker pace.
4.3 The case for research on enhancements
In this section I tackle the broader question of  an ethical justification for re-
search on enhancement or enhancement research (hence, ER). This question 
is surprisingly neglected in the bioethics literature on enhancement, as the 
leading critics of  biomedical enhancement [Kass, Habermas, Annas, Fuku-
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yama] have not addressed it directly. However, their statements against en-
hancement strongly suggest that research and development of  enhancements 
would also be considered unethical from their point of  view, on the basis 
of  the argument that ER would promote an unethical practice, and should 
therefore be banned. However, I do not think that just because particular tech-
nologies aimed at enhancing human capacities are deemed to be not ethically 
permissible in a certain context, research on enhancement per se is also not 
ethically permissible. In this section I would like to start from this a reflection 
on the justifiability of  ER in society.
To the best of  my knowledge, the only authors that have raised the point 
about the necessity to establish a framework for, and to regulate, ER are Lev 
and co-authors (2010). They write:
As with other biomedical interventions, research to assess the safety and ef-
ficacy of  these enhancements in humans should be conducted before their 
introduction into clinical practice. (Lev, Miller, and Emanuel 2010, 101)
This is what should happen, but not what happens in practice. There is no 
system in place to regulate ER, and very little – if  any – discussion about it. If  
this is the situation, it is also obvious that there are no safety precautions for 
the individuals who want to take on pharmacological enhancements, as there 
are no regulated trials that spell out the possible risks and harms, and benefits. 
Should this not be case? Or at least, should there not be a case for it? What 
could be the ethical justification for ER?
Lev and co-authors seem to justify research on enhancements on the basis 
of  a health-related value:
Categorically condemning research on biomedical enhancements as unethi-
cal is unwarranted, since at least some research on biomedical enhancements 
is likely to produce significant health benefits. Indeed, under certain circum-
stances enhancement research would be urgent, as it would address major 
public health concerns. Therefore, a blanket prohibition on enhancement 
research is unjustified. (Lev, Miller, and Emanuel 2010, 102)
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While I agree with them that “a blanket prohibition on enhancement research 
is unjustified,” it is not immediately clear that ER ought to be justified by 
having health-related social value, even though there might be some cases of  
“dual use” biomedical interventions, or interventions that can be used both as 
treatments and as enhancements. (Miller and Selgelid 2007) In such cases any 
health-related social value can be seen as an added value rather than a prereq-
uisite. In all other cases, while the health of  the research participant should 
of  course still remain a primary concern, research on performance enhancing 
substances should have as its first epistemic goal the validity and reliability of  
performance enhancement claims. Of  course this epistemic goal should be 
circumscribed by an ethical one, and thus the evaluation of  risks and benefits 
needs to be modified when shifting from the clinical to the enhancement con-
text3. Precisely what counts as benefit and risk in enhancement research need 
not be identical to what counts as benefit and risk in clinical research.
What policies would need to be put in place to regulate ER? To the best 
of  my knowledge, the only existing analysis of  the type of  regulations that 
would need to be implemented has been carried out by US law and bioethics 
scholar Hank Greely (2011). Greely reviews the policy tools available in the 
US, and shows how not necessarily new regulatory frameworks or systems 
would have to be invented, since existing regulations could accommodate bio-
medical enhancements. (Greely 2011) This would happen because:
FDA regulation already covers enhancements. If  a firm were to seek approv-
al to sell a new drug for enhancement purposes, no new safety regulation 
would be needed in the United States. The company would have to conduct 
serious clinical trials and to demonstrate to the satisfaction of  the FDA that 
the drug was safe and effective for the intended use. (Greely 2011, 510)
Greely proceeds then to identify two main issues that would need careful con-
sideration to assure the safety of  enhancements, namely the regulation of  
off-label use of  pharmaceuticals for enhancement purposes, and possibly the 
increased regulation of  dietary supplements. As it is plausible to speculate, 
3 For this argument I am indebted to Mike J McNamee (see Camporesi and Mc-
Namee 2014).
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many and probably the vast majority of  biomedical enhancements would be 
approved to treat disease and used off-label as enhancements. The off-label 
practice of  use for pharmaceuticals is already a widespread practice in the US, 
so from this point of  view the introduction of  enhancements would not be 
substantially new. 
What is off-label use? In the US, after a drug’s approval, the FDA works 
with the manufacturer to create a drug label that contains information about 
the drug, how it should be administered, and the indications for which it has 
been approved. Since the FDA itself  does not regulate the practice of  med-
icine, off-label use of  FDA-approved drugs is a legal and common medical 
practice: after approval, a licensed doctor can use a drug for any indication 
he/she consider appropriate. (National Task Force on CME 2013) I find the 
widespread use of  off-label drugs in the US very problematic from a scientific 
and ethical point of  view, since patients can be prescribed drugs by doctors 
without any evidential basis that the drug works in a context different from the 
one for which it was tested in clinical trials. Greely seems to concur with me 
on this point when he writes that:
Drugs can be approved as safe and effective for one use against one dis-
ease, based on clinical trial evidence, but then prescribed off-label for uses in 
people without that disease, or perhaps any disease, without any proof  that 
the drug is either safe or effective for the prescribed use. (Greely 2011, 511)
Contrary to very strong libertarian thinking, I do not think that the current 
off-label system promotes autonomy by empowering the individual with free-
dom of  choice (note that this is indeed the rhetoric underlying so many pro-
ponents of  DTC advertising), but that the patient needs and deserves some 
protection from the market’s free reign. While the “empowering freedom” 
argument could work in an ideal society, in practice the intricate financial ties 
between pharmaceutical companies, lobbies and politics in the US create mar-
kets where there is no legitimate demand, and lead to ethically problematic 
situations such as the case of  prescriptions for Ritalin or Adderall for adults 
under the rubric of  adult ADHD. (Wilens et al. 2008) For all these reasons, I 
do not think that the entry of  enhancements in society through the “off-label” 
system would be desirable. It would be equivalent to entering society “through 
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the back door” – to borrow an expression from Buchanan (2011) – as they are 
now. Once again that would happen without the appropriate regulation and 
demonstration of  effectiveness and risks/harm data, and without any trans-
parency, or accountability. 
Another issue that needs to be taken into account when reflecting on the 
regulation of  access of  enhancements in society is the necessity to tighten 
up regulations regarding dietary supplements. In the US, regulation of  such 
supplements is minimal according to the Dietary Supplement Health and Ed-
ucation Act (DSHEA 1994), which defines the FDA’s power to regulate them. 
The manufacturer neither has to prove that the supplements are safe, nor that 
they are effective, in order to get approval to enter the market. On the con-
trary, the burden of  proof  rests on the FDA to prove to a court that a supple-
ment is unsafe in order to remove it from the market. (Greely 2011) The only 
requirement for the manufacturer is that “that product label information is 
truthful and not misleading,” and even that minimum requirement is often 
not respected. As a way of  illustration of  this trend, consider “think Gum,” 
a chewing gum marketed in the US as a dietary supplement as the “brain 
boosting chewing gum.”4 According to the product website,5 the chewing gum 
improves memory by 25 %, as demonstrated by a “peer reviewed study” (of  
course, there are no data on the peer-reviewed study whatsoever). It is inter-
esting to note how the motto for the gum is “stop cheating, start chewing,” 
therefore going contra one of  the commonly raised arguments against using 
enhancements, namely that they are a way of  cheating! The system in place 
for regulation of  dietary supplements in the US seems therefore to be a very 
fruitful terrain for attempts to fraud scientifically or medically naïve individu-
als, in another instance of  the ‘sciencexploitation’ phenomenon described by 
Caulfield (2011) and applied in section 3.2 to direct-to-consumer genetic tests 
to scout out children’s talents. (Caulfield 2011; Camporesi 2013)
Therefore, it is plausible to speculate that biomedical enhancements 
which are manufactured as pills could also reach the market, at least in the US, 
as dietary supplements, therefore evading completely the purview of  FDA. 
Even if  they were marketed as pharmaceuticals to treat diseases, though, we 
4  For this example I am also indebted to Greely (2011)
5  [http://thinkgum.com /] [accessed, July 18, 2014]
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have seen how they could still be used off-label without having to demon-
strate either the safety or the efficacy for that particular use. The possibility 
that pharmacological enhancement could enter the market in this way seems 
to me particularly worrisome. Instead, I think that a much better – and more 
accountable – way for enhancements to gain entry to society would be to 
put in place a regulatory system for clinical research, and for prescription of  
performance-enhancing substances outside the current disease (including off-
label prescriptions) model. 
In the next section I attempt to lay the ground for the discussion of  how 
to shift the debate on enhancement technologies from the ethical level to a 
policy level. See (Camporesi and McNamee 2014) for a detailed discussion of  
the need to regulate the introduction of  performance enhancing technologies 
in professional sports, which at the moment amounts to “unregulated clinical 
research” as defined by King and Robeson (2007).
4.4 A deliberative democracy approach to deal with moral 
disagreement in the bioethical debate 
Is the enhancement debate satisfactorily answered with a discussion carried 
out at the ethical level? I start answering this question by analysing the original 
perspective put forward by Häyry in his book, Rationality and the genetic challenge.6 
(Häyry 2010) Häyry analyses three ways to deal with what he considers the 
challenges posed by genetics to society, which he refers to heuristically as 
neoconsequentialism, neo-virtue ethics, and neo-deontology. (Häyry 2010) A 
genetic challenge is defined as a “set of  questions raised by the engineering 
of  political and medical solutions to the original threats posed by nonhuman 
and human nature” to which “we cannot readily agree on what our reactions 
should be and on what grounds.” (Häyry 2010, 2) As the subtitle of  the 
book suggests, genetic challenges are understood as possible ways to “make 
people better.” Häyry provides an extensive overview of  the state of  the field 
by analyzing seven case studies, namely, preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
6 This section is a slightly revised form of  the first half  of  a paper originally 
published on Cambridge Quarterly of  Healthcare Ethics (2011): 20(2), 248-257, and 
co-authored with Paolo Maugeri.
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(PGD), the possibility to design children, savior siblings, reproductive cloning, 
embryonic stem cell research, gene therapies, and considerable life extension 
techniques. As depicted by Häyry – even though such labeling may not be 
correct, as John Coggon and John Harris have suggested (Coggon 2011; Harris 
2011) – the first framework (“neo-consequentialism” or “rational tangibility”) 
focuses on persons and how they value life and is represented in the works 
of  John Harris and Jonathan Glover; the second (“neo-virtue ethics” or 
“moral transcendence”) puts the emphasis on traditions and is exemplified 
by Michael Sandel and Leon Kass; and the third (“neo-deontology”) focuses 
on principles, with Jürgen Habermas and Ronald Green given as examples. 
Each of  these frameworks reaches very different conclusions in terms of  the 
ethical acceptability of  the genetic challenges presented above. Although the 
central part of  Häyry’s book is devoted to the description of  the state of  the 
art concerning the seven wonders (or sins) of  genetics, the most innovative 
chapter is the second, where Häyry spells out his methodological approach 
and the aim of  the book. Häyry’s original contribution to the discussion is 
the claim that it is not possible to argue with philosophical tools which of  
the three frameworks is best for assessing the ethical justifiability of  a new 
biotechnological practice, as the three approaches differ in the fundamental 
values and principles they employ. Häyry tests the internal coherence of  each 
position, and concludes that it is not possible to assess the superiority of  any 
position over another on philosophical grounds. In his words:
If  different approaches (or rationalities or methods of  genethics) cannot be 
universally graded and put into order, as I am saying, then conflicting nor-
mative views cannot be put into one rational order, either, and we have no 
philosophical way of  telling once and for all whether we should or should 
not engage in procreative selection, reproductive or therapeutic cloning, ge-
netic engineering, or considerable life extension. (Häyry 2010, 238)
According to this perspective, all ethical principles and judgments have re-
spectable support if  they meet the criteria of  internal consistency and if  in 
each case the combination of  principles and judgments is a stable balance 
from the author’s point of  view (a so-called reflective equipoise). (Häyry 2010, 
50) But, if  Häyry’s arguments are correct and ethical theories cannot be pre-
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ferred on rational grounds, what are we readers left to do with his polite by-
stander view? As Häyry himself  puts it: “Do we have any role in genethics, if  
all this [the content of  the book] is to be believed?” (Häyry 2010, 238) In the 
last pages of  the book, he lays out the work for the philosophically informed 
readers, when he writes that there are at least 72 stances that could be critically 
examined by the philosopher, resulting from the multiplication of  three viable 
methods of  ethics, three normative strands, and eight topics. (Häyry 2010, 
239) We do not think that focusing our attention on such a nonconfronta-
tional experience would necessarily be an improvement over the actual state 
of  the field and over the recognition of  the existence of  moral disagreement 
concerning questions raised by the genetic challenges. What should we do 
with Häyry’s nonconfrontationalism then? Should we take it as a claim about 
diverse methods in ethics, or rather as an insightful plea to confront views at 
another, more appropriate level? We think that confrontational ethics is still 
important in many respects and that, if  properly framed, can inform debates 
and, hopefully, help at reaching the right conclusions. 
Moral disagreement in society will persist, no matter what philosophers 
may say. This, however, is not an indication of  the fact that all views in the 
field of  philosophical ethics are equivalent or incommensurable. Rather, it 
highlights how, in practice, we face a political problem. The pressing questions 
posed by genethics do not allow us simply to acknowledge that moral posi-
tions differ and then nonconfrontationally to concern ourselves with ironing 
out internal inconsistencies. Instead, they demand a shift in focus from clas-
sical philosophical ethics to the realm of  political philosophy. Writes Häyry:
Philosophical considerations can show that some arguments are flawed and 
others open to discussion, but they cannot prove to everybody’s satisfaction 
the rightness or wrongness of  selection, cloning, or new treatments. (Häyry 
2010, 238)
In this passage Häyry is conflating two issues that should be kept distinct 
for analytical purposes. One issue is whether philosophical considerations, or 
arguments, can prove the rightness of  anything at all. Quite another is whether 
they can prove it to everybody’s satisfaction. The first is a question about moral 
relativism, the second one of  political pluralism, that is, the claim that there 
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exist different, and sometimes hard to reconcile, values in society. Let us tackle 
the first problem first. If  Häyry’s main claim were about moral relativism, 
then there would be several ways to spell it out that he does not attempt in his 
book. For instance, why is it impossible to say that something, say one of  the 
genetic challenges, is ethically justifiable or not? Is it because there is no such 
thing as objective moral truth? Or, more simply, is it that, even if  objective 
morality existed, it would be unreachable by ethical thinking? Whereas the 
former would be an ontological claim, the latter would be an epistemological 
one. Häyry’s position seems to be orthogonal to all these options. What he 
really seems to say is that there are different ways of  doing ethics, none of  
them being illegitimate, at least as long as they are internally consistent and 
in some accordance with how things are in the world. As Coggon puts it, “a 
claim in support of  simultaneous, non exclusive, yet competing rationality is a 
claim about the rightness of  pluralism in ethics.” (Coggon 2011, 50) Accepting 
Häyry’s position may mean that each of  the three methods he outlines has 
contradictory claims that cannot be undermined by other approaches, thus 
giving rise to irresolvable disagreement. For example, does the fact that 
Sandel/Kass-like conclusions are drawn by appeals to traditional values render 
them invulnerable to critiques by the rational tangibility approach of  Harris 
and Glover and vice versa? 
As for the second issue we mentioned, namely, political pluralism, the ab-
sence of  agreement on a particular issue poses the question of  how to reach 
a reasonable consensus, even if  provisional or revisable, in the polis. People 
may maintain their private rationalities (or rational moralities) on the basis 
of  philosophical arguments, but reasonable people may think that it is still 
worthwhile to reach a consensus in order to make decisions at the policy level. 
The question at stake, therefore, is not so much one of  politeness (referring 
to the polite bystander view proposed by Häyry) but is one of  indicating at 
what level each kind of  rationality can effectively prove insightful and, as a 
consequence, at what level confrontations should take place. 
The genetic challenges as described by Häyry are public questions requir-
ing, ideally, public answers. It is in this regard that we do not see Häyry’s “po-
lite bystander” approach as exhaustive. Practical questions such as who should 
decide on ethical issues related to genetic technologies cannot be answered 
solely by reference to internally consistent rationalities. On the contrary, we 
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think that, by following the route indicated by Häyry, we run the risk of  end-
ing up with a cornucopia of  ethical perspectives, each internally consistent 
but providing mere philosophical amusement. If  genetic challenges are to be 
taken seriously, as concrete instances of  moral disagreement in the real world, 
then certain real-world questions concerning whose interests are challenged 
and how these can reasonably be reconciled cannot be escaped or masked 
behind the polite facade of  a nonconfrontational notion of  rationality. At least 
three levels ought to be distinguished here:
1) the nonconfrontational philosophical level described by Häyry, which is 
useful for assessing the internal consistency of  each ethical position;
2) the confrontational philosophical level, which takes into account other 
ethical perspectives (after they have been assessed for consistency with the 
first approach);
3) the decision-making political level, in which moral disagreement is dealt 
with in practice.
As an alternative to the polite bystander approach, we suggest that the prob-
lem of  “everybody’s satisfaction” could be better addressed by engaging the 
different ethical perspectives in a process of  public reason giving in the spirit 
of  deliberative democracy (DD), as defined by Gutmann and Thompson 
(Gutmann and Thompson 2004) and applied to genethics issues by Farrelly. 
(Farrelly 2009) On this view, “first-order” theories are ethical perspectives that 
seek to resolve moral disagreement by demonstrating that alternative theories 
and principles should be rejected. First-order theories “measure their success 
by whether they resolve the conflict consistently on their own term. Their aim 
is to be the single theory that resolves moral disagreement.” (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, 126) In Häyry’s book, first-order theories can be assimilated 
to the three ways he describes to deal with the genetic challenges. Whereas 
Häyry’s polite bystander view claims that the validity of  first-order theories 
should be assessed only internally and not confronting one theory with an-
other, a fruitful way forward in the discussion of  the genetic challenge is a sec-
ond-order theory approach, which deals with the moral disagreement residual 
of  first-order theories. DD seeks a resolution to the moral disagreement by 
adopting a dynamic conception of  political justification, which is both morally 
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and politically provisional. (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 132) Within this 
DD perspective, the resolution of  first-order moral disagreement needs to re-
spect the DD principles of  reciprocity, publicity, and accountability and seeks 
a mutually binding (though provisional, therefore, at a specific time) decision, 
on the basis of  mutually justifiable reasons. Such a DD approach is not mor-
ally neutral, nor does it claim to be. Indeed, the quality of  moral neutrality is 
both undesirable and unattainable according to Gutmann and Thompson. If  
we accept this direction, we could read Häyry’s polite bystander view as a claim 
about first order theories, to which we could add as a further step our steering 
toward the realm of  political philosophy. How can a second-order DD ap-
proach build on the confrontational analysis of  first-order theories applied to 
genetic enhancements in sports that we discussed above? The details of  this 
process in the context of  decision-making in sports would, of  course, need to 
be spelled out in practice, but in this regard we can say that the current process 
of  decision-making in sports is unsatisfactory at best.
Consider, for example, the ruling made by the International Association 
of  Athletics Federations (IAAF) concerning the admissibility of  the runner 
Caster Semenya to compete with women after charging her of  not belonging 
properly to the category, which was neither transparent nor respectful of  her 
privacy. (Camporesi and Maugeri 2010; Karkazis et al. 2012) Furthermore, the 
reasons for Semenya’s banning and subsequent readmission were never made 
public, though not respecting the criteria of  publicity that is fundamental in 
the DD approach. In the context of  decisions surrounding the ethical justifi-
ability of  a gene enhancement (or other kind of  enhancement) practice in 
sports, we envisage a DD process that gives reasons to all the moral constitu-
ents involved in the field, where moral constituents is understood as all “those 
who are in effect bound by the decision, even though they may not have [but 
maybe they should have, as we argue] a voice in making them,” (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, 135) therefore including at least, but not only, the athletes.
To recapitulate, Häyry identifies three competing approaches used by 
scholars in the debate on the ethics of  genetic technologies (what he refers to 
as “genethics”): consequentialism; teleology or virtue-ethics and deontology. 
(Häyry 2010) Häyry argues that these three approaches are “incommensurable” 
because they respectively define (a) utility; (b) human flourishing or well-being, 
and (c) persons as the entities that matter in the ethical debate. Häyry also 
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argues that in practice the ethical judgments about the ethical permissibility of  
a technology depend ultimately on the choice of  world-views, attitudes and 
ideas about what counts in the moral discussion. Therefore, if  we do not agree 
on the “unit of  measurement” itself  of  discussion, then it will be impossible 
to actually compare the outcomes of  discussions grounded in different 
approaches. For Häyry, the three approaches can all be simultaneously valid, 
and the only necessary condition for their validity is that they are internally 
coherent/consistent. The only role for the philosopher in this field is to adopt 
a “polite bystander” role and assess the internal consistency/coherency of  
each account. Rather than adopting a “polite bystander” view, I think that a 
more productive way forward in the discussion of  gen-ethics could be based 
on a “moderate pluralistic approach to public health policy and ethics” as the 
one delineated by Selgelid (2009, 2012) coupled with a DD approach as the 
one spelled out by Gutmann and Thompson (2004), and aimed at reaching 
publicly shared decisions about the acceptability of  a particular technology. 
Indeed, often individuals’ motivations for seeking enhancements are that 
they see them as positional goods, able to give them a competitive advan-
tage. Therefore, the differential access to enhancement technologies is likely 
to exacerbate the existing inequalities in society. Along similar lines to what is 
done by Häyry, Selgelid spells out the three main approaches used in the en-
hancement debate to try to – unsuccessfully – resolve controversies regarding 
the particular application of  an enhancement technology. He refers to the 
three approaches as utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and libertarianism. (Selgelid 
2012; Selgelid 2013) As each perspective tends to place absolute or overriding 
weight on the values they emphasize (respectively utility, equality, and liberty), 
consequently the current approach to the enhancement debate is not able to 
make any substantial progress. To obviate the current misbalance in debate 
between the value of  liberty and other important values (such as equality and 
utility), Selgelid argues in favour of  a contextual approach that spells out, and 
tries to balance between, the values by shifting the focus of  the debate on 
enhancement towards the analysis of  how to reach a “fair” trade-off  between 
the different values. What would Selgelid’s moderate pluralistic approach en-
tail in practice? First, it would start with the aim to promote the three values of  
liberty, equality and utility as independently legitimate social goals, without any 
of  them being by default overriding the other. Secondly, it would aim to strike 
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a balance and make trade-offs between the values in cases where they conflict, 
with the assumption that no value has priority over the others. (Selgelid 2009) 
Selgelid also argues that the only possible way to make tangible progress in the 
enhancement debate is to address the controversial issues through a rigorous 
empirical analysis and a case by case contextual approach, which is what I tried 
to do in this work. Therefore, for Selgelid, the way to resolve disputes about 
enhancement is not the polite-bystander view to which the philosopher is rel-
egated as suggested by Häyry, but a fourth approach, which he refers to as a 
“moderate pluralistic approach to public health policy and ethics.” 
One potential problem with Selgelid’s moderate pluralistic approach is 
the apparent incommensurability of  the values of  liberty, equality and utility. 
Hence, questions such as “How much utility overweighs how much liberty (or 
vice versa) in a particular case?” seem impossible to answer. Selgelid is aware 
of  this issue, which may be irresolvable from a general, abstract philosophical 
viewpoint of  comparing first order theories. Not so, however, when the level 
of  analysis is shifted to the policy-making level, and when decisions need to 
be taken regarding the ethical acceptability of  a particular technology, and the 
ethically justifiability limits – for example – on personal liberty in favour of  
equality or on equality in favour of  utility and so on and so forth. This is where 
the DD approach comes into place. 
On this DD view, “first-order” ethical frameworks (i.e. deontology, 
utilitarianism, virtue ethics; or libertarianism, egalitarianism and utilitariasnism) 
try to resolve moral disagreement regarding a particular technology by 
demonstrating why that particular ethical theory is superior to another. This 
approach anyway is deemed to fail since, as pointed out by Häyry, different 
ethical frameworks are incommensurable as they use different “unit-values” 
(person, utility, wellbeing or human-flourishing, etc.), and the choice of  which 
ethical framework to adopt in the first place is guided by the preference 
of  the individual for one “unit-value” over another. Notwithstanding the 
impossibility to reach a moral agreement with first order theories, individuals 
who adopt different approaches may still agree that questions raised by the 
intersection of  genetics and society demand public answer, and therefore that 
confrontation needs to take place at the societal and public level. The DD 
approach deals with the moral disagreement residual of  first-order theories and 
seeks a resolution by adopting a dynamic conception of  political justification. 
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This second order approach aims at reaching a mutually binding (to all parties 
involved) consensus achieved through principles of  reciprocity, publicity, 
and accountability on mutually justifiable reasons. (Gutmann and Thompson 
2004) The consensus reached would be provisional, and subject to revision, 
depending on the consequences of  the policy applications. For example, in the 
case of  research on enhancements, it could be revised depending on the extent 
of  the black market of  pharmaceutical for enhancement purposes (which is 
at the moment a widespread problem for the case of  Ritalin and Adderall).
“Partially examined” conclusions
As I hope to have shown in many instances throughout this work, the debate 
on the application of  new genetic technologies often intersects, and overlaps, 
with the debate on the ethical justifiability of  enhancement technologies. In-
deed, many genetic technologies are explicitly enhancement-oriented, for ex-
ample pre-implantation genetic diagnosis aimed at choosing desired traits (see 
for example the recent patent awarded to 23&Me company for “Family in-
heritance predictor”1 (Grant 2013)), or genetic technologies aimed at enhanc-
ing athletic performance, or again genetic technologies aimed at providing 
children with a competitive advantage, by scouting out their supposed genetic 
predisposition for certain talents. In each of  the case studies included in this 
work I first provided a scientific, accurate analysis of  the technology under 
discussion, and then analysed the context of  its practice, and its relevance for 
the discussion of  the ethical permissibility of  the technology. 
I would like to conclude this work by opening up a new question: what, 
then, is the role of  the philosopher in the enhancement debate at its intersection 
with policy making? As I have shown, I do not think it could be one of  “polite 
bystander” as proposed by Häyry (2010), nor of  the philosopher making 
radical philosophical arguments, completely useless for the purposes of  policy 
making. As pointed out by Jonathan Wolff, appeals to inconsistencies or logical 
fallacies, while they may work well in the seminar room, do not work so well 
in public policy: you do not “win” if  you show that your opponent’s position 
is inconsistent – unless it is blatantly so – with another policy, as laws and 
regulations are compromises between different people with different interests, 
and are the product of  different times and contexts. (Wolff  2011)
Instead, the role of  philosopher in genethics should be at least on two 
levels, following the direction pointed out by Wolff  (2011). The first level 
1 http://blog.23andme.com/news/a-23andme-patent/ [accessed July 18, 2014]
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would be to help spell out the relevant and implicit values that generate moral 
disagreement in a particular case of  impact of  science and medicine on 
society. At a second and broader level, the philosopher should help “set out 
arguments and visions of  other ways of  doing things that might hope to shape 
the values that people hold.” (Wolff  2011, 195) For example, I think that in 
relation to enhancement technologies, there is a pressing need to stress the 
value of  social equality when discussing the permissibility of  an enhancement 
technology, together with the value of  responsibility towards our children, and 
of  what kind of  planet we want to leave to future generations. A reshaping 
(and possibly a resizing) of  the goals of  the debate will be necessary when 
attempting to reach a decision at the public policy level, as often the only 
realistically achievable goal will be a kind of  inter-subjective and provisional 
agreement between all parties involved. This should not be seen as a defeat 
for the philosopher, but as the only possible way to make progress in the 
enhancement debate for those who are interested in discussing real world 
scenarios, grounded in their social, political and regulatory contexts. 
By distancing myself  from the polite bystander view, or the radical phi-
losophy view, and from the discussion of  science fictional scenarios, I hope 
to continue to play an active part in the debate on enhancement technologies, 
and contribute to advancing the bioethical discussion in a productive way.
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